



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

REPRODUCED BY  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

**DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A**

**Approved for public release;  
Distribution Unlimited**

19980511 116

# Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-90-074

## CONTENTS

17 December 1990

### NEAR EAST

#### REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Palestinian Support for Saddam Reviewed [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST 26 Oct]	1
OPEC's Changing Role, Strategy Considered [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 13 Oct]	2
Financial Impact of Yemeni Exodus from Saudi Arabia [London AL-MAJALLAH 3 Oct]	4

#### PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Columnist Expresses His 'Hatred' for America [London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI 8 Oct]	6
---	---

#### EGYPT

Western Diplomatic Efforts in Gulf Crisis Analyzed [London AL-HAWADITH 12 Oct]	6
Interior Ministry To Receive Funding Increase [AL-AHRAR 5 Nov]	8
Businessmen, Scholars View Work of Next Assembly [AL-MASA' 15 Oct]	8
Bad Food Distributors To Be Arrested Like Drug Dealers [AL-AHRAR 29 Oct]	10

#### IRAQ

U.S. Accused of Using International Law for Private Gain [AL-JUMHURIYAH 20 Sep]	10
Opposition Leader Discusses Repression [Riyadh AL-RIYAD 12 Oct]	11
Opposition Leaders on Crisis, Post-Saddam Era	12
Mahmud 'Uthman on Treatment of Kurds [London AL-MAJALLAH 17 Oct]	12
Fakhri Karim on Occupation of Kuwait [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 22 Oct]	13
Sa'd Salih Jabr on Future After Saddam [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 20 Oct]	16
Former Prisoner Describes Torture, Coercion [London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 3, 10, 18 Oct]	17

#### KUWAIT

Iraqis Commandeering Vehicles [London AL-MAJALLAH 17 Oct]	28
---	----

#### LEBNANON

Lebanese Forces Leader Ja'ja' Interviewed [AL-SHIRA' 5 Nov]	30
---	----

#### TUNISIA

Correspondent Reports on Split in An Nahda Movement [London AL-MAJALLAH 17 Oct]	41
---	----

#### UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Crisis Impact on Armed Forces Recruitment, Training [London AL-MAJALLAH 17 Oct]	42
---	----

#### REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Goods Imported with Exodus from Saudi Arabia [Jeddah ARAB NEWS 28 Oct]	43
--	----

### SOUTH ASIA

#### BANGLADESH

Ershad in Brussels Asks For EC Aid, Trade [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 19 Oct]	45
Ershad Urges Maintenance of Communal Harmony [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 1 Nov]	45

Government Responds to Demands For Elections .....	46
Vice President's Remarks [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 10 Oct] .....	46
Ershad: Polls 'Next Year' [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 1 Nov] .....	47
Reportage on Relations Between Opposition Leaders .....	47
Khaleda Zia for Unity [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 14 Oct] .....	47
Hasina's Negative Response [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 15 Oct] .....	47
Government Issues Pressnotes on Civil Disturbances .....	48
Incidents in Dhaka, Chittagong [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 1 Nov] .....	48
10 October Incidents [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 11,12 Oct] .....	48
13 October Incidents [THE NEW NATION 14 Oct] .....	50
Law Breakers Warned [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 17 Oct] .....	50
Note on Blockade [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 28 Oct] .....	51
Shanti Bahini Split, Refugee Troubles Reported [THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER 18 Oct] .....	51

## INDIA

Gujral Tells India's Stand on Gulf Crisis [THE HINDU 22 Oct] .....	52
Ministry Statement on Oil Price, Tax Increases [THE HINDU 15 Oct] .....	53
Akali Dal Leader Leaves Lok Sabha, Meets Press .....	55
Details of Resignation [THE HINDU 13 Oct] .....	55
More on Press Conference [THE TIMES OF INDIA 13 Oct] .....	56
Bangarappa Sworn In as Karnataka Chief Minister [THE STATESMAN 18 Oct] .....	56
Defense Official on 'Reactive Armor' Technology [THE TIMES OF INDIA 13 Oct] .....	57
Writer Tells Current Condition of Indian Air Force [THE TIMES OF INDIA 15 Oct] .....	57
Paper Interviews Chosen Chief of Naval Staff [THE HINDU 17 Oct] .....	58
Survey Identifies 1,051 Backward Classes [THE STATESMAN 1 Oct] .....	59

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Palestinian Support for Saddam Reviewed

91AE0122A Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST  
in English 26 Oct 90 p 6

[Article by Laurie Mylroie; first paragraph is introduction; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Professor Laurie Mylroie, an expert on Iraqi affairs, perceives a 'dovetailing' of 'Arafat's posture with Saddam Husayn's policy, with the PLO plotting with him to squeeze Kuwait.

It is widely believed among a variety of Arab parties that Yasir 'Arafat coordinated with Saddam Husayn in the invasion of Kuwait. The evidence is still circumstantial and unclear. But, given the gravity of the charge and its far-reaching implications, it deserves serious attention and further inquiry.

In retrospect, it is obvious that since the beginning of the year, when Saddam Husayn first called for the U.S. to leave the Persian Gulf, he sought to raise tensions with Israel and the West in order to intimidate the Gulf states, while polishing his nationalist credentials to provide the most transparent of rationales for eventually invading Kuwait. When Saddam threatened to burn half of Israel, the little sheikhdom, not Jerusalem, was the object of his bellicosity.

In the same period that Saddam was preparing his invasion, 'Arafat was contributing his share to the area's problems. Along with King Husayn, 'Arafat raised the incessant cry that Soviet immigration was leading to war. Privately, Jordanian authorities admitted that they sought to pressure the Gulf states into giving more aid to Amman.

What about 'Arafat? Of course, he too sought money from the Gulf. He also sought to mobilize Arab support for the PLO. But was there a point at which 'Arafat's motives blended with Saddam's and he became a collaborator in invading Kuwait?

'Arafat had already shifted from the Egyptian camp toward the Iraqis, even before the 30 May raid of Palestine Liberation Front chief Abu-al-'Abbas on a Tel Aviv beach seemingly forced 'Arafat's hand and eventually ended the U.S.-PLO dialogue. When 'Arafat appeared at the 25 May UN Security Council session in Geneva, convened in response to the tragic slaying of seven Palestinians in Rish'on Letziyon, Washington promised 'Arafat that if he showed the same moderation as in his last appearance before that body, he would be rewarded.

But 'Arafat was not interested. Among other things, 'Arafat charged that a map on a new Israeli coin demonstrated that Jerusalem claimed vast territories in the Middle East. The coin was old, the "map" was in fact a

rock, and 'Arafat's claim was vintage nonsense. But 'Arafat's bombastic bluster dovetailed with Saddam's own efforts.

'Arafat provided key services to Saddam in the period before the invasion. Playing up supposed Israeli dangers to Arab countries, he repeatedly called for meetings of the Arab League. Those meetings became occasions for Iraq to press and intimidate Kuwait. At the 28 May Baghdad summit, for example, Saddam Husayn complained behind closed doors of overproduction of oil by Opec member-states.

He proclaimed that war by "economic means" was no different from the real thing, preparing what would become another flimsy rationale for invading Kuwait. At the summit, 'Arafat joined with Iraq against Egypt and the Gulf Arabs in calling for the use of the oil weapon to pressure Washington.

'Arafat's services to Saddam are most suspect in the context of Iraq coercing money from Kuwait. At the summit, Saddam demanded some \$12 billion from Kuwait. The Kuwaitis reportedly responded by trying to put the Iraqis off, telling Saddam that they did not have that kind of money on hand. They could not turn their assets into liquid funds so quickly. A month later, at the end of June, Iraq's American-educated Deputy Prime Minister Sa'dun Hammadi visited Kuwait.

Publicly, Hammadi was there to press adherence to Opec's oil production quotas. Privately, however, he pushed Iraqi demands for cash, bringing with him a detailed list of Kuwait's financial holdings to refute the Kuwaitis' claim that they could not pay Iraq. Kuwait's foreign assets are not public information. It is widely believed that Hammadi's list was prepared by Palestinian elements under the influence of the PLO in positions of trust in the highest echelons of Kuwait's banking and financial institutions.

They supplied the information to 'Arafat, who passed it on to Saddam. Moreover, it is reported that 'Arafat promised Saddam that, if he took over Kuwait, Palestinian employees in Kuwait's banks and investment authorities would work with him to secure control of Kuwaiti assets abroad.

Yet another Arab League meeting was convened at 'Arafat's behest in mid-July. 'Arafat joined with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz to criticize Egypt, while the Iraqi minister presented Iraq's demands on Kuwait, for the first time in public, marking the countdown to the invasion two weeks later.

Saddam took over all of Kuwait rather than just its northern areas over which there is a territorial dispute, because he wanted Kuwait's \$100-billion-plus holdings. Yet neither he nor 'Arafat understood well the working of international finance. The immediate, unprecedented worldwide freeze imposed on Kuwait's foreign assets prevented the transfer of Kuwaiti funds to Iraq.



Yet if the PLO didn't deliver Kuwait's assets, it has played an important role in helping consolidate Iraqi control in that country. In the first week after the invasion, the British press reported that the PLO had provided Iraqi forces with critical intelligence, including the names, addresses and telephone numbers of key personnel in the Kuwaiti population. Palestinians sympathetic to the PLO have constituted an informal intelligence network, helping Iraqi troops find and arrest foreigners and Kuwaitis, including police officers and military personnel.

The PLO has also supported Iraq in a variety of other ways since the invasion. At the 10 August Cairo summit, 'Arafat sought to deflect attention from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, raising, among other issues, Afghanistan and Kashmir, provoking the public ire of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak. The PLO, along with Libya, voted with Iraq at that summit. Abu-al-'Abbas has sent his forces into Kuwait to help police the sheikhdom, as have George Habash, head of the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine], and Nayif Hawatimah, head of the DPFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine] [as published]. Although Fatah forces have not entered Kuwait, Muhammad Milhim, a senior aide to 'Arafat, has publicly threatened terrorism "everywhere" in support of Iraq.

The "Peace" plan that 'Arafat peddled after the invasion in the name of Arab solutions to Arab problems has been highly advantageous to the PLO. One of the Iraqi army's first moves in Kuwait was to take the nationality records back to Baghdad. Baghdad planned a "transfer" operation from the start; and, last month, Belgium's foreign minister charged that the PLO was working with Iraq to resettle Palestinians in Kuwait. Were 'Arafat's peace plan—which makes no mention of the return of the al-Sabah regime—to succeed, the PLO would gain a territorial base, something it has lacked since its expulsion from Lebanon.

King Fahd of Saudi Arabia snubbed 'Arafat at the Cairo summit, and has refused to meet with him since or take his phone calls. Saudi Arabia has suspended its financial support for the Palestinians. Qatar expelled the PLO envoy there on three days' notice, and ordinary Palestinians have been expelled en masse from the Gulf states. In early September the United Arab Emirates halted media coverage of the intifadah.

The Egyptian press openly calls the PLO a fifth column and reported that 'Arafat asked Palestinians in Saudi Arabia, the UAE [United Arab Emirates], and Qatar to collect information.

Clearly, Saddam seeks to fuel the intifadah to bring Israel into the picture in order to divide the Arab coalition opposing him, without running the risks entailed in military confrontation with Jerusalem. The strong possibility that 'Arafat collaborated with Saddam in seizing Kuwait throws the present PLO-Iraqi cooperation into a new, far more reprehensible light.

### OPEC's Changing Role, Strategy Considered

91AE0033A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
13 Oct 90 p 13

[Article by Dr. Faruz Muhammad Akhdar: "How Do We Increase OPEC's Effectiveness?"]

[Text] I wrote an article, published in AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT on 6 October, entitled "OPEC," in which I stressed maintaining the OPEC organization, so that it would be the international support and defender of the rights and positions of oil-exporting countries. I called for an intensive Saudi presence in the organization, as well as for increasing OPEC's power and effectiveness, by means of three basic pillars:

1. Inviting the other oil-exporting countries to join OPEC;
2. Counteracting the paper market in oil by entering this market and managing it for the benefit of oil-exporting countries;
3. Changing OPEC's internal voting method, to make it similar to voting in the IMF, so that the weight of a member's vote depends on the member nation's reserves and production.

This article will concentrate on explaining these pillars in a simplified fashion, in order that a nonspecialist may follow and understand.

#### First: Increasing OPEC's Membership

The number of nations in the world that produce oil, or have oil reserves—on various levels and capacities—now amounts to 70, while only 13 countries belong to OPEC. We are not asking for membership in OPEC for all those countries, but rather, we will nominate certain of them that have oil reserves, qualifying them for membership in the organization, such as Britain, Norway, the Soviet Union, the PRC, Mexico, Canada, Egypt, Oman and even the United States. OPEC membership for nations like these would lead to:

- \* Increased international weight and standing for the organization;
- \* Making these oil-producing nations' policies subject to the general decisions of the organization;
- \* Participation by these countries in the responsibilities of the organization's decisions on the international level, and participation in defending its decisions, to the extent that these nations profited because of OPEC decisions while outside of the organization;
- \* Disposing of the idea that dominates certain international circles, which see OPEC as an Arab organization, whose policies constantly favor the Arabs on every occasion; and,

\* Profiting from the research that these countries could give the organization, and from the participation of specialists from these nations in support of OPEC.

Perhaps one should ask a serious question at this point. How can we convince these nations to join OPEC? It is possible that this or that country would use as a pretext that it does not support commercial alliances that impede the free course of international trade, and that its belief in total competition in trade markets would not enable it to participate in the organization. It might also say that it can benefit from OPEC decisions without joining it, or without bearing the moral responsibility or international censure that membership in the organization could impose upon it, etc. At this point, we must say that this matter requires considerable power of persuasion and consultation both publicly and behind the scenes, and on the level of the OPEC member nations, as well as the organization as an international unit. The organization and its member states should use all the measures that political scientists call "the carrot and stick" approach, since these nations should be reminded that unless some of these countries join, particularly those that gain large profits from OPEC decisions, the organization's effectiveness will be impacted. This could result in its dissolution, which would lead to a downturn in prices, and this would certainly have a negative affect on the economies of all oil-producing nations. Moreover, that might also lead to a lowering of production costs in those countries competing with them, and which depend heavily on oil. We say to them: the large industrial countries, which are not oil-producing nations, such as Germany, Japan, France and Italy, have relative superiority with regard to their production costs whenever oil prices drop significantly. There could be another need for these nations to join the organization. Joining could lead to the use of mutual, integrated trading methods among OPEC member nations with regard to various types of oil. Certain member states could export a specific type of oil to other member nations and, in return, import another type. In this way, these countries would collectively achieve a kind of commercial integration in the oil trade. This commercial integration among OPEC member nations could be on the basis of bilateral or collective agreements, which would be of benefit for all these countries, by increasing the additional value that is derived from different types of oil and places of availability.

#### **Second: Paper Market in Oil**

By this we mean a market that buys and sells oil futures and, on the basis of that, buys and sells oil using contractual documents for future delivery, without the actual transfer of oil from the stocks of the seller to the buyer in the market. This market was established recently in the New York Mercantile Exchange (Nymex), and on a smaller scale in the London commercial market, which deals in what is known as Brent oil. The size of this market is estimated at more than 100 million barrels per day, i.e., about twice the actual oil consumed each day.

OPEC could get into this market through a subsidiary commercial organization, so that it could become a commercial house in the New York oil market. A part of the OPEC nations' oil (according to each country's annual share of OPEC's production) could be allocated for this commercial house, along with earmarking a specific sum of money as capital for this new establishment. This would be done on the basis that determination of a futures buying and selling policy would be in light of OPEC's general policy, so that there would be balance and discipline in connection with setting OPEC's declared price and, at the same time, achieving material profit on the capital of this commercial house.

As to whether there is agreement among OPEC member nations for the idea or way to operate this commercial house in the speculative oil market, Saudi Arabia itself could establish this commercial house in New York, supported by Saudi oil and Saudi capital. This commercial house could be a Saudi commercial firm, in which Saudi oil would participate, or this Saudi company could even be established on a private property basis, without any governmental ownership. This firm would buy Saudi oil from the government, or would purchase on guarantee of delivery when requested. The point here is that two main goals would be gained by entering this market. The first goal is for the oil-exporting countries to dominate this speculative oil market, so that they would be able to prevent this market from having the clout to oppose the strategic aims of the oil-exporting countries. The second goal is to share with the commercial houses in New York—which is this speculative oil market—in the profits that these commercial houses gain. These houses have no actual oil, but they deal in its future prices. If there is revenue from trading in oil, no one deserves it more than the countries that own this oil.

#### **Third: New Voting Method in OPEC**

As we said, 13 countries belong to OPEC. Voting is on the basis of one vote per member. As a consequence, the weight of Saudi Arabia's vote, for example, which has proven oil reserves of 255 billion barrels, and whose production capacity is approximately 8.25 million barrels per day, is the same as the vote of a country such as Gabon, for example, with only 1.7 billion barrels of reserves and production capacity of 200,000 barrels per day. This huge disparity in capacities and resources is what has compelled us to call for correcting the situation and method of voting in the organization, in order to make voting representative of the resources of each country, and the members that control them. This would be similar to the voting method followed by the IMF. It is well known in theory and practice that under the free economy system in democratic political life, the system of one vote for each individual is followed, whereas voting in commercial businesses and companies is on the basis of one vote for each single monetary unit. If we apply this system to international organizations, we find that the United Nations follows the system of one vote for each member nation, regardless of the country's size and resources, while the IMF—because of its being a

fiscal organization—follows a system of voting weighted by the value of the member nation's share. Since OPEC is an economic, commercial organization, it certainly should follow the weighted system, so that OPEC member nations would have a vote commensurate with the value of their oil production capacities and reserves. (The table accompanying this article makes clear the proposed voting strength for each member nation, in accordance with the reserves and production capacity of each of the 13 OPEC members.) It remains for us to stress at this point that the process of certifying the reserves and production capacity numbers for each country, if this proposal is adopted, must be done by means of an impartial technical committee, tasked with surveying the production areas and oil reserves in each country, in order to confirm the validity and truthfulness of the declared numbers.

### **Financial Impact of Yemeni Exodus from Saudi Arabia**

91AE0079A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
3 Oct 90 pp 54-59

[Article by Salah Sindi in Jeddah: "The Yemenis Do Not Know on Which Foot to Dance"]

[Text] Injury to the Republic of Yemen as a result of the current Gulf crisis went beyond the loss of aid from Gulf countries and the cessation of remittances by Yemeni workers there. Also impaired were the investments of those workers in the region, and especially in Saudi Arabia where such investments were particularly undermined by Yemeni president 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's support for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and threats to Saudi Arabia by amassing its troops at the Saudi border. That caused the kingdom to reexamine the privileges enjoyed by the Yemeni community in Saudi Arabia since the reasons for granting those privileges were no longer valid. Indeed, groups of Yemeni workers have already begun leaving Saudi Arabia for their homeland.

Yemeni investors with long-standing commercial registration got mired in a quandary. One option was to liquidate all their investments, worth tens of millions of riyals, and return to Yemen where any kind of investment is difficult. The other option was to stay put and accept the newly-imposed Saudi sponsorship requirement, thereby inviting inevitable rancor from the Yemeni government. Those investors also fear government retribution against their relatives in Yemen.

One such investor said it would be difficult to return to Yemen and start from scratch in a country without investment opportunities or infrastructure. Furthermore, the Yemeni government would be unable to absorb all those repatriated workers estimated at more than 1.5 million from Saudi Arabia alone.

The investor added that it would be difficult for any investor in Saudi Arabia to liquidate all holdings within the three-month Saudi government deadline for that

group to settle their affairs and liquidate their businesses, since most investors are both debtors and creditors. In other words, they owe people money and others owe them money. Most of the [Yemenis] in this category conceded to the edict of the Saudi ministry of the interior, realizing that it was directed against the Yemeni government and not against them, and they would not even consider a return to Yemen to initiate new commercial ventures.

They believe that they would suffer great losses should they liquidate their investments because the disarray resulting from simultaneous mass liquidation would severely depress [the value of] investments and inventories. Some have already experienced this problem, incurring cash losses of some 700,000 riyals when liquidating a supermarket they owned.

The Yemeni government has also put a stranglehold on them as the Yemeni consulate in Jeddah announced a temporary measure to allow automobiles into Yemen duty-free for a period of six months. Citizens believe that if they return to Yemen, the government would pursue them once the six-month period is over. Furthermore, the Yemeni council of ministers has resolved that goods and property [entering] in commercial quantities would be subject to standard laws and customs duties. In other words, investors in Saudi Arabia cannot transfer their investments to Yemen—something they consider to be their basic right.

He adds that Saudi newspapers have begun to carry [help wanted] ads since the decree was issued, and commercial institutions are announcing all kinds of job opportunities. It is true that the Yemeni work force is noted for patience and longevity, but they are also frequently temporary and have no distinguishing technical skills. Furthermore, after six months or a year in Saudi Arabia, Yemeni workers tend to return to Yemen where they would spend their savings on Qat. They also demand higher wages than Asian workers known for their endurance and skill. Observers of political developments in the region expect Egyptian workers to replace the Yemeni work force in case the latter do no wish to stay and abide by the new sponsorship requirement.

The fish market is noted for small Yemeni investments in the sense that it is composed of small fishermen. The Saudi Fish Company and other commercial establishments will invest in this opportunity especially since the Saudi Fish Company exports a considerable portion of its output. As to workers at the fish market itself, a person who deals with that market says that Yemeni workers can be totally dispensed with and replaced with eastern Asians, and especially with Filipinos who are known to be enamored of that occupation.

Scrap market investors say they will accept the sponsorship requirement of the Saudi ministry of the interior and will not depart Saudi Arabia especially since most transactions by that sector are consummated on credit

and depend on exports to Europe and Japan. The collection process is therefore quite complicated, and those [investors] are not about to give up their very lucrative businesses and return to Yemen.

#### Internal Decision

A Yemeni investor says that the Saudi decree is a Saudi prerogative and is strictly an internal matter. It was stupid of the Yemeni president to interfere in Saudi internal affairs, especially since the decree does not victimize anyone. At issue is why the Saudi government made the decision to cancel all privileges for Yemeni citizens. President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih has been paid for his collaboration in the conspiracy and now wants us to pay for what he got. I believe that most investors here do not wish to go back. Many have welcomed the Saudi decree and have set about looking for sponsors.

An investor from south Yemen said the unification of Yemen was a catastrophe for us. President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih has been remunerated for his betrayal and he now wants us southerners to pay the price of that betrayal and then asks us to return to Yemen. He mocks us by saying he would provide suitable jobs. How can he absorb all those workers? We all know that the economic situation in Yemen is in shambles, [that Yemen] has forfeited all aid, and that the cessation of expatriate remittances is inflicting further injuries on it.

Another side to the issue is that many Yemeni investors in the Saudi market hold commercial registrations and have disguised operations under the names of Saudi citizens. There is no way that those citizens would accede to the cursory liquidation of those investments because all of them are both debtors and creditors. Those Yemenis will accede to the new requirement since they will be unable to liquidate their affairs within the deadline period. Furthermore, the Saudis hold bailments guaranteeing that [the Yemenis] can depart only after they have completely reconciled all their affairs.

In view of this dilemma of Yemenis in Saudi Arabia, many small Saudi investors have started looking for investment opportunities to substitute for those [Yemeni] investors but Saudi market watchers observe that sales of businesses remain limited to small owner-operated investments generally run without need for employees, such as cafes, small shops, and stores.

#### Only 10,000 Riyals Needed

In the prosperous al-Salamah commercial district of Jeddah, a store has a For-Sale sign and the price is only 10,000 riyals. The Yemeni owner says that it was worth more than 50,000 riyals before the privileges were revoked but that he will accept 10,000 riyals, if he can get it, because of his situation and since he must leave.

Most Yemeni investors in Saudi Arabia are concentrated in Jeddah's native markets of al-Bawadi, al-Suriyyin, and Bab-Sharif downtown as well as the fish market, the vegetable market, and the Petromin and scrap markets.

There are no accurate statistics on investments by the Yemeni community but their value is estimated by one such investor at upward of 3,000 million riyals. He bases his estimate on the volume of monthly expatriate remittances to Yemen, calculated at more than 2 billion riyals.

Money changers that used to transfer those billions to Yemen believe they may lose a great deal if those workers, not the investors, depart for their native land. Money changing shops could then see a considerable decline in transfers—the business in which they are engaged—especially by ordinary workers who represent the vast majority of citizens in Saudi Arabia.

A money changer says: I do not believe that we will be severely impacted by the departure of Yemeni workers since they will most certainly be replaced by others who will also need to transfer funds home.

Some money changers have actually begun the search for other nationals to help them with transfers home.

Meanwhile, a Saudi businessman well acquainted with labor conditions in the Saudi market, says that the absence of that type of worker will not impact the labor market in Saudi Arabia thanks to the existence of large communities of workers that find no opportunity [for work] and can replace [the Yemenis]. Yemeni workers are also unskilled and can therefore be very easily replaced. Furthermore, the kind of work they perform—such as pumping gas or serving in cafes, does not require skill or experience.

Stores at the al-Bawadi market in Jeddah vary in price from 100,000 to 500,000 riyals per foot. Several Saudis in search of investment opportunities are looking for locations to take over but most of those shopkeepers, who are Yemeni, adamantly refuse to give up their stores and are ready to look for sponsors.

Said such a shopkeeper: "You are the 10th person asking about and looking for a store to acquire." He added that it was difficult to find a procurable store in that market and that no merchant would give up his shop.

Another shopkeeper said that those who agreed to sell account for no more than one percent of the aggregate number of shops in the market.

Yemeni investors say that the Yemeni government's position on Gulf developments not only caused the revocation of privileges to the Yemeni community in Saudi Arabia but may also undermine Yemeni investments in Yemen itself. A group of Yemeni investors who have already begun channeling their investments to Yemen expect that these investments will decline for lack of confidence in the Yemeni economy which is essentially decaying and fully dependent on Gulf aid which has completely dried up after the Yemeni president took his hostile stand towards Saudi Arabia. Those sources believe that nobody wants to invest in a country, such as Yemen, which suffers a stifling economic crisis.



## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

## Columnist Expresses His 'Hatred' for America

91AE0035A London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI in Arabic  
8 Oct 90 p 11

[Article by Hamdi Farraj: "We All Hate America"]

[Text] Politics, it is said, is the art of the possible. But we believe that as far as the imperialist quarters are concerned it is neither an art nor a science, since science has always had positive and sublime goals which man has sought and continues to seek to achieve.

Given the imperialist and reactionary actions, it is more appropriate to describe these actions as a game and a dirty one at that. This is how we perceive these actions; that is, they are not a science as described by some. For this reason they are hated by all the peoples and so are their proponents, including the peoples whose leadership are playing an imperialist role. We believe that the history of all the peoples is filled with resentment and hatred for politics and politicians simply because they represent the other side of war, hegemony, colonialism, and exploitation.

In the third world countries of which we are a part—a political division in all circumstances—politics have become a forbidden territory and getting involved in their complexities has, whether you are aware or not, become the danger itself.

Highly-placed U.S. sources have expressed their fear of the wave of hatred for the United States sweeping Jordan, pointing out that broad anti-American fronts are being set up consisting of communists, Ba'thists, fundamentalists, and Islamicists. The U.S. sources added that the United States is afraid that this example might be followed in all the Arab countries, including the "allied countries." The sources did not say the "subservient" countries. The question that strongly and forcefully comes to the fore here in the mind of any person is: Is the United States really unaware of the feelings of hatred that our masses harbor toward it and toward its arrogance and tyranny? Do these masses and people really look upon the United States with love, respect, and appreciation? Does it really believe that hatred for it is harbored only by the communists, the Ba'thists, the fundamentalists, and the Islamicists, not to mention others?

It is inconceivable that the policymakers in the White House who know everything about this world are not aware or do not know that all the Arab peoples not only harbor resentment and hatred but also disgust. Hostility of religious movements toward communist countries is less than that if compared with hostility toward the United States, head of the snake and the great satan. The latter characterization is of religious connotation, despite the fact that conflict between religion and communism was created, nurtured, and deepened by colonialism. Hostility toward imperialism and the United

States does not come from the peoples of our nation alone. Indeed our hostility might be less intense than that of many world peoples, such as the Vietnamese, the Cubans, the Chinese, the Japanese, and other peoples. Therefore, the allegation by the U.S. sources that only the communists, the Ba'thists, and the Islamicists in Jordan are hostile is a lie. We believe that these sources are lying and they know that they are lying. In other words, they are only lying to themselves. They are aware of the hostility and persist in inflaming it instead of trying to eliminate it and transform it into ties of love, friendship, and respect. For example, they are aware that the presence of their fleets in our countries and nearby our holy places arouses the feelings of the sons of all our Arab and Islamic nation. Yet they persist in dispatching those fleets, and they are forced to pay \$7 billion to their ally Mubarak in order to continue aligning himself with them and to suppress his own people. They are now forced to warm up their relations with al-Asad from zero level to that of welcoming him and coordinating with him despite the fact that Syria is still on the U.S. list of terrorism. We, of course, recall here how the United States backed Afghanistan's Muslim rebels against the communists. It is now tampering with the holiest of their holies and is trying to drag the communists into participating with it. Until recently it was supplying Saddam Husayn with all types of weapons in the war against Iran while today it is likening him to Hitler and instigating all the world against him.

As we can see, the essence of this variable and inconsistent policy is one. It cannot be the art of the possible or the impossible. The only thing that changes in it is the regimes' outer appearance. As for the peoples, their hostility to the United States is becoming greater and deeper, particularly when they find that a regime like Saddam's is supporting them and guiding them in confronting imperialism and its subservients.

Neither the United States with its might, nor King Fahd, Custodian of the Two Holy places, or Hafiz al-Asad, who for 20 years was verbally attacking imperialism, which today is flirting with him publicly in Damascus in front of the deceived masses, or Mubarak, whom the Arab regimes sponsored as the opposite of al-Sadat, who today is proving to be the sincerest of all in serving the United States because he is its loyal protege, are capable of eradicating hatred toward the United States from our masses' heart.

## EGYPT

## Western Diplomatic Efforts in Gulf Crisis Analyzed

91AE0046A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic  
12 Oct 90 p 5

[Article by Milhim Karam: "Before the Storm"]

[Text] All signs in the horizon warn of an imminent storm. What the Japanese prime minister said was most

realistic. He said: We have not felt that Iraq has shown it desires for negotiations and peace. As for President Mitterand's visit [to Saudi Arabia], it produced a similar impression despite Iraq's touting and promoting the French initiative because it is content with a promise by Iraq to withdraw (despite the fact that Roland Dumas has made it clear that the French President's initiative is the same as the Security Council resolutions. The difference in wording is a matter of form). With regard to the optimism expressed by Primakov, President Gorbachev's envoy, who carried a message to President Saddam Husayn, and his statement that a peaceful settlement is possible, it is an individual judgment or an attempt at washing one's hand or looking ahead for vindication from the consequences of blood-shedding, the Soviet Union having done what it has to do for the sake of justice and peace.

Primakov returned to the master of the Kremlin with his impressions, which were different from those reported by the press. Toshiki Kaifu too returned home believing in the need for supporting his American allies with funds and weapons because the gap between reality and the desired peace in the Gulf is limitless.

The more significant meeting was that which took place between King Fahd and President Mitterand, who expressed his admiration for the Saudi monarch's practicality in dealing with matters and for his avoiding recklessness, rashness, drawing wrong conclusions, and seeking war. He is peaceful, but he will not be taken in by treachery.

The two leaders agreed on avoiding confrontation at the early stages and on France refusing to give in to the campaign of inducements by Iraq to establish a bilateral dialogue with it and, consequently, separate it from the West.

The French president stressed that this [campaign] is a juvenile calculation. France has stood behind the Security Council resolutions. So how can it dissent from them or alter them?

The two leaders agreed that what is required is peace, but this does not mean that [Iraq's] failure to respond to it will prevent the Security Council from taking strong military measures to which the world, foremost of which is the Soviet Union, will be committed. France denounced Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and all the illegitimate and artificial situations deriving from it. France is anxious to meet Saudi demands. Its view is based on current developments and on accepting nothing short of restoring legitimacy to Kuwait. Kuwait is to be left to decide on the constitutional steps it deems fit through parliament. What is important is that the Iraqi forces should leave by choice or by force and that Saudi Arabia be provided with more French troops and weapons.

Mitterand was firm and frank in saying that he was happy to meet an Arab leader with such sound thinking

and such a courageous stand, unperturbed and unequivocal, and with a strong will and determination that many heads of state lack.

Reading the situation correctly one would see that the whole world is in a state of false calm that precedes the storm. While one party is trying to prevent a confrontation, the other is trying to stir up things and is seeking to start a war because a third country possesses such an awesome arsenal that should not continue to exist because it poses a danger to the whole world.

Apparently, indeed truly, the Helsinki summit has gone beyond confirming the end of the cold war and consecrating peaceful coexistence to establishing a "holy alliance" between the two giants whose aim is to establish peace and order in the globe on which we live.

The phenomenon of Iraqi armament prompts the European countries and indeed the two giants to reconsider cuts in their military budgets in favor of development, since it cannot be guaranteed that third world countries—10 or 15 states—will in the future possess nuclear or chemical weapons that would threaten them and create problems for them. Thus, they would be compelled, if they decided to continue cutting their military allocations, to create a comprehensive protection system for all Europe the cost of which will be borne proportionately by the community countries.

We are awaiting the birth of a new world order the outlines and surprises of which are unknown to us. Will this order stem from the hatred of the small countries for the big countries causing them to be engaged them in an arms race? The West, which has long lost the demographic battle and whose population has thus decreased while that of the poor countries has increased, is still superior in science and technology. But what if this superiority is weakened?

The Western world will find itself in a situation similar to Kuwait's—a small population, very wealthy, and poorly armed. Thus, at any moment it will be threatened by Iraq or by any country that follows its example. This would lead to demands to exploit the atmosphere of tension and [Iraqi] refusal in order to launch a destructive war that would provide the big powers an opportunity to eliminate a phenomenon that might undermine all their future plans and push history several years back, particularly since the West perceives that Saddam Husayn's goal is to subvert the militarily weak countries in order to put itself in a position of sole negotiator with the United States on the affairs of the area's oil. Also, the world powers that have helped Iraq stood idly by when it "cleaned up" Kurdistan with the means that we all know about and that those powers provided it with.

However, Iraq's weakness lies in its attempts to be the area's sole spokesman and to incite the desire for war. Iraq alludes to those it is trying to subjugate with repeated threats aimed at intimidating them.

Will the world allow it to do so, or does such behavior strengthen its resolve to wage a destructive and devastating war, particularly since there are those who believe that Baghdad, whether in war or in peace, has become an unacceptable danger?

Despite all this, the chances of peace have not been lost completely and Arab diplomacy has not given up. King Fahd is still advocating conciliation and peace and so is President Husni Mubarak and most of the Arab leaders who are offering their good offices.

Finally, war is not inevitable although it has become more likely and many peaceful initiatives have reached a dead end and an unsurmountable barrier. True courage is to go back on one's mistake, which requires a unique boldness. Didn't Khrushchev backtrack in the Gulf of Pigs [Cuban missiles] situation in order to save peace? A just victory is not the number of rounds we win but the adoption of an attitude true with ourselves, even if we may be the losers. Heroism is not a stretch of time but rather an abridgment of time through a great stand which we are all waiting for before the volcano erupts.

#### **Interior Ministry To Receive Funding Increase**

91P40053B Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 5 Nov 90 p 1

[Text] The government has decided to increase Interior Ministry funding by 40 million pounds from 73 million to 113 million pounds, for the development of the security system, its weaponry and equipment.

It has also been decided that special guard officers and security for public personalities are to be selected from third-year students at the police academy. They will undergo special training during their third- and fourth-year studies, including a special training mission in the United States for six months in two three-month interims, one during their third-year study and the other right after they graduate.

#### **Businessmen, Scholars View Work of Next Assembly**

91AA0054A Cairo AL-MASA' in Arabic 15 Oct 90 p 6

[Article by Mukhtar 'Abd-al-'Al, Ashraf Abu-Sayf and Hisham Abu-al-Wafa': "New People's Assembly...in Eyes of Economists. Higher Production and Subsidy Rationalization Key Issue."]

[Text] In seven days, the door to candidacy for the People's Assembly elections will be opened.

Many faces will vie for a seat in parliament, but what do the people want from their elected representatives?

We posed this question to voters from the various segments that represent the production sector in banks and in the economic sector and to investors, exporters, businessmen, and merchants. So what did they say?

To begin with, Dr. Husni Hafiz, first undersecretary of state at the National Investment Bank, made it clear that People's Assembly members in the upcoming stage must shoulder momentous responsibilities and must be up to the task. The only way to do that is to be armed with education, knowledge, good example, values, and principles. This is in addition to adequate familiarity with current economic issues because the upcoming stage and its challenges primarily call for elements willing to keep on making loyal and endless efforts to serve their country without expecting anything in return.

Dr. Husni Hafiz believes that the most important issues the new deputies ought to concern themselves with are:

- How to raise production and productivity and attain self-reliance.
- Price controls and subsidy and consumption rationalization.
- Reexamination of the owner-tenant relationship with regard to arable land.
- Support for a true economic open-door policy and deregulation of export industries.

'Ayn Shams professor Dr. Husam 'Isa believes that, if it is representative of the true forces in society, the new assembly should play a strong and effective role in solving Egypt's economic problems and other problems. He stressed that the two most important questions are how to bring inflation under control and how to raise production—two interrelated issues—and the concomitant issues of redistribution of income, channeling savings to investment projects, and attracting Egyptian money deposited in foreign banks abroad.

#### **Taking Advantage of Climate**

Sayyid Abu-al-Layl, director of the technical office of the Egyptian Bank board of directors, believes that the new assembly will be required to reformulate Egypt's economic policy to keep pace with the political changes that have occurred in Egypt's relations with foreign countries in the wake of the gulf crisis, taking advantage of these changes and of Egypt's excellent relations with the IMF, with international institutions, and with European countries, Japan, and the Arab countries, as well as the cooperation between Egypt and the gulf states, to enact a series of legislation governing economic units with a view to consolidating Egypt's economic relations with these parties, and turning Egypt into a financial market able to assimilate a large amount of money and investments to reform the Egyptian economy.

Therefore, certain laws must be reexamined, such as the following:

- The corporate law with a view to fostering the securities market.
- The free zone law, in light of the Port Sa'id experience assessment, seeing to it that free zones are productive and capable of attracting investment money.
- The banking law to match the challenges facing the Egyptian economy.

- The tax law with a view to raising the tax-exemption ceiling.
- The law governing real estate ownership by Arabs.

### Raising Production

As for Dr. Hazim al-Biblawi, board chairman of the Export Development Bank, he believes that we need new members able to grasp the modern realities of progress and technology and to translate them into action consistent with the needs of their constituents.

In this framework, Dr. Khilaf 'Abd-al-Jabir, chairman of the Shura Council economic committee, added another dimension, which was that the new People's Assembly should support the government's past and present efforts to shore up the Egyptian economy and correct its course, in which great headway has been made, and to enact new legislation to assist such endeavors.

Mahmud 'Abdallah, board chairman of the Cairo Barclays Bank, pointed out that the new assembly will be required to provide protection to the banking system in Egypt to allow it to grow stronger and make the kind of contribution to investment and growth that we want and hope for, while putting an end to the trembling-hands phenomenon among bank leaders who are intimidated by the large number of oversight agencies

### National Problems

Dr. Khalil Bir'i, professor of economics at Cairo University, explained that the new assembly ought to focus its efforts on debating national problems, the most important of which are raising production and eradicating unemployment, because this would facilitate the elimination of all other problems, such as higher prices, low incomes, and exports from abroad.

He believes that People's Assembly members should be able to represent the voters well and have enough education, culture, and awareness to debate various problems and give their opinions thereon.

Dr. Sharif Qasim, professor of economics at Sadat Academy, suggested that the new People's Assembly members should be closer to the general public, not just to their constituents, and that partisan affiliations should not overshadow the interests of the country as a whole.

Sa'id al-Tawil, board chairman of the Businessmen's Association, believes that, in order to remove all obstacles that enable bureaucrats to cripple business activity and progress, laws and resolutions ratified by the new assembly should be enacted with an economic rather than an administrative mentality.

Muhammad al-Sayyid, director general of the Chambers of Commerce Federation, expressed the hope that the new assembly will afford attention and precedence to domestic trade laws, the majority of which were enacted more than 50 years ago, and that the new session will enact a new chambers of commerce law that has been

drafted more than once but never enacted. He stressed that the old law was enacted in 1951, during which time many trade concepts have changed.

### Export Facilities

He also believes that, besides integrity and popularity among their constituents, new People's Assembly members must have the ability to represent the problems of the masses, a view shared by Munir Raghieb al-Qassab, secretary of the lumber division [of the federation].

'Abbas al-'Atabani, director of the Giza Chamber of Commerce, believes that, in order to correct the economic course, exporters should be offered all kinds of facilities and that the concept of the right product at the right price should be applied to agricultural and industrial exports.

Salah Husayn, deputy chief of the general investors division, called for efforts to improve the investment climate and to let go of slogans and laws enacted at specific times that are no longer applicable, like the employer-employee relationship law, for example. He added that new People's Assembly members should be educated and must be aware of the people's problems to debate them.

Accountant Hilal Shatta, deputy chief of the exporters' division, says: "Investors are concerned about a number of issues, and I hope that the new People's Assembly will take them up. The pressing matter, however, is solving the problem of the 'T.S.' [expansion unknown] form."

For, under the economic open door policy and the existing banking freedom, it does not make sense to jail exporters unable to get their money from abroad because this would prompt many to refrain from concluding business deals, something that would ultimately impact negatively on the Egyptian economy. And even though the Ministry of Economy supports us in this demand, no special legislation has been enacted as of yet."

### Courage and Bravery

He believes that the new People's Assembly members should have the courage and gumption to debate all public matters and put the country's interests ahead of theirs.

As for factory owner Dr. Faruq al-Shuwayqi, he explained that higher production means new job opportunities that, in turn, would solve the problem of unemployment plaguing the country. Therefore, he calls upon the assembly to legislate production and solve production problems; pass legislation that would help increase exports and cut freight charges, which are the highest in the world; lower customs fees on imported manufactured products; and lower interest rates on export loans following the pattern applied to food security projects.

Merchant Engineer Hasan al-Sahfi'i believes that the People's Assembly must enact legislation that would



restore the bank open-credit system; deregulate investment activities; remove all red tape pertaining to the creation and establishment of all types of institutions and companies; and keep markets open by which the forces of supply and demand would determine the price without setting a profit margin for any kind of commodity.

Dr. Mahmud Yasir Ramadan, owner of a chemical supplies factory in Duqqi, believes that the new People's Assembly should reexamine the hallmark law that is unfair to investors and detrimental to investment activity. He called for the need to reexamine rent and real estate laws and to enact a special law for small industries so that they may prosper.

#### Taxes

'Adil 'Abd-al-Hamid Mansur, owner of a ready-to-wear clothes factory, pointed out that the current tax policy ought to be reexamined so that people would be charged according to rational rules and regulations and not at random because this is bound to create a kind of instability and apprehension.

In this area, Kamal Husayn, chief of the butchers' division of the Cairo Chamber of Commerce, called for the need to assess taxes on butchers at the source rather than at random, emphasizing that this is nothing new, for the great majority of European countries go by this system.

He appealed to the parties not to nominate old faces for election and to look for other persons who are keen and eager to realize the people's demands and have a good reputation.

Fish merchant Hajj Muhsin al-Hurani believes that the new People's Assembly must follow the old assembly's example of not fixing fish prices, leaving that to market forces because fixed prices prompt dealers to sell inferior quality fish.

As for Hajj Mahir Zaydan, fruit and vegetable wholesaler, he said: "I hope that the People's Assembly in the upcoming stage would look at dealers as individuals who support the Egyptian economy and not just people after profit at any cost."

Regarding vegetables and fruits, he believes that prices ought to be set continually to enable everyone to buy food at an affordable price!

#### Bad Food Distributors To Be Arrested Like Drug Dealers

91P40053A Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 29 Oct 90 p 1

[Report by 'Ammad Nasif]

[Text] Major General 'Abd-al-Halim Musa, Minister of Interior, has issued an order for the arrest of anyone who distributes spoiled food as if they were drug dealers. Furthermore, he has issued instructions to the director of

supply investigations in the governorates to intensify food supervision in the coastal regions.

AL-AHRAR disclosed in its last issue that 25,000 tons of spoiled food imported for 30 public sector companies had been seized upon entry to the ports of Alexandria and Port Sa'id. In the last few days, 72 citizens were poisoned after eating spoiled food, 59 of them from the Districts of al-Qabbari, Mina al-Basal and 'Izbat Abu Duna in Alexandria. Moreover, 13 children at al-Iskan Day Care in al-Qabbari were poisoned after eating spoiled food.

The prosecutor general's office in the Governorates of Alexandria and Port Sa'id has ordered the destruction of 144,691 kg of spoiled food.

Some companies have still been able to bring spoiled food into the country, and supply detectives of al-Gharbiyah have confiscated 100 tons of spoiled food, including fish and meat. Cairo supply detectives have seized 120 tons of spoiled food belonging to 18 merchants. Al-Qalyubiyah supply detectives seized five tons of ful [broad beans] while it was being brought into al-Mansurah State Prison after it was found to be spoiled and not fit for consumption.

#### IRAQ

##### U.S. Accused of Using International Law for Private Gain

91AE0034A Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic  
20 Sep 90 p 3

[Editorial: "American Administration or International Legitimacy"]

[Text] Within only a month and a half, Arab and world public opinion have discovered the startling truth about the United Nations, which cancels out all its previous history and destroys the convictions and concepts that had prevailed until a short time ago.

This international institution, which along the way recognized its limited role and influence on the sum of world situations for more than four decades, has been changed like night and day into an influential power that is trying to establish the idea of international legitimacy, and apply its resolutions quickly, so as to dazzle eyes and curdle blood.

Iraq—and the Arab world—is asked to believe that, to surrender to American and Western resolutions that the United Nations has issued, and to forget the United Nations' previous history, disregarding resolutions it has adopted that were never implemented. On the contrary, UN indifference toward its agencies' progress went on for 20 years, because it was not egged on by American initiative.

Iraqis and Arabs are also asked to forget the pain and suffering caused by the rape of Palestine, the delays and

procrastinations that occurred in the halls of the Security Council, before issuing resolutions that did nothing but condemn the Zionist aggressor, and which were then rejected by the American veto.

Those responsible for these international institutions want to convince the world of the justice of their resolutions, merely because Washington stands behind them, because what is America's right is not the right of others, even if what America wants is at variance with the principles of the international law that regulates the workings of these institutions, and even if the American administration's desires are incompatible with the principles and bases of the international charter.

Therefore, with extreme ease, the United Nations and its agencies have issued resolutions. We are the ones who have experience in being patient. While all the world's peoples waited at its doors, it has trampled and rejected rights. The rapist aggressor has been turned into the rightful one, the villain into the victim, the robber into the bank guard, and the terrorist into the persecuted.

Seven consecutive resolutions aimed at Iraq and its people, during a period which, in the best of cases, does not exceed the period in which just one Arab issue would be discussed for the purpose of issuing a resolution. These disreputable resolutions have proved beyond any doubt that certain international bodies have been changed into an institution subservient to the American State Department, an implementing tool for the policy of President George Bush. After completely abandoning its neutrality, it hatches his plots. He announces from his corridors what he wishes, so as to impose his will and his desires on all peoples of the world without exception, and on issues pertaining to Iraq or others.

What is sadly true is that all these resolutions are incompatible with the best interests of all peoples and their economic conditions, including the American people. However, they comply with the sick wishes of a few rulers, who try to govern on the necks of their people. This is what puts these important international institutions on the path that the UN gang has pursued.

### Opposition Leader Discusses Repression

91AE0105A Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic  
12 Oct 90 p 17

[Article: "Iraqi Opposition Officer: Our People Have Been Suffering for 22 Years From Saddam's Abnormal Actions and From Attacks on Women's Honor; 10 Percent of Iraqi People Are Homeless Because of Policy of Oppression"]

[Text] Major General Hasan al-Naqib, a most prominent Iraqi opposition leader, has pointed out that the Iraqi people are not accustomed to many of the actions perpetrated by Saddam Husayn, especially attacks on women's honor.

In an interview published in London, al-Naqib said: "As an officer, I feel that our Iraqi army has been offended because we have military and patriotic principles and virtues."

He stressed that the phenomenon of Iraqi prisoners is proof that the Iraqi army did not believe in the eight-year war which Saddam Husayn imposed on Iran.

Al-Naqib added: "This war was interspersed by two massacres: The first as a result of the war and the second as a result of Saddam's liquidation of Iraqi religious and military figures."

Maj. Gen. al-Naqib characterized the actions as a catastrophe whose consequences, including the killing of innocent lives and straining Iraq under the burden of debts, are being endured by the Iraqi people.

He also said: "In this area, there have been numerous incidents about which every city in Iraq talks. Saddam has completely crushed the Iraqi people. His objective is to turn 17 million Iraqis into slaves who obey him without complaint or objection."

The prominent Iraqi opposition figure pointed out that the most abnormal thing about Saddam Husayn is that he is in his best mood when the death sentence is carried out against an ex-brother or friend of his. On such occasions, he dresses up as if he is going to a party.

In his interview, al-Naqib pointed out that Saddam did not hesitate to kill 'Adnan Khayrallah, his cousin and brother-in-law, just because he suspected that Khayrallah was vying with him for power and position.

Maj. Gen. Hasan al-Naqib, who was recently invited to form an Iraqi government in exile by virtue of his military position as [former] assistant chief of staff of the Iraqi army and by virtue of his political position as his country's ex-ambassador to a number of countries, said: "If our brothers in Kuwait have experienced Saddam's abnormal actions for just two months, then the steadfast Iraqi people have been enduring and suffering from such abnormal actions for 22 years."

He emphasized that Saddam is now embroiled in his invasion of Kuwait and noted that he has learned that Iraq's ruler has tried to withdraw, provided that he is allowed to keep some spoils.

But al-Naqib said: "However, the influential forces throughout the world have rejected this offer and have demanded unconditional withdrawal and restoration of a legitimate government in Kuwait."

He stressed that the Iraqi opposition does not endorse the destruction of Iraq because of Saddam's offense, saying: "The Iraqi people are one thing and Saddam another. They are the opposite of each other. The Iraqi people are a hostage now, as are others."

The prominent Iraqi opposition figure expressed regret to the Kuwaiti brothers for what they have endured,

saying: "It is the act of a rash and criminal dictator who has been practicing his suppression against the Iraqi people for 22 years and who continues to practice this suppression."

He emphasized that the Iraqi opposition is working collectively now to rescue Iraq from Saddam's evil, to establish true democracy, to fully observe the principle of human rights, and to give the Iraqi people the liberty to select the system of government they want with utter freedom.

### Opposition Leaders on Crisis, Post-Saddam Era

#### Mahmud 'Uthman on Treatment of Kurds

91AE0076A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
17 Oct 90 pp 30-31

[Interview with Dr. Mahmud 'Uthman, member of the political leadership of the Kurdistan-Iraqi Front, by Idris Sayyid Hamdi: "Saddam Husayn Destroyed 2000 Mosques in Kurdish Areas;" first paragraph AL-MAJALLAH introduction; Paris, date not given]

[Text] The tragedy of the Iraqi Kurds reveals the contradictions of Saddam Husayn's political speech. The Kurdish tragedy also exposes the Iraqi president's claims, which he reiterates in his dealings with regard to his invasion of Kuwait. There is no one better suited than a Kurdish opposition leader to expose the dimensions of this tragedy. He is Dr. Mahmud 'Uthman, a member of the political leadership of the Kurdistan-Iraqi Front, speaking on behalf of the Kurdistan Socialist Movement, whom AL-MAJALLAH interviewed during his official visit to Paris to meet with Jacques Itali.

[Hamdi] How do you view the future of the regime in Iraq, in light of events in the Gulf?

['Uthman] We find Saddam Husayn's position to be preposterous vis-a-vis Kuwait, which stood beside him for eight years in his war against Iran. We in the Kurdistan-Iraqi Front are against the use of force to resolve problems and disputes among nations, in view of our suffering Baghdad's persecution and maltreatment for scores of years. An examination of recent events, the world's grouping together against Iraq, and the intense land, sea, and air blockade against it, all confirm that this regime has gotten into a critical situation. I think that real change in any country comes from within, and not from outside. There is a connection between the two, because international isolation and the intensity of the strangulation provide a domestic climate that will blow away the ruling regime and lead to a revolution.

[Hamdi] And from the perspective of the Kurdish opposition?

['Uthman] As a Kurdish opposition front, we have established relations with all forms of Iraqi opposition—Islamic, nationalist, and communist. However, the truth is that the Iraqi opposition in general is weak, in view of

its having been subjected to continual violent blows. Most of the leadership is now in exile (Damascus, Tehran, and European capitals). Despite that, political coordination with various opposition forces exists and continues. We have become increasingly convinced of the importance of forming a true Iraqi opposition front. From this point of departure, we would like—as quickly as possible—to form the Iraqi front. It would receive every welcome and effective action from us.

[Hamdi] In the context of this front, what are your Kurdish demands?

['Uthman] Our real demand is to make Kurdish rights available in Iraq; our goal is to create democratic rule. Since its establishment, Iraq has never had a democratic regime. Democracy would give us the right to participate proportionally in governing. Our numbers, which are more than 4 million, constitute a little less than one-third of the total population. Democracy also would prevent one-man rule. One-man rule embroiled Iraq in a useless war that lasted for eight years. It also embroiled Iraq in the invasion of Kuwait and in provoking the entire world. If matters were to continue along these lines, one-man rule would bring more complicated problems down on Iraq. There must be true democratic institutions in order to repress these capricious acts.

[Hamdi] In the few months following the invasion, Iraq has made promises of free elections, pluralism, and constitutional changes?

['Uthman] Experience has taught us that words are not enough. Words have not protected tens of thousands of persons, victims of Saddam Husayn in Kurdish towns and villages. Words about political freedoms in Iraq are repeated frequently. However, they evaporated with the entry of the first Iraqi tank into Kuwaiti territory. Moreover, words about democracy have been put off indefinitely, as is the custom of this Iraqi regime. The historic lesson that Kurds have learned is that changing the regime itself is a fundamental condition for real changes in order for Iraq to breathe the air of freedom. The exercise of democracy is basically incompatible with the nature of the political structure of the ruling party in Iraq.

[Hamdi] How do you interpret Saddam Husayn standing under Islam's banner to protect himself?

['Uthman] It is merely a transparent maneuver that the facts refute. Saddam Husayn has killed many of the Islamic Ulema, and has destroyed approximately 2,000 mosques in the Kurdish region. He rejects the Islamic political thesis. This is our experience with him. The political writings of ruling party cadres in Iraq bear witness to that. Why did Saddam embark on his war against the Iranians with the claim that it was resistance of Arab nationalism against Persian nationalism? Where was Islam in all these doings?

### Collective Annihilation

[Hamdi] What about his defending the poor?

[Uthman] This is another lie which can be refuted by a quick review of the horrors of the collective annihilation, scorching of lands, and the policy of forced emigration to which the Kurds are being subjected, the majority of whom are poor. Some 150,000 Kurds were forced to emigrate to Iran in 1980. One young man was abducted from each family, totaling 10,000 youths whose fate is still unknown. Moreover, 5,000 persons have been abducted from the al-Barzani tribes since 1983, and their fate is still unknown. Systematic chemical annihilation went on from April 1987 to the end of 1988, using mustard gas, cyanide, Tabun, and Sarin, which can kill or damage the body in general, and the nervous system in particular. One attack, on 16, 17, and 18 March 1988, resulted in the murder of 5,000 persons and the injuring of 10,000 others. Most of the inhabitants of the town of Halabjah were made homeless and emigrated, and 120 Kurdish villages were bombarded. Moreover, the food supplies in Camp Marun for Kurdish refugees in Turkey were poisoned in 1989 by Iraqi intelligence agents. Poisoning also took place at Camp Mush in Turkey in 1989, Camp Zaywuh in Iran in 1990, and Camp Diyar Bakr in Turkey in 1990. In addition, after the war with Iran ended, the Iraqi army launched an attack against the Bahdinan area near the Turkish border, using chemical weapons. Approximately 60 villages were bombarded, causing thousands of deaths, and the detention of hundreds of others, about whom nothing more has been heard. The total number of Kurdish refugees include 370,000 in Iran and 30,000 in Turkey. They live in refugee camps in extremely harsh circumstances. Aren't they poor people who deserve the sympathy and compassion of Saddam Husayn, if those two qualities exist? His resorting to claims of protecting the poor and redistributing the wealth is evidence of the political bankruptcy that the Iraqi president is experiencing. The world puts its hand on its heart because of hundreds of Western hostages held by Saddam Husayn, but he is holding more than 4 million Kurds in Iraq hostages as well.

### Collective Detention

[Hamdi] How do you explain that?

[Uthman] There are a million Kurds living in special camps, like Palestinian refugee camps under the Israeli occupation. These camps accommodate people who are designated to reside in what is tantamount to collective detention. There are one-half million in detention camps on the desert borders with Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The numbers are growing and prove that for every Kurd, there is an interned Kurd. Iraq's jails are the scene of the executions of children as well as older Kurds. There is discrimination in areas of work, in matriculation in schools and universities, and in joining the diplomatic

corps and army. The sum of these circumstances and persecutions confirms that all Iraqi Kurds are hostages to the ruling Iraqi regime.

[Hamdi] Why doesn't that cause you to use armed action?

[Uthman] Kurds have suffered violence and death from the Iraqi regime, which has weakened the military structure of the resistance. Therefore, we are currently concentrating on political or diplomatic action. France's meeting with us officially is a precedent, the first of its kind, which means a new gain is added to the gains we have made toward international recognition of our movement's legitimacy. The Kurdish leadership is trying by various means to protect the Kurds in Iraq from the tyranny of the regime. We have only begun to protect the life of Kurds. We want international guarantees under UN supervision to protect them. We want the world to forget the political dimension of the problem. We demand that it be considered a humanitarian issue concerning millions of displaced persons, detainees, emigres, and children in refugee camps. We want to provide health care for those who will die from negligence and the paucity of resources.

As regards armed struggle, it is limited to certain acts of guerilla warfare. Our position and circumstances do not permit more than that.

### The Kurdish Front

Six Kurdish opposition parties joined together within the framework of the Kurdistan-Iraqi Front in 1988. They are the Kurdistan National Federation, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Kurdistan Socialist Movement, the Kurdistan Democratic People's Party, the Kurdistan Socialist Party, and the Iraqi Communist Party (Kurdistan region), as well as a number of national personalities.

### Dr. Mahmud 'Uthman

Born in 1938; joined the Kurdish opposition at 15; graduated from the Medical College in Baghdad in 1961; joined the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Mustafa al-Barzani, in 1953; member of the party's Political Office from 1964 to 1975, along with performing volunteer medical services in Kurdish areas; fluent in Arabic, Kurdish, Farsi, English, French, and German. He spoke on behalf of the Kurdistan Socialist Movement Party and is a member of the political leadership of the Kurdistan-Iraqi Front representing his party.

### Fakhri Karim on Occupation of Kuwait

91AE0076B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
22 Oct 90 p 7

[Interview with Iraqi opposition leader Fakhri Karim: "We Condemn the Occupation of Kuwait, Reveal Saddam's Attempt to Sell Majnun Island;" first two paragraphs AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT introduction; London, date not given]

[Text] Iraqi opposition forces have been active recently in various activities, particularly after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait on 2 August, working to overthrow Saddam Husayn's regime, which has embroiled Iraq in a vortex of wars and adventures, ruining Iraq's economy and marring its cultural and social structure. Iraqi opposition forces have joined in condemning this invasion, considering it to be one of Saddam Husayn's adventures, which only serve his aggressive policies in the region.

Reflecting on the history of the Iraqi opposition forces' movement, one notes that these forces' efforts are fragmented both inside and outside of Iraq, which has compelled them to seek to create an appropriate framework for joint action. In order to ascertain the dimensions of these efforts, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT met with Fakhri Karim, one of the most prominent Iraqi opposition leaders, to discuss the Iraqi opposition forces' efforts to join together and unite their fronts, for the purpose of overthrowing Saddam Husayn's regime and establishing a democratic regime in its place.

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Do you agree with us that the Iraqi opposition forces' efforts, both within and outside of Iraq, are fragmented and need to find an appropriate framework for mutual action, for the purpose of bringing down Saddam Husayn's regime and replacing it with a democratic regime?

[Karim] There is an erroneous concept being published in the Arab and world media about one Iraqi opposition abroad and another inside Iraq. The fact is that basically there is one domestic opposition movement, which has extensions abroad.

This error stems from the strong presence abroad of representatives of the opposition and its leadership. The reason for this strong opposition presence abroad is the nature of the dictatorial regime in Iraq, which has maintained for many years a completely terroristic rule against all the forces of the Iraqi people, using every bloody method (without exaggeration), methods that even Hitler did not think of. One of the results of this terrorism was the emigration of tens of thousands of Iraqi people, as well as the cruel forced emigration of tens of thousands of others. Moreover, there is the plight of the peaceful citizens who live in northern Iraq in the Kurdistan region, after the regime's use of chemical weapons. Regarding the strong presence of Iraqi opposition leaders abroad, this is because of the terrorism forced upon the Iraqi people and the absence of any possibility of political initiative, or even a mere normal life.

The Iraqi opposition has in fact remained fragmented throughout past years, despite efforts being made to create frameworks for joint action among its basic forces. All these frameworks, however, whether represented in the Democratic National Front, or the Nationalist National Front, or the Kurdistan Front, remained powerless, because they did not include all the basic forces and orientations in Iraqi society. Objectively, the only

one who benefited from this fragmentation was Saddam Husayn and his dictatorial regime. This fragmentation has continued up until now, despite everyone continually stressing the importance of overcoming this negative situation and moving to take any appropriate form of joint action in the coming stage.

#### **Condemning the Occupation of Kuwait**

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Have the Iraqi opposition forces been able to reach an agreement to overcome their differences and look for ways to work together to achieve their mutual goals?

[Karim] During the present crisis, the possibilities of achieving a joint framework have strengthened. Signs of that have begun to appear, particularly after representatives of all the basic opposition orientations adopted a unified stand condemning the occupation of Kuwait and its brutal annexation to Iraq, demanding the unrestricted and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces, and holding the regime responsible for the massive presence of foreign forces in the Gulf region.

In this regard, the Iraqi opposition forces called for a meeting and an exchange of views about the possibility of reaching an agreement concerning this matter. Several meetings were held among representatives of these forces, during which basic programmatic ideas were formulated, and methods of action were sought in order to achieve them. Happily, these meetings did reach an agreement about mutual goals. They include the overthrow of the dictatorial regime; the establishment of a pluralistic, democratic system; the establishment of a transitional, coalition government, which will be the basis of free, parliamentary life; the drafting of a permanent democratic constitution for the country; and the holding of direct elections within two years after the overthrow of the regime. These goals are in addition to regional goals, led by support for the struggle of the Palestinian people to establish their independent, national, state, and other goals pertaining to Arab and international political movements. These discussions are still continuing in order to overcome obstacles pertaining to certain issues with regard to operating the front, and intense efforts are still being made to reach a compromise that will express mutual aspirations pertaining to issues in dispute.

#### **Interim Government**

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Has an agreement been reached among Iraqi opposition forces with regard to forming an interim government in exile?

[Karim] No, there is no agreement by Iraqi opposition forces with respect to forming an interim government representing all opposition forces.

It is not on the opposition forces' agenda to form an interim government in exile. We believe that the task in the present circumstances is to mobilize all forces within



a joint framework and, consequently, it is only possible to stress the opposition's role as an alternative to the existing dictatorial regime.

#### **Saddam's Deceiving Slogans**

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] What is the Iraqi opposition's evaluation of the futile adventure undertaken by Saddam Husayn on 2 August, with his occupation of Kuwait, and his claims of returning the branch to the tree?

[Karim] Saddam Husayn's occupation of Kuwait was not a happy occasion for the Iraqi people. Saddam Husayn did not undertake this new adventure as an expression of his unionism, his Islam, his zeal for the poor of the Arab nation, nor his intense hatred for imperialism and Zionism. In fact, objectively, he has served the enemies of the Iraqi people and the Arab and Islamic nation by perpetrating this crime.

The Iraqi people know that Saddam Husayn's occupation of Kuwait is but an extension of his policies and program on the domestic level and another doomed attempt to get out of the strangulating crisis that is intensifying around his regime in various political, economic, and social fields.

The Iraqi people knew the truth of Saddam Husayn's claims, after he backed away from completing his slogans and goals that he put forward for eight years. He agreed to the Algiers Treaty of 1975, which he personally signed with the Shah of Iran, without authorization from the Iraqi people. He then embarked on war in 1980, on the pretext of restoring Iraq's rights, which he had personally weakened by agreeing to that treaty. Then he turned around again and abandoned eight years of bloody war that cost thousands of innocent lives, smashed the economy of Iraq, and damaged its cultural and social structure.

Next he launched this new, doomed adventure under the same slogans, exposing the sovereignty and independence of Iraq and the safety of its people to enormous dangers. What would you say to the Iraqi who is subjected to all these perils? He knows very well that Saddam Husayn, with his aggressive methods, policies, and goals, delights in the occupation of Kuwait, and he is not deceived by Saddam Husayn's fraudulent claims about returning the branch to the tree.

#### **Armed Opposition**

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] The Kurds are considered the only armed opposition forces confronting Saddam Husayn's regime. Geographically, they are not able to be the alternative to Saddam Husayn's regime. Is there military coordination inside Iraq among opposition forces?

[Karim] Kurdish opposition forces operate basically in the Kurdistan region, along with democratic forces. The nature of the situation is that armed action in this region

has not in the past been decisive nor able to change the regime in Baghdad. This is also the case today. Moreover, it has not been one of this movement's goals to take on this role, but rather, to weaken the regime and join with all opposition forces to prepare a suitable climate and the potential for the toppling of the regime, and to establish a democratic alternative.

By its nature, the Kurdish movement struggles for direct nationalist goals within the framework of the opposition movement's mutual goals, and on the basis of establishing a democratic system to enable the Kurdish people to achieve true self-determination within the framework of a united Iraqi state. Today, the opposition forces, and especially the factions of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement, as well as other opposition forces, operate so as to benefit from this important geopolitical position, in order to weaken the regime and [to create] a springboard for any cases of political sympathies in the country. One cannot ignore the impact of the Iraqi opposition on various segments of Iraqi society, including circles in the army and armed forces, particularly after this army became an army of 1 million men. Those affiliated with this important institution come from various segments of the Iraqi people. Saddam Husayn's claims regarding his ideological army have stopped, and he has personally shared in weakening his ideological elite, either by executions or by eliminations through expulsion, discharge, or retirements.

Information still confirms that these eliminations continue. They extend even to the closest relatives of Saddam Husayn, since it is well known that he cannot tolerate the prominence of any political personality, not to mention any influential military officer. Iraqi public opinion in particular, and Arab opinion in general, must note from time to time the disappearance of names of brilliant Iraqi Army officers, including those who wore medals for valor and decorations for courage. However, he has not tolerated any military prominence except for himself, even if this officer was his wife's brother and his nephew, or the child of the wife of his son. Events accompanying the death of the minister of defense, or the abandonment of Mahir 'Abd-al-Rashid, are well known.

There is no other regime like Saddam Husayn's regime; its terrorism engulfs all Iraqi people. This is evident merely by reviewing the movements within the Iraqi opposition. They include Kurds, Arab nationalists, nationalists and democrats, and Islamic movements of all descriptions, as well as Iraqi Ba'thists themselves. The results of this bloody terrorism can be found in the existence of more than 1.5 million Iraqi fugitives in all parts of the world.

Other results are represented by the following facts: the destruction of Iraq's huge economic and financial capabilities. On the eve of war with Iran, Iraq had reserves amounting to more than \$37 billion, and Iraq's oil reserves—on the eve of that war—totaled \$23 billion and, in 1981, reached \$31 billion.

As for today, Iraq is nearly bankrupt. Iraq's revenues do not nearly cover normal budget demands. Debt service exceeds \$80 billion, not to mention the requirements of military industry, and covering the cost of Saddam Husayn's aggressive, expansionist adventures and policies, which Iraq's resources could not accommodate even in stable political circumstances. What costs do you think will be required to rebuild what Saddam Husayn's wars have destroyed and to develop the country's economy?

#### **Majnun for \$185 Billion**

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT] Do you see a way out of this present crisis caused by Saddam Husayn's occupation of Kuwait?

[Karim] By means of his well-known adventure, Saddam Husayn thought he could get out of this critical situation by attempting to sell Majnun Island for \$185 billion to Japanese companies, believing that he could thereby get out of the crisis intensifying around him, and then proceed to carry out his aggressive policies at home and abroad.

This is a result of his new tragic adventure—the occupation of Kuwait. He has led the country and people into a dangerous ordeal. The specter of famine looms over the country, and the economic effects are ruinous. This aggression has resulted in a comprehensive, international blockade, and economic and political sanctions that will have a subsequent impact on Iraq's economic and political history, not to mention the results that will stem from the possibility of resorting to the option of war to resolve the current crisis. We do not want this; we hope and strive for the support of all the forces of Arab and world public opinion, so that this option is not used. Pressures of various other kinds must also contrive to compel Saddam Husayn to withdraw from Kuwait, because the military option will subject Iraq and the Iraqi people to enormous dangers. Saddam Husayn and his gang take no notice of the fate of Iraq and the Iraqi people, nor of the Arab people. On the contrary, it is only important to him to remain in power and to dominate the Iraqi people.

#### **Sa'd Salih Jabr on Future After Saddam**

91AE0076C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
20 Oct 90 p 7

[Article by Ibrahim Nuwar: "Iraq After Saddam Will be a Democratic Iraq; We Will Guarantee the Ba'th Party the Exercise of Political Activity"]

[Text] At the present time, the Iraqi opposition is in a state of unusual activity, preparing for the downfall of Saddam Husayn and the establishment of a new democratic regime based on political liberalism and economic freedom. Sa'd Salih Jabr and Sadiq al-'Atiyah, two leaders of the New Nation Party, the party of the liberal Iraqi opposition, are making enormous efforts in Iraqi

leadership circles abroad, including academicians, intellectuals, businessmen, and former military officers, for the purpose of guaranteeing successful conditions for the establishment of a democratic regime in an Iraq after Saddam.

"Iraq's invasion of Kuwait exposed Saddam Husayn's barbaric nature to all Arabs and to the world. All of those who helped him during his war with Iran know today who Saddam is." Sa'd Salih Jabr spoke sharply, cuttingly, and added: "We bet on the collapse of the alliance supporting Saddam Husayn at the present time. This will be the beginning of the end."

I spoke with him while we walked on a London street. How will that happen? He quickly replied: "Just as it happened with regard to the breakup and collapse of Iraq's pact with Egypt. The Egyptians recently found out that Saddam Husayn was just using them, and Egypt stopped its official assistance to Iraq, especially military. Then the Egyptians began to withdraw individuals from their jobs, which they were pursuing in Iraq."

Sa'd Salih Jabr went on to give his idea of the collapse of the alliance supporting Saddam Husayn at the present time. He said: "There are 400,000 Palestinians in Kuwait who lost their life savings with one stroke of Saddam's pen, when he announced the abolishment of the Kuwaiti dinar and replaced it with the Iraqi dinar. There are tens of thousands [of people] who lost their jobs in Kuwait. These losses will lead to a turnaround against Saddam Husayn among Palestinians, no matter what the positions of the official Palestinian leadership."

He reemphasized that one should look at the poor from Yemen to Sudan to Tunisia. Saddam Husayn promised them wealth, but they are the ones who now are paying Saddam's bills. They will turn their backs on him, because they simply cannot continue in their alliance with Saddam.

Jabr said in a confident voice: "We are ready to build a new Iraq. We are the true liberal party for Iraq. We embrace the concept of political freedom for all, including the Ba'th Party itself, even though that will cost us dearly."

I asked him what that meant. "What will it cost you to give the Ba'th Party freedom to operate the same as the rest of the parties in Iraq?"

Sa'd Salih Jabr laughed and replied: "This will cost us a great deal. It will cost a lot to increase the number of police forces to provide full protection for Ba'th members from the wrath of the masses, who would perhaps destroy them before matters stabilize on the side of democracy."

"We pledge to provide political freedom to all, from parties with the ideological orientation of Islamic fundamentalists to Communists, parties with a nationalist outlook, including the Ba'thists, and parties with a racial character, such as the Kurdish parties, etc. Our mission

is to guarantee the participation of everyone in building a democratic Iraq. Iraq after Saddam must be an oasis for democracy and a factory for new construction."

Before asking Sa'd Salih Jabr to offer his views about an Iraq after Saddam Husayn, I said to him: "We are crossing the bridge before we reach it. Let's try to reach the bridge. How? How can Saddam Husayn be brought down, while we are moving toward a war that would encircle the Gulf, and toward the possibility of subjecting Iraq to a military strike, because of Saddam's insistence on not withdrawing from Kuwait?" At this, signs of distress appeared on Jabr's face, and he said: "Unfortunately, Iraqis are paying for the mistakes of a criminal, whom they did not choose to be their leader. Unfortunately, the Iraqis will pay the price not just once, but many times over."

We reached the apartment of a friend, and our conversation halted for a few minutes. He then resumed the conversation, saying: "We do not want international troops to remove Saddam from Iraq; we do not want that to happen. We want the Iraqis to supervise the judgment of Saddam Husayn, to bring him to trial and imprison him."

I asked him about the Iraqi Army, and he replied: "As you know, Saddam Husayn's family controls everything in Iraq. The army, security, and police forces are the most important tools that Saddam controls in order to subjugate the Iraqi people. Nevertheless, attempts at coup d'etats have not stopped; the executions of officers by Saddam Husayn and his myrmidons have not stopped. All of this proves that the Iraqi Army, despite Saddam's control, holds revolution dearly." When I asked him about the size of their contacts inside the Iraqi Army, he replied mildly: "Yes, we have contacts; we expect the Iraqi Army to play a separate role in getting rid of Saddam."

I asked him about popular groups, about the initiatives of the New Nation Party within youth, student, labor, official, and academic circles. Sa'd Salih Jabr looked out a window opposite him and said: "You cannot imagine the nature of oppression within Iraq. The most we can do currently is to distribute a pamphlet, or arrange a contact with an anonymous leader opposed to Saddam Husayn inside Iraq. However, it is very important that we follow up on everything that happens day by day there with our people. Moreover, outside of Iraq, we keep in touch with liberal opposition groups, in order to reach mutual understandings about the future of Iraq."

When Sa'd Salih Jabr got up to prepare coffee for us, the conversation turned to the work of Iraqi circles abroad. Sadiq al-'Atiyah, the founder of the New Nation Party alongside Sa'd Salih Jabr, said that there are hundreds of thousands of Iraqis "who have fled from the tyranny of Saddam Husayn and the al-Takriti family. They are some of the most skilled Iraqis, including former officers

and ministers who have wide national expertise, academicians, businessmen, and youths, all of whom want to share in overthrowing Saddam Husayn. We are working with them."

I asked how?

Sadiq al-'Atiyah explained that there were diverse methods of dealing with Iraqi colonies in Europe and the United States, and even in the Arab countries. He said: "We began to publish a newspaper, AL-TIYAR AL-JADID, in the summer of 1984. This newspaper has adopted a firm line with regard to the overthrow of the ruling regime in Iraq, from which the people have suffered every affliction. AL-TIYAR AL-JADID has continued to be a voice for all factions and orientations of the Iraqi opposition."

"We have been zealous in publishing various views and articles that express points of view with which we might differ or agree. The aim is to manage dialogues among opposition factions and inform the citizens of all facets of the truth, as well as differing trends."

Sa'd Salih Jabr returned with the coffee, and Sadiq al-'Atiyah resumed discussing the experience of publishing AL-TIYAR AL-JADID, and the financial difficulties that the New Nation Party faces. These problems forced them to change AL-TIYAR AL-JADID into merely a daily pamphlet, printed and distributed by facsimile and mail to a sizeable list of subscribers and Iraqis who believe in the issue of democracy.

While we drank our coffee, we finished our discussion about the Iraqi opposition and democracy and the efforts required to reconcile the political parties and groups that have an interest in eliminating Saddam Husayn. Sa'd Salih Jabr said: "We are prepared to deal with everyone for the purpose of overthrowing the present regime in Iraq. Then, after that, let everyone express their views concerning the new regime. Our view is clear and definite. We want a democratic Iraq; we are ready to cooperate with the Islamic movements, Kurds, nationalists, and others, in order to bring down Saddam."

When I asked them about the hope for tomorrow, Jabr and al-'Atiyah said simultaneously: "Iraq will be victorious, and the Iraq of tomorrow will be the Iraq of democracy and freedom."

#### **Former Prisoner Describes Torture, Coercion**

91AE0069A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
3, 10, 18 Oct 90

[Article by Dr. Nijm 'Abd-al-Karim: "Prominent Official Discusses His Experiences in Iraqi Prisons; Describes Prison Life, Discusses Torture Methods"]



[3 Oct 90 pp 18-22]

[Text] I had heard a great deal about this knowledgeable and erudite Iraqi who lives in a hospital in a country in Europe. It was destiny that led me to make his acquaintance.

Every time we went to see him, he would captivate us with his eloquence and his well-crafted literary style. He was especially eloquent when he talked about the misfortunes he experienced during a period of more than 17 years which he spent in the prisons of Saddam Husayn. I had often urged him to write his memoirs because the information his memoirs would contain would be sensational and extremely provocative. After all, the man's experience has been unique and distinguished. Furthermore, it would not be easy for just anyone to write about experiences like those which this man went through. Not just anyone would be able to write in the same captivating style which this man uses: it is a style punctuated with words of wisdom, poetry, and aphorisms.

But the man would always decline to write his memoirs, citing a variety of excuses like his health and other reasons. When things became more critical and I pressed him even more to write those memoirs, he eventually agreed, but he set certain conditions: his name was not to be mentioned; his photograph was not to be published; and the interview that would be conducted with him would not be conducted in a question and answer format. He asked us to tape what he had to say based on his recollections. Here then are this man's recollections published here in installments. This is the first of these installments.

I swear to you, Arabs and Muslims, I swear to you in God's name that the facts I am about to lay out in front of you are impossible to believe and not, as it is said, stranger than fiction. What I am about to tell you is impossible to believe because it is so repugnant and offensive. Even the most predatory of creatures would find the facts I am about to tell you disgusting and repulsive. I am not appealing to your emotions here—we have been having more than our share these days of such emotional appeals which cover a large segment of our lives and are being made in the various media—but I am going to talk to you about what happened to me personally. I am going to talk to you about what happened to my family, my children, my relatives, and my friends. I am going to tell you about my experiences in the 17 years I spent in the prisons of the Iraqi regime. I am going to tell you about the experience which has turned me into a broken man lying in a corner of a hospital in Europe. I am going to tell you figures, and I am going to give you evidence and proof. God is my witness.

### The Price of My Convictions

I held a prominent position in a previous Iraqi government. I believed then, and I still do, that Arabism and Islam are like Siamese twins: they are inseparable. But let me be more precise: I am talking about an Arabism that supports the spread of Islam and explains Islam to

Muslims who do not speak Arabic. I am convinced that the only way Islam can be spread and Muslims who do not speak Arabic can become more enlightened about Islam lies in spreading an awareness about nationalism and Arabism and in spreading the heritage of Islam which originated with the Arabs.

So much for this side of nationalism and Arabism, but contrary to suggestions some people tried to make, this nationalism is not racist. It is rather an Arabism that tries to strengthen the standing and authority of Islam. When Islam is properly understood and practiced, justice will prevail among all on this planet, and this justice will benefit Muslims as well as non-Muslims. We do not need a secular nationalism exported to us by those who grew up on values that are different from those of God's religion. Those who grew up on such values are people like Nasif al-Yazji, Antoine Sa'adah, Shibli Shamil, Michel 'Aflaq, George Habash, and the list goes on. To put it briefly, I believe in a national framework for the substance of Islam. This has been the philosophy of my life. It is the philosophy I spoke of and lived by; it is the philosophy I wrote about in my theses and the one I discussed in my literary and academic activities. Many Iraqi men subscribed to this notion of a national Islam and an Islamic nationalism. Chief among those men was the late Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Bazaz, who was prime minister of Iraq. He was poisoned by Saddam Husayn, and he died in a hospital in Britain.

### How I Was Tortured

The rules of narration require that a narrative have a beginning, a middle, and an end, but let me depart from these agreed upon rules and let me interject [here] the essential distinction between the Iraqi president and his counterparts: those tyrants who, history tells us, had a long history of crime; took pleasure in dismembering people; and enjoyed decapitating them. This man, and I mean Saddam Husayn, has surpassed with marked distinction these countless tyrants, and he managed to use his destructive intelligence to benefit from the methods they used to torture people. In fact, he himself devised some tools of death that had hitherto been unknown.

In the early period of my imprisonment three persons took turns questioning me. One of them was Saddam Husayn, who was then vice president and party official responsible for the physical elimination of individuals. When he interviewed me, he often played the role of thinker and theoretician. Barzan al-Tikriti, Saddam Husayn's brother, was the second person who questioned me. He was an intelligence officer who was in charge of the terrorist and threatening side [of the job]. He was the one who issued the orders about the form and kind of torture that was being prepared for me. I was also questioned by Dr. Fadil al-Barak, a senior intelligence officer. He played the role of a negotiator and an intellectual, and he gave one the sense that he was employing reason, logic, and argument in his conversation with an interviewee.

I was also questioned by scores of junior investigators who had been chosen from a pool of base and disreputable people and social misfits like Majid; Hasan al-Matir; Qays; Sa'd Khalil, who is the son of the singer, Wahidah Khalil; and 'Amir, a man who boasts about his deviant behavior. Let me describe to you, fellow Arabs, you who don't know anything about Saddam, let me describe to you what happened to me on the first day I was arrested. I was expecting that I would be arrested. I had, after all, been experiencing and enduring what was happening in Iraq on a daily basis, and I had seen many honorable people walk with honor and pride to their own hanging.

Ever since the assassination of Dr. Nasir al-Hani, the man who had brought the Iraqi Ba'th Party to power and who had served as Iraq's ambassador to the United States, everyone who was involved in Iraq's political movement during that period or earlier was living in a state of fear, terror, and apprehension. After Dr. Nasir al-Hani was killed and his body was dumped into Baghdad Canal, Hardan al-Tikriti was killed in al-Amiri Hospital in Kuwait. The series of assassinations continued as people who had been comrades fighting on the same side proceeded to kill and eliminate each other. No one who was involved in Iraq's political movement felt safe in his own bed, and everyone's life had been turned into a terrifying hell.

As a man of law I had an opportunity to investigate many of these cases, and in the course of my work for the national government, I came upon a set of facts whose revelation and exposure would have had extremely grave consequences.

#### **An Arbitrary Method**

That is why I was arbitrarily and summarily removed from my position when the party seized power in Iraq. It was therefore inevitable that I would eventually be tortured just like the many notable figures in Iraq who were tortured before me and had preceded me to this gloomy destiny.

My intuition was right. Days after Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Bazaz was arrested, I was approached by someone at exactly 2 p.m. I was told that I would have to accompany that person to the police station and that I would be back in one hour. When I asked that person to give me a moment to make a telephone call, he refused emphatically. When I went with him, I found two other persons waiting for us. One of these two men told me when we got into the car, "You will not be going back home. We are not going to the police station as you were told. We are going somewhere else."

In those days when civilians were arrested, they were taken either to the Public Security Directorate, which is on the eastern side of Baghdad, in al-Rasafah, or to al-Nihayah Palace, which is on the western side of the city, in al-Karakh. I knew that we were going to al-Nihayah Palace as we drove to the side of al-Karakh. News about al-Nihayah Palace and the methods and arts

of terrorism which were being practiced there had become well-known in Iraq. What was done in that place was far worse than what was done in the Bastille and in Hitler's crematoria. Iraqis have a saying about al-Nihayah Palace; they say he who enters it is lost, and he who leaves it has been born.

While we were en route to al-Nihayah Palace, one of my escorts told me, "You will be our guest for a few days. You will be asked about some information, and you will have to answer all the questions correctly. Otherwise, you know what the outcome will be."

My escorts stopped the car and escorted me into a vacant, unfurnished room where I stayed for almost 24 hours. On the following day, they took me to a large, well-furnished room where a well-groomed young man was seated behind a large and elegant desk. I greeted the young man, and I tried to act naturally, but as I started to sit on one of the chairs, the young man exclaimed in a commanding voice and told me not to sit down and to stand in front of him. So I did what he told me to do, and then he asked me about my name, my age, my profession, my address, and my religion, and I answered all his questions. Then he asked me about my political ideas and about my devotion to my religious beliefs, and I answered his question truthfully. But the man insulted me and talked to me in an abusive way. He told me, "A curse on your father and on the father of such rotten, worn-out ideas." Then he motioned to the men around me, and one of them removed my eyeglasses. Then all of them started beating me up and kicking me, and I eventually collapsed on the floor. Then they picked me up and made me stand on my feet and continued to beat me and kick me until I collapsed on the floor again. They did this repeatedly.

When they stopped beating me for a few moments, I asked them why this was happening to me. Had I violated the laws which were in effect in the country? This was their answer: "Listen up, you dog, you son of a bitch: Your ideas are a contradictory mix of ideas held by Muslim Brothers, by members of al-Da'wah Party, and by Nasirists. We in Iraq hate these three parties, and we don't want them to have any influence in the country. The Nasirists, who call themselves nationalists, are the ones we particularly do not want, and you were a member of their government."

"But you do not object to the Communist Party's activities," I said, "and the communists are engaged in their political activity." "Shut up," said the man. Then he added, "All the communists have become Ba'thists. Haven't you been watching television? Haven't you heard about 'Aziz al-Haj, who is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party? Haven't you heard about his announcement that he was joining the Ba'th Party? Haven't you heard that 'Abd-al-Qadir Isma'il, 'Adil Salam, and other communists have followed his lead and become members of the Ba'th Party?"

"And what do you want from me?" I asked. "You know what we want from you," said the man. "First, you are to declare on television that you are joining the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, and you are to declare that Nasirism and the Ba'th are two sides of the same coin. You are to cooperate with us and provide us with the names of Nasirists. Since you are a religious man, you would be acquainted with religious groups. We want you to tell us about the relationship between the Muslim Brothers and the Da'wah Party. We want you to tell us how they worked together, and we want you to tell us in particular how Shaykh Badri's group worked with Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's group." (Shaykh Badri is a Sunni and al-Sadr is a Shi'ite.) "Keep in mind that your reports and the information you have will be very important to the course of the party." Then he added, "What do you say?"

After listening to this man, I was determined not to allow myself to be swayed by what he told me. I was determined not to be dragged into this tricky quagmire. "Is it conceivable that someone like me who had spent almost 30 years serving his country with honor and devotion would end up spying on his colleagues and fellow fighters and writing reports against them? I will not become that despicable man you want me to become. You will not get anything out of me, and I will not give you any names. You can do anything you want to do; you can even kill me, but I won't do what you want me to do."

As soon as I concluded my speech, the young man signaled to those who had been beating me up. His signal indicated that he wished to talk with me. He walked from behind the desk, and he faced me. Then he said: "We want you to know this: Iraq will not be ruled by any party but ours. We will uproot and eradicate any other party that tries to grow in Iraq." Suddenly he spat in my face and he ordered the others to get me out of the room. I was then returned to the first room.

#### A Meeting With Saddam

I spent the night thinking about how I would deal with possible situations in which I might find myself. Then the men came and took me to another room. Although there was no one in that room, formidable preparations had been made to furnish it and to put up drapes and install telephones in it. I was given a seat, and there was every indication that someone important would be coming to question me. Senior members of Iraq's Ba'th Party do not usually allow themselves to be in rooms into which others would walk so they would not have to stand up and greet those people who enter that room. Instead, they let their guest wait in a room so that he would be the one who has to stand up and greet them when they walk into that room. The moments of deadly, terrifying silence seemed like an eternity. Suddenly, a group of official guardsmen, wearing the uniforms of the presidential guard walked in and spread themselves out around the room. Then the door behind the desk was opened, and the vice president, Saddam Husayn, walked in. He was followed by another man who was carrying my youngest child. My daughter Zaynab, who was

no more than four years old, tried to flee from the man's grip as soon as she saw me. She leaned towards me with her entire body as though she were asking me to protect her from this strange brute. It was obvious from Zaynab's features that she had been weeping and screaming so hard that she was exhausted. When I involuntarily moved toward her, one of the guards restrained me and held me in my place. After that, the man who was carrying my child walked out of the room with my child screaming, "Daddy! Daddy!" Meanwhile Saddam Husayn took his seat behind the desk, and another man carrying notebooks and papers walked in. The vice president then started questioning me.

But let me pause here, fellow Arabs, and instead of telling you what happened between Saddam Husayn and me, let me tell you about this long and arduous journey of over 17 years during which I experienced all kinds of pain and torture. This was the journey which began after this interview with Saddam Husayn which you will hear about in a future installment.

#### The Onset of the Journey

Saddam Husayn has increased and intensified the methods of torture which have been prevalent in the prisons of Iraq since the dawn of human history. Those who examined the methods of torture employed by China's Emperor Chen against his enemies, those who examined what the Romans did to their prisoners and what the popes of Rome did during the Dark Ages, and those who examined other methods of torture as well will discover that Saddam has outdone them all with his designs for the people of Iraq in their struggle with death and torture.

Saddam Husayn, followed by his guards, left after a discussion that lasted over six hours. I stayed in my place until Majid al-Shakrah and his gang came, and they asked me to follow them. I thought then that I was about to meet my maker, so I kept reciting the introductory chapter of the koran as well as a few other verses from the koran which I managed to remember. I was confident as I walked behind those executioners that God would be pleased with me when I came into His presence. We walked along a crooked path where the light gradually grew dimmer. There were cells on both sides of the path, and I could hear the groans of the torture victims. We walked down a long corridor which veered to the right first and then to the left. Then a steel door which had been locked was unlocked, and I was lowered into a dark subterranean vault where there was a horrible stench. Then I saw a faint light coming from a small candle at the end of the vault. I walked toward the light and I saw two people who were seated. I was delighted to have the company of two men in the vault, and I said, "Thank God, these two colleagues will keep me company in the vault." But when I greeted them, they did not return the greeting. When I greeted them again, they did not return my greeting then either. I felt closer to them, and I told myself, "They are undoubtedly asleep because they must be exhausted as a result of the severe torture they must have suffered." I stayed quiet for some time, but when I wanted to wake them up hours later, I was terrified and

horrified when I extended my arm to one of them. What I thought were two men in front of me were human heads which had been separated from their bodies a few hours earlier. I knew that because the flesh on their faces was still soft. I was overcome with fear, and I was afraid I would go mad. I asked God for forgiveness, and I sought His protection against the devil and his doings. Then I regained my composure and calmed myself and sought a place to sleep. But my hand found feet which had been chopped off as well as bones and skulls. What I saw was terrifying indeed.

Those who brag about freedom and whose praises are sung on radio broadcasts cut people up in dark subterranean vaults. They burn the bodies of human beings with chemicals, and then they pretend in front of people and the world that they are seeking freedom and applying socialism.

The candle was extinguished, and I remained alone in a dark tomb with human skulls and bones. There was no doubt in my mind that I would be cut up like those people had been.

I turned to God, and I prayed that I would meet Him with my faith in my religion strong and vigorous. I remembered my children, and I prayed for God to extend His mercy to them. But I was overcome by emotion when I remembered my children, and I wept. Then I leaned my back against the wall and I fell asleep. I don't know how long I slept, but when I woke up, the steel door was being opened, and I became aware of someone coming down to me in the vault. I was convinced that it was the grim reaper himself. God only knows that the prospect of death was delightful to me, and I hoped I would soon meet my maker. But even that dream was not to be: my journey was just beginning.

#### Al-Siyab's Baghdad

I won't say any more [for now] about the painful journey of the Iraqi people under Saddam Husayn's rule. But I will reiterate what the late poet Badr Shakir al-Siyab said about Baghdad.

"What is Baghdad? It's a huge brothel  
Where maggots are a wave of flames and silk;  
(The voice of Lawahiz, the singer, in the background  
Sounds like the ticking clock hanging on the wall  
In the waiting room of a train station.)  
Baghdad is a nightmare: (a putrid drink  
Swallowed by the man reclining and marking time:  
His hours become days; his days become years; and  
the year  
Turns into a yoke: an open wound in the conscience.)  
Is this Baghdad? Do these bullet holes, scattered  
Between al-Rasafah and al-Jisr tell the tale of what  
Baghdad has become? Or has 'Amurah  
Returned with the Grim Reaper?  
But what is this I hear over the din of my shackles?  
Is this the sound of a Persian water wheel,  
Or is it the cry of a sapling setting down its roots?"

May God have mercy on al-Siyab's soul! The Baghdad he described then was heaven compared to the hell which Saddam's Baghdad has become. So long, until we meet again.

[10 Oct 90 pp 26-29]

When I was taken out of the dark, subterranean vault which was full of human skulls and limbs, I was taken to the room where I was first questioned by a young man. That day, however, that young man was not seated behind his desk. He was seated in a corner of the room and his place behind the desk was occupied by someone else.

The young man introduced me to the man behind the desk as a "big time criminal" because I was against the party and had provided cover and protection for some Islamic and nationalistic elements. In addition, according to him, I had argued with the vice president, that is, with Saddam Husayn, about destructive ideological and intellectual issues which endangered the future of the party in Iraq.

After this brief introduction the man who was seated behind the desk asked, "Aren't you so and so?"

"Yes," I said.

"Do you live in such and such a place?"

"Yes, I do."

"You completed your studies in law school at this college in that year, and you were employed as an official in the previous government in that ministry. You have so many children, and your wife's name is so and so. Her sister is a beautiful young woman who is a student in that college. Also, your oldest son is 21 years old." Then he went on and on, reviewing the names of family members, focusing in particular on the young men and the young women in the family. I answered his questions affirmatively, confirming that the information he had was accurate.

Suddenly, he asked me, "Do you know Barzan al-Tikriti?"

"Yes, I do."

"Who is he?"

"He is the official in charge of intelligence."

"Have you ever met him or do you know him?"

"No, I have not yet had the honor."

"You will now know who is Barzan al-Tikriti. You are today in his presence. Either you will do exactly what you are asked to do without any silly arguments like the ones you tried to have with the vice president, or else. You know what will become of you."

"But, Brother Barzan, my moral nature makes me ill-equipped to do what you want me to do."



"And what does your moral nature have to do with it? Aren't you a close friend of Dr. Murtada al-'Askari, who is considered one of the religious parties' theoreticians?"

"Yes, we were together in the College of the Principles of Religion. He was the dean of the college then, and that is the only connection I have with him. I don't have any relationship with any of the Islamic parties because I am not one of their supporters. My tendency is an Arab tendency."

"Since your tendency is an Arab tendency, why then do you refuse to join the Ba'th Party, and why do you refuse to declare that publicly on television?"

"Because I associate Arabism with Islam. Your party is based on a secular view, and because of considerations inherent in its makeup, your theory of the party places no importance on Islam. This is because Mr. Michel 'Aflaq, the founder of the party, had lived in an environment in which people had endured much persecution from the Ottoman Turks who used to persecute Christians in the name of Islam, and Islam is innocent of what the Turks used to do in its name. That is why such parties were born. I told the vice president the same thing two days ago."

"What do you mean when you say 'such parties'?"

"I mean that it was no arbitrary coincidence that the founder of the Communist Party in Iraq is a Christian. Nor is it a coincidence that most of the communist and secular parties in the Arab homeland, such as the Iraqi Ba'th Party, the Social National Party, and other parties in the Arab homeland, were founded and established by non-Muslims."

"What are you getting at?"

"What I want to get at is that our fellow Arabs who are Christian would not have formed such parties which ignore Islam if they had assurances that their treatment in their own country would be equal to that of their fellow countrymen who are Muslims. Our fellow Arabs who are Christian would not have interacted with the missionary movements which were sent into our area by colonialism under the guise of religion if they had had assurances about the social justice which the Muslim caliph, 'Umar Ibn-al-Khattab, was calling for when he exclaimed, 'When did you enslave those people who were born free?'"

"Listen, I am not going to put up with such talk. I am not Saddam Husayn al-Tikriti. Saddam is a compassionate, kind-hearted man. He was a good sport, and he listened to what you had to say, but I am Barzan al-Tikriti, and I do not have time for such arguments. You are now being asked to write reports about your friends who are nationalists, Islamicists, and Nasirists. I want you to know for sure that if you deal with us, you and your family will be well provided for, and you will have a good life. To prove this to you, the first thing we will do is let you call your

family to tell them when you will be released, and that will be in a matter of hours. Hey, what do you say?"

"Brother Barzan, I am a person who has no desires or designs in this world. If I were, I would have done what you want me to do, but I don't think I can disobey my God and my conscience. Therefore, I will leave matters in God's hands."

"Listen, if you think we are going to kill you and put an end to this matter, you are mistaken. Death will be the easiest thing. This is your last chance. What do you say?"

I said nothing for a long time, and Barzan felt that he and his men were not going to get anything out of me. He roared at me in a brutal and savage way, and he insulted and vilified me. Then he gave the men a signal, and they took turns beating me up and whipping me. I collapsed more than once as a result of the beating I was getting. Then he asked them to stop, and he told me, "I will see you after your visit with the ironsmith."


#### **Innovative Torture**

I was taken to a cell and I was made to sit on a chair. What horrible things were done to me! My feet were tied to the legs of the chair, and my hands, too, were tied with bands fastened to the same chair. Then my mouth was pulled with a belt that was fastened to my head, and thick pieces of cotton were placed over my eyes. Then a sponge-lined iron ring with small needles underneath the sponge lining was placed around my head, and the ring was tightened around my head. The pain I felt was indescribable, and I remained in this position, unable to move my hands or my feet. I had also been blindfolded. Then they started pulling out the nails of my two big toes. I felt as though they were also pulling my life out of my body, but I showed no sign of any intention to resist, and I did not even try to cry for help. They then turned on a hot water faucet which they let drip over my head. The hot water dripping repeatedly over my head almost burned my skull. At the same time, my head and my feet were bleeding because of the pins which had been stuck into my head and because my toenails had been pulled out.

I was left alone in the cell, and I don't know how long I stayed in that condition. When I was untied, I was able to discern from a small hole in the ceiling of the cell that night had fallen. Someone came to dress my wounds, but he used a liquid that burned terribly. I do not exaggerate when I say that dressing the wounds was more painful and more harrowing than the torture itself.

I was unable to sleep that night. My wounds were very severe. While I was in that condition, I started to think and to review in my mind what might happen to members of my family.

I had heard a great deal about people whose honor had been violated, and I had also heard about people who had been tortured. Many had been subjected to harsh physical attacks with fists, shoes, canes and whips; many



had been suspended and beaten on the soles of their feet; many had been subjected to electric shocks and humiliating measures; and many had been sexually abused and tortured repeatedly. Many people had also been threatened and told that members of their family and their friends would be raped in front of their eyes.

As I lay on the hard floor of the cell after I had been left there, I became hysterical, and I started to weep uncontrollably. I complained to God about the suffering and the injustice which were being inflicted on the people of Iraq. Images of my children, my wife, and my mother came then into my mind, and I started to draw mental pictures of all my loved ones. Suddenly I remembered these lines of verse:

"Dear God, will I be reunited with my family?  
Will we celebrate our joyous reunion?  
Will I hear the voices of my small children,  
And will my heart know the joy that my newborn child will give?  
Will I hear the voice of the only woman I love,  
The mother of my children?  
Will I hear the voice of my mother whom I yearn to see?  
That, dear God, and Your Truth, are all I seek.  
Will I see my friends, my loved ones, my home, my happy home?  
I am surrounded by darkness, Dear God,  
Tortured by the effeminate and the dull-witted  
Who vilify, insult, restrain, and severely torture:  
With ropes of steel they pull and twist my hands,  
And with iron they strike and crush my joints.  
Return me, dear God, to my loved ones,  
Bring joy to their hearts, O Merciful One."

#### Another Investigation

I was restless in my sleep, and I struggled with the pain when I sat. I stayed in this condition between being awake and being asleep until the door to the cell was opened and three men walked in. One of them was a tall man, and his name was Ahmad. The other two men were 'Abbas, an extremely hard-hearted man, and Abu-Hasan.

Ahmad started by asking me to tell him my name, my age, and my address. Then he asked me about my family and how many people were in my family. He also asked me about my income, my property, and what I had studied. Then he said, "You will be executed today. Do you wish to bequeath anything to anyone?" "Yes, I do," I said. "I would like to appoint my oldest son executor of my will. Please give me pencil and paper."

"You don't need to write anything down," said Ahmad. "You can tell us what you want, and we will tell your son."

I thought about this at length, and I wondered about what I should bequeath to my son and what instructions I should give him. Will these people who have been

accustomed to a life of crime convey my wishes to him in full? Is it not possible that they might use this will as a reason to hurt my family?

So I said, "[Tell him] I would like him to continue studying law, and I want him to look after his brothers and to supervise their studies and their upbringing. I want him to respect his mother at all times."

As I spoke, telling those men the admonitions and the advice that they would convey to my son, 'Abbas twitched, and his jerky motion shoved me in front of him. His shove made me jump and lose my balance, and I fell on the floor. After making me stand up on my feet, the men walked out of the cell. I walked for 500 meters in a corridor and then I turned left toward a small building which seemed to be attached to al-Nihayah Palace. The men opened a steel door, and we walked into a vacant room. Only a few garden tilling implements were in that room. Then they opened another door in that room, and we walked into something that looked like a small subterranean vault. There, they made me sit over a hole and one of the men shaved my head. He used an old razor blade that notched me in several places and caused blood to drip from my head. After that man finished shaving my head, all of them started laughing at me because I had become hairless. One of them told me mockingly, "This is what you will look like when you are executed. When you go to heaven, none of the beautiful hours will want to look at you because you have become bald." And they laughed and chuckled at me.

#### Advice Before Execution

Relatively speaking, Abu-Hasan was the most reasonable one. He asked the others to be quiet, and then he turned to me and said, "Why do you want to risk death and leave your six children behind? Don't you love your children? Don't you want to see them? Don't you want to live with them?"

"You will be executed in less than one hour. The bullets in these three guns, which are ours, will be fired into your body. If you were to show some flexibility and cooperate with the party and, if you were to appear on television and say what you are being asked to say, you could save yourself. By the way, there is a new admonition which you will declare when you appear on the small screen. You will say that Islamic parties took money from several foreign agencies. Give this some thought, and you will see that we are giving you good advice." I told him, "What you want from me is something I do not know. I have no ties to religious parties, but the relationship I have with them is one of friendship and respect. When I declare falsely in front of viewers that they took money from foreign agencies, they will be questioned and interrogated because of the false statement I made against them. I refuse to lie, and I also refuse to harm others."

"Then prepare yourself to die," said he.

I said, "I declare that there is no God but Allah and that Muhammad is His messenger. God is truth. Death is our right, and the afterlife is also our right." Then I started reciting those verses from the koran which I managed to remember.

I was totally absorbed in my meditation and my prayers, and my eyes were closed as I recited verses from the holy koran. In the meantime, 'Abbas had returned with a black fez which he quickly placed on top of my head. He tied together underneath my jaw the two strings that were hanging down from the sides of the fez. Then, he tied my hands behind my back and left. The men said they would be back shortly to execute me.

The fez was full of beetles. When I started getting extremely uncomfortable as a result of the mischief and harm caused by the beetles, I understood why they had used an old razor blade to shave my head and why they had tied my hands behind my back. They did not want me to be able to take off the fez which they had tied around my head. Whenever I tried to move the fez a little by hitting it against the wall, the beetles would do more harm to my head. I stayed in this condition till the afternoon. I heard their laughter getting louder, and they returned. I was verbally assaulted with insults that were so degrading, I would be ashamed to repeat what they told me or write it down. But they removed the fez from my head, and they untied me. Then they took me with them to another room where I saw something that I could not bear to see: I saw my oldest son whom I had mentioned that same morning in connection with my will.

"Why did they bring you here, son? Why are you here, my dear boy?" But before I tell you what happened to my oldest son that day, let me tell you a little bit about him.

My son, who was born in Baghdad in 1954, has had an active mind ever since he was a little boy. He completed his elementary school education with distinction, and he was one of the very advanced students in middle school and afterwards in secondary school. Then he enrolled in the College of Law. In all the stages of his education, my son remained devout in the practice of his religion, and he performed all his religious duties. He is respected by his family and by his colleagues and professors.

It was our intention that he be married in those days when he was arrested. And now I find him here in the same room with me! How is his mother taking all of this, I wondered, now that she has had the misfortune of having her husband arrested? And now her eldest son has been arrested too, like his father! How is she taking all this?

#### **A Hero's Seat!**

Among the many methods of torture—all of which we will mention—is the one which is called a hero's seat. This method involves the use of a bottle—a beer bottle in most cases—which is placed on the floor. The torture victim, naked, with hands tied around his back, is

brought in and two executioners force him to sit on the bottle, whose top has been broken so that more pain would be inflicted on the torture victim when the bottle penetrates his anus. Then the executioners press down on the victim's shoulders so that the entire bottle would penetrate the victim's body. Besides being extremely humiliating and degrading, this method causes severe pain and serious injury to the victim who bleeds as a result of being subjected to this torture. Afterwards, the victim is also unable to walk or to sit down.

Now that I have described to you the "hero's seat," that is, sitting on a bottle, some of you may be wondering, "What does this degrading and humiliating procedure have to do with my presence in the same room with my eldest son?" My firstborn son had been stripped of all his clothes. He was now being positioned over the bottle, and they were getting ready to press down on his shoulders. But they were looking at me as though they were waiting for me to give them a signal whether or not they should start the procedure. But the damnable 'Abbas could tell from the expression on my face that I was bewildered and that I was having doubts. So he pushed down on my son's shoulders with all his might, and my son let out such a scream! I wish I had died before I ever heard that scream. I thought all of Baghdad must have heard that scream and was stunned by its horror.

But the executioner, Saddam, was laughing and chuckling that day. He was merrily celebrating his birthday which every home in Iraq was required to celebrate.

#### **[18 Oct 90 pp 32-34]**

As I said earlier in my account, what happened to me and my son was only the beginning of the journey. Some people may think that what I have been saying is incredible, and I would not blame them for thinking the way they do, but as God is my witness, I will stand by everything I am saying. I would challenge Saddam or any other official to deny what I said. I want this fact to be made known. I simply cannot find the words to describe what is really happening in Iraq. I cannot describe the killing and the destruction of all human values which are taking place inside and outside Saddam's prisons.

#### **The Science of Torture**

O my beloved Baghdad! Like a mother mourning the loss of her child, Baghdad is a city in mourning, draped in black, scorched by dust, and wailing and moaning just as it did when it was invaded by the Moguls. The Moguls are back! If only those who are being deceived by Saddam realize that his recently proclaimed revolutionary and Islamic premises are nothing but falsehoods devised by this man from Tikrit. But let us review the methods of torture which are being used in Saddam Husayn's prisons so we can confirm what I am saying.

There are 100 and maybe more methods of torture which are being used in Saddam Husayn's prisons. Some of these methods are used to torture women, but most of



them are used to influence a husband, a father, or a relative, and to make him confess. However, when a woman is tortured because of her own involvement in political activity, she is subjected to different forms of torture. A woman may be suspended from her hair after her hands and legs are tied, and she may be suspended from her feet during her menstrual cycle. When this is done, the menstrual blood is either retained in her body, and that causes her to have severe pain, or it is discharged and flows downward to her face and into her mouth when she opens it to cry and scream. A woman is usually left in that position until her menstrual cycle is completed. She would cry for help, but she would get none.

Sexual attack is another method of torture used against women. If a woman is being used to force her husband to make a confession, then she is sexually attacked in front of her husband to force him to confess and provide the information the interrogators want him to provide, whether that information is accurate or not. Like men, women may also be beaten and humiliated in various ways just as men are.

Children are used to influence their fathers or brothers. They are beaten and tortured in front of their fathers and brothers in an attempt to get those fathers and brothers to confess. When he is being beaten or tortured an innocent child would scream, plead, and cry for help. If the father or brother refuses to provide any information, executioners would do things that you may not believe, but I swear to you on everything that is holy, that killing that child would be better for the child and for human dignity than subjecting him to some of these things.

I will tell you the story of the Kurdish woman who was taken to the Department of Public Security where she was attacked and tortured in front of her husband to force him to make a confession. When she was brought in, she was carrying an infant in her arms. But when her husband refused to give any information, the executioners snatched the infant out of its mother's arms. They placed an iron skewer in an open fire until it became red hot, and they told the father they would put the skewer on the infant's stomach if he did not give them the information they wanted. When the father said nothing, they placed the skewer on the child's stomach, and the child kicked and screamed as its body writhed in pain.

The preliminary questioning is usually carried out by those who have been spurned by society because of their poor parentage, because they are social misfits, or because of their deviant behavior. This is done deliberately. In al-Nihayah Palace, for example, those people include Sa'd, the son of Wahidah, who is the lover of a well-known Iraqi singer; Qasi; 'Abbas; Muzaffar; Jabbar al-A'raj; Salman; Kazim; 'Awwad; Qays; and others whose failure in life was caused by their addiction to alcohol, drugs, and gambling. Some of these people were fired from their jobs or expelled from school because of their poor manners. Others, however, like Ibrahim


Shalal from al-Kut, have led a life of crime but want to show their devotion to the party. Questions were raised about Ibrahim Shalal, who is a senior official in the Department of Public Security, when the case of Nazim Kazar was raised because it was said that Shalal was one of Nazim Kazar's sympathizers. When Shalal was sent out of Baghdad and transferred to Kirkuk, he tortured and killed Kurds to prove to his superiors that he was devoted to his work and to the party. There is also 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Baka' as well as Fadil al-Zarkani who specialized in the procurement of methods of torture from East Germany and the Soviet Union, and that does not include the executioners they bring into Iraq from the prisons of Israel.

### Specialized Missions

People are sent from Iraq on missions to learn about the latest methods discovered in the torture laboratories of the world and to specialize in them. A number of experts in the principles of terror visit Iraq regularly all the time to lecture on the theory and practice of torture. 'Abd-al-Jabbar 'Umar, Iraq's former ambassador to Kuwait and present ambassador to Germany, had specialized in training others in the methods of terror. He did that after applying those methods himself and, subsequently, before carrying those methods to Kuwait.

Connecting sensitive parts of the body, like the ears and eyelids, to electricity is one of the methods of torture which is used in the prisons of Iraq. This is done by carefully tying an electric wire to that sensitive part of the body to give the torture victim such an electric shock and a jolt that he will lose his balance. Besides, electricity is applied to a victim's genitals. A victim is also made to sit on a heater. This method is used in the following way: before the heater is turned on, the torture victim is tied to a heater which is fixed to the wall. The torture victim is tied very securely to the heater, and no clothing or anything else separates the victim of torture from that heater. The heater is then turned on, and the person in question is kept seated in that position until burns appear on his skin.

Al-falaqah is another method of torture. Although it is a well-known method, it is applied differently in Saddam's prisons because more modifications, such as beard burning, have been introduced to it. This method of torture is applied to clerics, and it was applied to Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. Victims are also suspended from ceiling fans, they are beaten while they are suspended, and electric heat is used to burn their hands. This is done by tying the victim's hands to an electric heating element before the element is turned on. Then the power is turned on, and the victim's hand is broiled. A few days after being subjected to such a procedure, a victim's hand becomes purulent. Shaykh 'Umar Faraj, the imam of Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq mosque, was subjected to this procedure. Other methods of torture include the use of fire to burn different parts of the body, the use of an electric drill to drill holes in a victim's hands or feet, and the use of an iron hammer to break a victim's nose.



A victim's jaw may also be broken, and water may be pumped into his body. This is done by having the victim kneel on the floor and using nails to tie him firmly and hold him securely in that position. A hot water pipe is then inserted into the victim's behind, and the hot water is turned on. The victim's body is then filled with water, and he loses consciousness.

Victims' limbs and extremities, like their hands, feet, and fingers, are also chopped off. This is what happened to the chief of police in al-Basrah when he was detained with us in al-Nihayah Palace. He had to crawl on his knees whenever he wanted to go to the bathroom.

These methods of torture also include the use of an air pump to blow air into a victim's stomach. An electric air pump is inserted into a victim's behind and air is released inside his body. The victim becomes bloated, and he loses consciousness when parts of his body are lacerated. The victim of such a procedure suffers severe and excruciating pain in his intestines, his stomach, and in other parts of his body. A detainee may be ordered to get into a water basin or rather a basin of filth located in the Directorate of Public Safety, the Fifth Branch. Detainees may also be ordered to hit another detainee on the head with their shoes. Those who refuse to obey are tortured more severely and whipped. This is what happens to political prisoners. A torture victim is stripped of all his clothes and placed in a place full of beehives where he is stung everywhere in his body. Victims of torture are also placed in specially designed cylinders which have been placed in the district building of al-A'zamiyah district. These cylinders are hollow. After a victim is placed in one of them, the door to the cylinder is closed, and the victim remains standing inside the cylinder for days. A victim may also have his ear pressed to the wall with a nail; if he moves in any way, his ear is torn.


In addition to all that, the hair on a victim's head may be pulled. A victim's beard, eyebrows, and the hair in his armpits may also be pulled. When hair is pulled from a victim's armpits, pieces of his flesh are usually pulled out with his hair. Another method of torture involves placing a victim's head inside an iron device that puts pressure on his head and eventually crushes his skull. Iron instruments are used to pull out victims' teeth; a victim's jaw may be cracked by placing it in a doorway and then closing the door; and needles are inserted in a victim's fingertips between his nails and the flesh. Detainees are held in small rooms where corpses have been left to rot. This is done to terrify the detainees and to make them suffer from the stench of rotting flesh. A detainee is made to lie on his stomach over a bed, and parts of his body are allowed to stick out from underneath the bed. Then a trained dog is brought in to bite the victim in these sensitive parts of his body. Parts of a victim's body are subjected to injury, and the wounds are then sprinkled with arsenic, vinegar, pepper, and salt.

Among the methods of torture which are used against detainees is that of turning a detainee into an object of ridicule by shaving half his beard or half his head. Another method involves tying a detainee's hands when it is time to eat and drink so he would be forced to lean and bow and eat and drink the way animals do. Detainees are not given water to quench their thirst so they would be forced to drink filthy water. A detainee may have a bucket of human waste thrown over his head, and he may be ordered to sing a certain song and to do so by imitating a male or a female singer. This method of torture was applied to clerics who were whipped if they refused to do what they were being ordered to do. A detainee may also be ordered to dance, and this method too is applied to senior clerics to humiliate them even further. A number of detainees are gathered together, and each one of them is ordered to imitate the sound of an animal (a dog, donkey, cow, or some such animal). University professors and intellectuals are subjected to this kind of humiliation.

#### A Conversation With My Son

To protect human feelings, I will stop listing the other methods of torture. These methods of torture are so horrible, they cannot be described. Suffice it to say that under Saddam Iraq now holds first place among the countries which export human organs to the world. Iraq is exporting human organs, like kidneys, eyes, and other organs, to the countries of Europe and America in particular.

Let me go back to the day on which my son was made to sit on a bottle in front of me. My son had fainted after this hateful procedure, and when he regained consciousness, we were left alone in the same room. We were told that we were being left alone because preparations were being made for my execution which was to take place shortly. Actually, however, we were being watched from windows through which we could be seen, but we could not see them. My son was sobbing, and even the most



hard-hearted tyrant would have been moved by my son's tears. I wept and my son wept as we embraced each other.

I told my son, "My dear son, let me apologize for giving you the burden of a major responsibility at a time when you are still a young man. Fate has brought me to al-Nihayah Palace, and I am being asked here to do something which I cannot do. I am being asked to go on television and announce to the public that many of the political movements and organizations [in the country] were receiving funds from abroad. I know nothing about this matter. If I were to declare what they want me to declare, many people will be thrown into detention centers. Who knows how many! I am also being asked to announce that the Movement of Arab Nationalists and the advocates of Arab unity and other pro-unity groups are two sides of the same coin with the Iraqi Ba'th Party. My son, I do not share this opinion, and that is why I am facing execution.

"Son, I ask that you respect your mother and that you consult with her about your affairs. Don't change your custom of greeting her every morning and kissing her hand. Spend time with her every day. And I don't have to urge you, son, to take care of your brothers. From now on, you are considered the head of the household, and your role will be that of their 'father'."

As I spoke, my son sobbed. I told my son, "Young people in Iraq have been living in a corrupt environment as a result of the fact that alcoholic beverages and other detestable substances have become widespread. Moreover, people are being brainwashed by television and by trivial ideas on television programs which encourage many to dilute the Islamic and Arab nature of man's character. Be careful, son. Keep your brothers away from all such matters which could corrupt. They should be

ahead of everybody in their quest for knowledge." I told him that I owed Hajj 'Abd-al-Rahman al-'Imari some money, and I asked him to return that money to him. "If you need anything, son, ask your uncle. Please give him my regards and ask him to settle my debts."

My verbal instructions to my son were interrupted when they walked into the room. My last words to my son were, "My respects to your mother, and take her on the pilgrimage if you can."

After my son was taken out of the room in a scene that would have melted a heart of cold marble, not stone, I was taken to a new cell where I was to wait for my execution which was to take place at dawn. A new executioner took charge of me. Although this man was called Mas'ab, his real name was 'Abd-al-Amir, and he was from the city of al-Kazim. He ordered me to go into a small vault under the stairs. That place was not large enough for a human being because it had been designed to hold small animals. I squatted on the floor and my feet were sticking out, and then I felt the sting of the whip as it came down on the tips of my toes. When I tried to pull my toes in, I could not. I was kept in that place for close to two hours. Then I was transferred to a very small and dark cell. As I felt my way in that cell I found that it was about 1.5 meters long and also 1.5 meters wide. They closed the steel door and left.

You can imagine what feelings a person who was to be executed in a few hours might have! You can imagine how thoughts would rush into his head and how he would get torn between a hodgepodge of feelings. But the time passed, and the passage of time suggested that the dawn had come and gone. And yet, no one had come.

I put my life in God's hands in preparation for facing the unknown. After some time the door was opened, and I was taken out of the cell and led to the offices where people are questioned. It was unusual for me, and I don't know why my heart started pounding this time even though I had accepted my fate and had often said, [quoting the koran] "Say: 'Nothing will befall us except what Allah has ordained'" [Koran, 9:51]. I was prepared for the worst.

I was led into a room where there were six people. I recognized one of them: it was Majid al-Shukr. He asked me what was my name, how old I was, and where I lived. Other such questions followed. Then he walked toward me until his face almost touched mine. He slapped me from the right and then from the left, and then he told me, "You will be released tomorrow."

## KUWAIT

### Iraqis Commandeering Vehicles

91AE0047A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
17 Oct 90 pp 46-47

[Article: "Invasion Forces Lead Plunder; Iraqi Forces Steal Whatever Moves on Wheels; Car Ownership

Denied to Citizens, Permitted for Party Members; Luxury Cars Reserved for President's Son and Command Council"]

[Text] Reports confirm that vehicles were the first thing the Iraqi invasion commanders seized upon invading Kuwait and that those commanders vied with each other to seize luxury cars as invaluable personal spoils. Most of those vehicles have now been moved to Iraq where they are not expected to survive long.

As a consequence of the large number of vehicles that have been moved to Iraq, including the vehicles seized from a number of fleeing foreigners at the Turkish and Jordanian borders, Iraqi gas stations now find it difficult to supply the needed quantities of gas, according to the reports. 'Isam 'Abd-al-Rahim al-Jalabi, Iraq's minister of oil, noted on 18 September that the number of vehicles streaming into the country from Kuwait amounted to nearly 100,000 vehicles, all of which need gas.

Throughout the past 10 years, the ordinary Iraqi citizen has found it almost impossible to get a new car. Meanwhile, luxury cars have been reserved for high-ranking government officials and for 'Udayy, President Saddam Husayn's eldest son, exclusively. Therefore, it is not surprising that the deluge of vehicles streaming into Iraq recently included a large percentage of luxury cars taken away from their owners forcefully.

Prior to the invasion, there were 150 or 200 vehicles [as published]. Car companies consider what has been taken from Kuwait tantamount to theft. The new owners of stolen cars will face the problem of spare parts. In any case, a major shortage of spare parts will develop. General Motors Company believes that there might be in Iraq now enough spare parts for two years. Whenever the vehicles of Iraqis returning from Kuwait ran out of gas, they abandoned them on the roadside after stripping away whatever contents they could carry, including batteries, stereo systems, and so forth.

Iraq's car imports have been subjected to controls for years. Prior to the war with Iran, the total number of vehicles imported annually amounted to nearly 60,000 vehicles, mainly from the Japanese Toyota and Mitsubishi companies. During the war, the main supplier became the Brazilian Volkswagen Company which exported 150,000 vehicles to Iraq in the period between 1983 and 1987. The import program flourished recently, considering that a contract was concluded with General Motors Company to supply 15,000 vehicles in 1989-90. Japanese firms were also about to return to the market, considering that Toyota had shipped 900 vehicles immediately prior to the invasion as a part of a deal valued at \$134 million to supply 17,000 vehicles.

By the end of 1988, the total number of new vehicles needed amounted to nearly 150,000 vehicles annually. The distribution of late models was subject to strict control, considering that such models were passed by the president, or his aides as gifts and rewards to party members, government officials, and army officers. As for

private companies and citizens, they were required to obtain special import permits which were allowed to be issued within narrow limits only.

As a consequence, the used car market flourished. Prior to the invasion, the price of a light Toyota truck amounted to more than \$129,000. The most widespread car in Iraq was the Passat model, produced by the Brazilian Volkswagen Company. The 1988 version is the latest model of this car available in Iraq, and it is sold for \$58,000 as a used car. At a higher level, a used Oldsmobile, produced by General Motors Company, was sold for a price reaching \$96,770 per car. These cars were distributed fundamentally to army officers. Meanwhile, the price of a Toyota Corolla amounted to \$151,610 [prices as published].

BMW's have been the most expensive cars used in Iraq, with the price of a BMW amounting to \$25,610. The German company reports that it has lost all the new cars and spare parts it had in Kuwait. At its dealership in Kuwait, BMW had nearly 250 cars with a price range of \$19,310 to \$83,450, depending on the [model and the] exchange rate prevalent prior to the invasion.

It is believed that the company's entire store of new cars in Kuwait has been moved to Iraq, in addition to the 5,000 BMW vehicles that belonged to Kuwaiti citizens.

Mercedes Benz, another German company, believes that all its new cars have also been moved to Kuwait, even though it is not sure of this. Its store of new cars at its dealership in Kuwait, namely 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Bashir Company, amounted to 200 cars, valued at an average of \$38,220 per car. The company estimates that 10,000 of the cars it produces were in use in Kuwait.

The makers of top-quality cars are not the only ones harmed in this regard. A source has stated that the "Iraqis have driven away with whatever moves on wheels and with gas." The U.S. General Motors Company says that the majority of its store in Kuwait, amounting to 4,000 vehicles, has disappeared, and so has the store of spare parts.

Prior to the invasion, General Motors boasted that it had achieved the highest percentage of car sales in Kuwait, covering 35 percent of the volume of the car and light truck market. In this regard, General Motors said that its sales had exceeded the sales of Japan's Toyota Company. General Motors was selling nearly 10,000 vehicles annually. Its most popular make was the Caprice Classic model which sold for nearly \$20,000. The company has characterized this make as the car used most successfully by foreigners to flee Kuwait across the desert to the Saudi borders. This model has also disappeared from Kuwait, the same as General Motors light trucks, Buicks, and Cadillacs.

It is not likely that vehicles moved to Iraq will remain usable for a long time. Even though Iraqi machinists have become well known for their ability to maintain vehicles for years after their life span has lapsed, the maintenance facilities needed for late models are very few in Baghdad.



## LEBNANON

**Lebanese Forces Leader Ja'ja' Interviewed**

91AE0144A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic  
5 Nov 90 pp 15-21

[Interview With Samir Ja'ja', Lebanese Forces Leader, by Zayn Hammud in Ghadras; "Samir Ja'ja', Lebanese Forces Commander, to AL-SHIRA': There Will Be no Concord as Long as 'Forces' Are Prohibited From Entering Government; Our Representation in Government Is One Thing and Our Representation Through Sa'adah Is Another; Current Government Is not National Concord Government; Cabinet Consisting of 30 Ministers, What Folklore Is This; Al-Ta'if [Accord] Is Very Valuable; We Support It to the End; Our Acceptance of Accord Is Final; Question of Parliamentary Appointments Is Very Premature; We Were not Represented in Government Because We Sought to Avoid Problem With 'Awn, But Now; Junblat Issued License for al-Damur Airport, But not for al-Halat; Hostility Has Disappeared Between Us and Whoever Approved al-Ta'if Accord;" first nine paragraphs are AL-SHIRA' introduction; date not given]

[Text] Oh how difficult it is to move from one condition to another, be it the condition of war or the condition of peace!

If the individual among us has to make a great effort to forget the horrors of the previous wars in Lebanon and the direct and indirect consequences he has endured as a result of these wars; if he has to remove from his memory the dark image of this or that circle before he meets with an official from the other side in honor of a new phase, which is hoped to be a phase of stability and peace in which the country regains its normal life and its unity; if the individual among us has to endure a lot in dealing with the wounds of the past, then how does it feel for those who have been involved in all aspects and minute details of the war to be moving towards peace, especially since the children of this "accursed war" brandished their weapons as of the first day of the war and experienced all its chapters until they mastered the war and became an indivisible part of it, or rather became its makers and princes?

Perhaps Samir Ja'ja', who is one of these people, established a close relationship with the war, felt its pulsations, and turned out to be one of its most significant products before he became the Lebanese Forces commander and one of the most prominent contributors to the continuation of the war in recent years.

The "doctor" [Ja'ja'] is one of these people because his political and propagandistic language is different today from what it was in the past, at least outwardly. The language is new, and so is the vocabulary he uses, which is almost free of the "past legacy." It is as if the Lebanese Forces commander wishes to emphasize that he has placed his feet on the threshold of peace.

Ja'ja's sole book today is the al-Ta'if accord book. He carries this book wherever he goes, as if it is the most important piece of the Lebanese Forces' political literature. Ja'ja', it seems, reads from the pages of this book only. If one asks him about an issue, he responds with a quotation from the al-Ta'if [accord]. If one talks to Ja'ja' and tries to provoke him, he only answers through the contents of the al-Ta'if accord to the point that it makes one feel that he has become the rival of Speaker Husayn al-Husayni in considering himself the "man of al-Ta'if."

Why this transformation? Has Ja'ja' actually abandoned his past options and become fully committed to the al-Ta'if accord with all the Arab dimensions that this accord signifies—dimensions that ensure Arab patronage of a solution to the Lebanese crisis in accordance with options that are far from the military, foreign, partitionist, and other such options?

Or is the commitment of the Lebanese Forces' commander a temporary commitment dictated by the phase coming on the heels of the end of General Michel 'Awn, Ja'ja's archenemy, and by the requirements of establishing a Maronite Christian leadership which he is most likely to assume now that Camille Sham'un and Pierre al-Jumayyil have passed away and the others are overseas? It makes no difference whether they are in compulsory or voluntary exile.

The questions are numerous and an endeavor has had to be made to get answers to them. Thus, an interview had to be conducted with the "doctor" at his extremely fortified bastion in the town of Ghadras which, seated atop Kasrawan, overlooks the Mediterranean Sea with all its different nationalities and affiliations.

In the interview with Ja'ja', one could not but notice numerous changes in the doctor's personality, primarily in his political slogan and in his insistence on launching a dialogue with everybody—Amal, the Progressive Socialist Party, Hizballah, and so forth—and on taking advantage of the available opportunity to develop national concord and to express resentment over the possibility that the Lebanese Forces will be prohibited from entering the government, and so forth.

Has he tired of war or is he, along with other warlords, trying to clothe the militias in a new attire?

[Hammud] Should we address you with the title of Mr. minister?

[Ja'ja'] It is too early for that.

[Hammud] Do we understand from this that the cabinet is still far [from being formed]?

[Ja'ja'] To tell you the truth, this issue is one of the thorny points or impediments raised within the context of the accord process. I do not know why such impediments are raised in this manner even though everybody has displayed goodwill! If we consult the national accord charter "very quickly" and if we consider the second part of the al-Ta'if accord, we read the following in article one

of part two: All Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be disbanded and their weapons shall be handed over to the State of Lebanon in six months which begin—listen to when the six months begin—upon ratification of the national accord charter and upon constitutional approval of the political reforms. Now, for this grace period to begin, a certain document is supposed to be ratified, and it has been; the president of the republic is supposed to be elected, and he has been; and a national accord government is supposed to be formed. At the time, it was not possible to form a national accord government because of the presence of General 'Awn and the obstruction he caused. So we leaped directly to ratification of the political reforms and accomplished the task, even though this was supposed to be preceded by a national accord government. General 'Awn has gone, and they still exclude a national accord government or refuse to discuss it. Therefore....

[Hammud] How could we characterize the current government if we are waiting for the formation of a national accord government?

[Ja'ja'] A national accord government is a government in which all the main factions are represented. You are aware that there is at least one major faction that is not represented in the current government. Therefore, this government is not a national accord government. At the time this government was projected, it was proposed that the Lebanese Forces be directly represented in this government in my person and in the person of another individual. Okay, the Lebanese Forces could not be represented because they wanted to avoid a problem with General 'Awn, is it not so? Fine, now the General 'Awn obstacle has disappeared. So why isn't a national accord government being formed? I cannot understand it.

[Hammud] Isn't Dr. George Sa'adah representing you in this case, especially since you are considered a leader of the Phalanges?

[Ja'ja'] Okay, Dr. George Sa'adah represents the Phalangist Party. If Dr. Sa'adah represents us, then Shaykh 'Abd-al-Amir Qablan can, for example, represent Minister Nabih Birri. Or let us assume that Marwan Hamadah, for example, can represent Walid Junblat. But this is one thing, and that is another. Dr. Sa'adah represents the Phalangist Party as 'Ali al-Khalil represents—and allow me to say this despite the presence of a definite difference in the absence of a party—a certain province and as Minister Dallul represents another province. But as a main party, the Lebanese Forces are not represented in the government. We certainly have other friends besides Dr. Sa'adah. We are friends with Minister Dallul, Minister Mansur, and Minister Sasin. We have numerous friends in the government. But in politics, chumminess does not count, and one cannot say: It does not matter. Your friend is present there, and this means you are present there. On this basis we say that there is a fundamental step with which we are supposed to begin. "I do not know why"

there are those who try to obstruct or to bypass this step or, as the saying goes, "give it a deaf ear." This is the step of forming a national accord government. In the accord process, we have had enough "outsmarting" each other. This "outsmarting" in the past 40 years led to the 15-year war, and the war has led to whatever consequences it has led to. This time, we have an accord in our hands—an accord that has been approved by the majority of the Lebanese and supported by all the Arab states and all states of the world. It is enough to implement this accord in order to enable everybody to achieve his right as a minimum—and this is certain—so that this accord can act as an inlet to greater and greater agreements and arrangements that lead to the new Lebanon that we want. So, "let us not try to outsmart and outfox each other." This government is not a national accord government, and it does not represent everybody. I tell you very simply that Walid Junblat has a militia, and he is in the government. Nabih Birri has a militia, and, the way I see it, he is in the government on this basis. Samir Ja'ja', the Lebanese resistance leader, is not in this government. Why and how come? Earlier, there were reasons but those reasons have now disappeared. We were compelled to form this government in this manner because of an abnormal situation which existed then. That abnormal situation has vanished now.

#### Al-Ta'if Accord Is Invaluable

[Hammud] Do I understand that there is some sort of a "veto" against inclusion of the Lebanese Forces in the new government, and is this one of the obstacles you have mentioned?

[Ja'ja'] By God it is possible, it is possible, "and I don't know why?" A lengthy discussion was held within the context of the al-Ta'if accord to emphasize that nobody should "veto" anybody, that nobody "should target anybody," and that we should end this process of outsmarting and outfoxing. Why this "veto?" I don't know. It is certainly obstructing the accord process, and this is something that should not happen. On this basis and with an utterly positive spirit, I hope that all those pushing the peace process forward, beginning with President al-Harawi and with the chamber [of deputies] and ending with all of the country's political forces, will end this outsmarting, this maneuvering process, and this bypassing of steps. The al-Ta'if accord is very invaluable, and "it would be a shame to muddle it up. Why are they doing this?" Why the "veto" against the Lebanese Forces? What is the reason? This reason cannot be acceptable to us. If we are going to resume the veto policy, then what process is this, and what national accord is this?

[Hammud] It is noted that you had your conditions previously—conditions that led to suspending the discussion on the government. One of those conditions, for example, called for delineating a greater Beirut that extends from the al-Kalb River to the al-Awwali River. There were other conditions connected with Maronite representation in the government.

[Ja'ja'] This is untrue. We did not set any conditions, and we are not setting any conditions in connection with anything. Why are matters viewed negatively at times? What I mean is that when I proceed to say that it is my opinion that greater Beirut should extend from the al-Kalb River to the al-Awwali River, then this is considered a condition; whereas if Speaker Husayn al-Husayni says that greater Beirut should extend from Khaldah to the al-Kalb River, his statement is not considered a condition. Each political faction has an opinion which it projects. I am amazed as to how the "world is turned upside down" if the Lebanese Forces present some ideas that do not please some people! These are not conditions or anything like that. We present our opinion as part of all the opinions presented on the issues raised. If we are not entitled to express our opinion on the issues raised now, then let them at least tell us so. We will then make a decision to either refrain from expressing our opinion or will see what we can do. But we should at least be able to express our opinion on the issues raised. Some have delineated the border at al-Awwali River, others have delineated it at Khaldah, and others yet at al-Damur. All these are valuable projections, and we consider our projection one of these valuable projections. We should put them all on the table and see on what the majority agrees. Therefore, there are no conditions. What exists is free expression. We believe that we are entitled to express our opinion on all issues raised for discussion. There are no conditions nor anything like that. At the same time, I wish to ask: Why this deviation, and why are some people trying to "foil" the accord process? Why the veto against the Lebanese Forces? I do not believe it is constructive to have a veto against the Lebanese Forces or a veto by any faction against any other faction. This is something that contradicts the word and spirit of the national accord process. If we persist in the veto policy, then what kind of national accord will we have? Therefore, this particular point should be tackled before others because this is the crux of the issue. If we stay within the sphere of the veto, the other steps will lead to nothing.

#### Greater Beirut

[Hammud] As long as you believe that there is a "veto" against the Lebanese Forces' participation in the government, then is it possible that you will link this matter with greater Beirut, i.e., obstruct establishing greater Beirut in order to get...?

[Ja'ja'] The phrase "to obstruct greater Beirut" is unsound. We support greater Beirut. But at the same time, we support al-Ta'if accord. Some factions cannot select the parts of the al-Ta'if accord that they like and call for implementing them while disregarding the parts they do not like. As the al-Ta'if accord contains a security plan and as it calls for the state's restoration of its sovereignty, it also calls for political reforms that were supposed to be carried out after formation of the national accord government. But because of the circumstances prevailing previously, the reforms were carried out before formation of the national accord government.

The circumstances dictated this and we did not say anything at the time. The reforms were carried out. Isn't it so? As all these steps exist, there is also the step of forming a national accord government—a step which some people are trying to bypass. We support greater Beirut. But we are also for a national accord government and for the al-Ta'if process in its entirety. We cannot take a part of the al-Ta'if process and implement it and take the other part and dump it in the sea. We either implement the process in its entirety and this accord in its entirety, or we are not sincere in what we present. We are positive to the end, and we support the al-Ta'if accord in its entirety. But we support the accord in its entirety, not one half or one quarter of the accord. We are for implementing the accord in full. Now, if every Lebanese faction tries to embrace the parts of the al-Ta'if accord that suit it and abandon the other parts, then by God, this will not be a positive process at all.

[Hammud] Well, regarding Maronite representation in the new government, in case it is formed, what is your position on this representation, considering that you are directly concerned with it? What I mean is: If, for example, the Maronites are allotted six portfolios in a cabinet consisting of 30 ministers, then how many of these six portfolios will the Lebanese Forces want?

[Ja'ja'] Seven (laughing). First, we do not support, and I hope you will not for... Take no offense for what I am about to say. But a cabinet consisting of 30 ministers is not, in my opinion, a serious step. What I mean is that we want to reduce, not increase (he says with a laugh) the number of ministers. It is our opinion that such a cabinet will not be functional. Imagine a cabinet of 30 ministers! In our ordinary Chamber of Deputies' sessions, one can barely find 30 deputies present. Just imagine with me how "folkloric" a cabinet consisting of 30 ministers would be! I will again say, sir, that we have positive factors, and it is a shame to waste these factors on details. Can anybody imagine a cabinet of 30 ministers? This is the first point. The second point concerns Maronite, Christian, or Lebanese representation generally. Why do you confine this issue to Maronite representation? We present ourselves as resistance at the level of Lebanon in its entirety, and we believe that we are as concerned with the south as we are with the north, but from our perspective and in our way. As for representation in the cabinet, let the issue be raised as it has been customarily raised for the past 50 years. Let it be raised with the president of the republic and with the premier-designate and let agreement be reached accordingly and in the appropriate manner. Why anticipate matters? We have no preconditions or anything of the sort. This process has to be a controversial process falling between aspiration and reality. It is certainly a controversial process, and "it has always been."

#### Leaders and Notables

[Hammud] In fact, the cabinet issue and the greater Beirut issue are raised from the angle of the fear existing in the country at present. There is fear of the future role

which the Lebanese Forces could play and fear that they would turn against the settlement, especially since the Lebanese Forces' leadership and you yourself as the head of this leadership historically have always been opposed to the positive developments occurring in the country. What I mean is that after the Bakfayya talks of 1985, the 12 March movement was staged; and, after the tripartite agreement, the 15 January movement was staged. Then there was the summer of 1988. You invented or contributed fundamentally to inventing the 'Awn phenomenon.

[Ja'ja'] By God, Mr. Zayn, I am sorry that you personally present matters in this manner. The observations I have on this particular question are the following:

First, everything in this life is relative. What you consider positive steps that could have materialized we viewed as negative steps. One is at least supposed to see one's position and the others' position. The tripartite agreement, which you considered or consider to be a positive accomplishment for Lebanon, we viewed as a catastrophe for Lebanon. The same goes for the Bakfayya retreats. You consider what happened in connection with Sulayman Franjiyah's election and nomination the most important step on the path of advancing and developing Lebanon. We did not consider it so. You must at least safeguard the others' right to have an opinion on matters. It is my opinion that we should safeguard the others' right to express their opinion. Regarding the 'Awn phenomenon, I will not dwell on it. However, I tell you that the one who fundamentally created it is ex-President al-Jumayyil. All we did at the time was try to absorb this phenomenon, because we were aware how serious it was, and try not to clash with 'Awn. Everybody has become aware of this. But despite the fact, some people still insist on holding us responsible for creating the 'Awn phenomenon at a time when all those involved in politics, be they big or small, want to see the true nature of the issue. Some people do not wish to see issues as they truly are and want to hold us responsible for the 'Awn phenomenon. Therefore, I wish to remind you that, before he became prime minister, we and 'Awn had been locked in a ceaseless four-year conflict. This conflict often reached the point of military action and resulted in dead, wounded, destruction, and devastation throughout the four years. I will remind you of the 4 May incident which occurred five months before 'Awn was appointed prime minister. On 4 May, a military clash erupted between us and 'Awn at the level of the entire country. Therefore, you cannot proceed on the basis of the presence of ill will on the part of the Lebanese Forces. First, there may be ill will among (some other forces). If so, then I can tell you: Perhaps these ill-meaning people wish to establish greater Beirut and then turn around tomorrow and attack and destroy the Lebanese Forces and all the liberal politicians. With this logic, everybody can presume the presence of ill will. Consequently, we will not be able to embark on any step. When we proceeded with the accord process, we believed, to begin with, that the notables and the leaders would do the discussing and the talking, that if values in

Lebanon were lost so badly and that if nobody could any longer take anybody's words seriously, then by God it was my opinion that the issue could no longer be solved. That is if this is how things are. If we believe that everybody is "out to get" everybody else and that everybody harbors malice for everybody else, then again there is no possibility of a solution. But as soon as everybody accepted the al-Ta'if accord, their acceptance meant that they assumed that the parties concerned would move forward with the accord. We must all contribute to leading this process to its conclusion. Or else, the process should have been halted earlier, that is if we assume that there are those who harbor ill will. Therefore, the assumption is rejected altogether. The developments have proven that we have been a 100 times more serious than others insofar as the entire al-Ta'if process is concerned. From the outset, some have supported the process outwardly and have tried to obstruct it practically. We, on the other hand, maintained complete silence from the outset and did not do anything [to obstruct it]. Meanwhile, the most we did was perhaps contribute to pushing the al-Ta'if process forward. Later, we certainly enhanced the process with declared and undeclared positions. Everybody knows how much we contributed to advancing this process. So when you come now and tell me that perhaps the Lebanese Forces were not sincere and should, therefore, be kept outside the government, then I tell you: "Excuse me but this is enough." We can take no more of this. When you present issues in this manner, you strike all the mainstays of the al-Ta'if accord and the accord process in the heart.

[Hammud] These fears have their political background and their political content. At the popular level, it is said that Dr. Ja'ja' will condone the settlement for one or two years at the most. The fears are now linked to political given facts and have a connection with the phased Syrian-U.S. rapprochement and with a timetable defined in the al-Ta'if accord for a Syrian withdrawal. Will the Lebanese Forces again repeat what they did on 12 March and 15 January, and in the summer of 1988?

[Ja'ja'] I again tell you that this is from your perspective. From our perspective, Prime Minister Salim al-Huss' boycott of the government at the time is what, perhaps, led to the obstruction. The vacillating conduct of the national ministers is what led to the obstruction. The insistence on nominating ex-President Sulayman Franjiyah in particular to the presidency is what led to the obstruction. Otherwise, our position on the 12 March tripartite agreement and on the 1988 presidential election was clear. We did not declare that we supported them and then proceeded to "foil" them. We said from the outset that we were opposed to them. We declared our position and acted accordingly. But now we say that we support the al-Ta'if accord to the end. You cannot come and tell me "but perhaps" you will change your mind. Politics can never be conducted in this manner in any country of the world, in any society, or in any place. Otherwise, politics will turn, and you will excuse me for using the expression, into "children's games" if we



approach them with the logic of "perhaps this faction is for the al-Ta'if accord now but may change its mind later." If we allow this question, then the same question will have to be posed to all those who have approved the accord process and all those who are participating in it. Consequently, we will not be able to accomplish anything, everybody will be mobilized against everybody else, and nobody will understand anything. What we are saying is that our position toward the al-Ta'if accord is very clear. We are for the accord, and we put all our capabilities at the disposal of this accord. We want to move the national accord process forward to its conclusion, provided that we implement the entire process and not implement one part and disregard the other parts. We cannot talk about national accord when the Lebanese Forces are prohibited from joining the government. What national accord process is this process that you want to talk about?

### Reconciliations

[Hammud] There are reconciliations that have to coincide with the formation of the government so that this government may be a national accord government or national reconciliation government. Insofar as you are concerned, there are entrenched hostilities, especially between you and the Franjiyah family and between you and Eli Hubayqah. How prepared are you for reconciliation?

[Ja'ja'] We are still trying to outsmart each other. Why, despite all the issues, problems, and conflicts in the country and all the hostilities that have developed in the past 15 years, does a part of the national press refuse to see anything but subsidiary problems that are the consequence of greater conflicts? If you tell me today that you want to achieve reconciliation, then I will tell you that I support you 100 percent. But you must achieve comprehensive reconciliations and not just bring together factions that have no political standing whatsoever and give them such standing under the pretext of reconciliation. I am for a complete and comprehensive reconciliation, but provided that it is spelled out who should be included in this reconciliation. If you want to tell me that I should be reconciled, then it is as if you are suggesting that the country's entire problem is confined to our problem with the Franjiyah family and to our conflict with Eli Hubayqah. Well, there is no doubt that these conflicts do exist. But in my opinion, they constitute just five percent of Lebanon's crisis. Before you talk to me about these conflicts, which are cold conflicts at present and some of which have already been outstripped by time and are no longer projected as conflicts, "go and reconcile" Amal and Hizballah. Their conflict is embodied at present in a severely violent armed confrontation that is costing the country and the citizen every day a dear price that the citizen pays in blood and sweat, at home and at work. If it is reconciliations that we want, this is great. But then Kamil al-As'ad must also be brought along and involved in the reconciliation. No faction may be left outside the reconciliation. We should also bring Shaykh Farid Hamadah and involve him in

the reconciliation, as we should do with all the Lebanese factions concerned with the Lebanese crisis, as well as Faysal al-Dawud and Ibrahim Qulaylat. Hasn't Ibrahim Qulaylat been an existing party? Then we must involve him in the reconciliation process. We must bring 'Arif al-A'war and include him in the reconciliation, if this is what is intended by reconciliation.

[Hammud] The intended reconciliation concerns you.

[Ja'ja'] No, no. I am concerned with reconciliation.

[Hammud] I do not mean reconciliation between Amal and Hizballah.

[Ja'ja'] To the contrary, I consider myself to be a whole lot more concerned with reconciliation with the Amal Movement, the Socialist Party, and Hizballah than with the others because the problems with the others are subsidiary problems when compared to the main problem and because we do not want to be diverted from the main issues. The war erupted in 1975, not as a consequence of a problem between us and the Franjiyah family or as a result of a "game of marbles" between us and Eli Hubayqah. No, this would be tantamount to dwarfing the problem. The problem arose from broader and larger starting points. If you wish to deal with the problem, then you must proceed to its major starting points. On the way, one deals with the problem's minor manifestations. But one does [not] go to the limit of forgetting the core and crux of the problem and its important bases and then proceed to deal with some details. The reconciliation should be a comprehensive, total, and complete reconciliation. In any case and in addition to what I have said, we consider the state of hostility to have disappeared between us and whoever agreed to the al-Ta'if accord. Consequently, we have no problem with any of the parties that have supported the al-Ta'if accord. Therefore, we are ready for everything.

### Dialogue With Amal

[Hammud] Well, as long as we are talking about reconciliation, what results has your dialogue with Amal produced within this context?

[Ja'ja'] Regarding our dialogue with Amal, you know that after 15 years of estrangement, you must not expect us to achieve final solutions in 15 days. To date, the dialogue with Amal has been good. It is the start of a process that bodes well. But extensive discussion is still needed. There is no doubt that some points have emerged to us as points fit for a common base for a future alliance. We have had disagreement and differing viewpoints on some other emerging points. We continue our efforts to develop with the Amal Movement a broad common ground for future political action.

[Hammud] It is noticed in this context that in his interview with AL-SHIRA' last week, Alfred Madi stressed that three quarters of Lebanon's problems will be solved when the Lebanese Forces and Amal Movement develop a state of agreement. It is noticed that you

are wagering heavily on this dialogue. Is this wager the same insofar as you, doctor, are concerned?

[Ja'ja'] It is normal to attach great importance to the dialogue we are holding with Amal. But at the same time, we attach importance to any dialogue that we may hold with any other Lebanese faction from the extreme right to the extreme left. We are not closed to any faction, any party, or any leadership because whoever wants to march forward with the al-Ta'if accord and forge ahead with the national accord process must act on their basis. Proceeding from this point, we have no veto, and we "are not closed to anybody." We are open to dialogue with all the Lebanese factions, especially with those that have supported the al-Ta'if accord and that contribute to the national accord process.

[Hammud] Well, the parliamentary appointments issue has been revived, especially in this interim phase, and it seems that the principle that will be embraced is the principle of inheritance.

[Ja'ja'] Before we talk about this principle, it is my opinion that the issue is very premature. We have revived a story which is called in French "ecclesiasticism," i.e., selectivity. The al-Ta'if accord incorporates numerous provisions. There are people who select a provision from the top, the bottom, or the middle and say: Come let us implement this provision only. Brother, there is order in the al-Ta'if accord. It is detailed and itemized, meaning that this provision is to be implemented first, then this one, and then that one. The appointment of deputies comes after formation of the national accord government. A national accord government in which all the factions are represented must be formed first, and then the deputies' issue is discussed. Now, regarding the deputies issue in particular, there are two opinions, neither of which we support at present. However, I will tell you what opinions are projected in the country. The first opinion calls for appointing deputies as provided for by the al-Ta'if accord. The second opinion believes that the appointment of deputies in this manner will constitute a very serious precedent and will be an undemocratic act. A third opinion asks: Well, why don't we wait until the comprehensive security plan for all of Lebanon, which is supposed to be implemented in one year, is implemented? Why don't we wait until a comprehensive security plan is implemented in Lebanon in its entirety and then hold parliamentary elections in the full sense of the word? We will have thus avoided committing the proscribed and will have secured, even if only at a minimum, continuity of the democratic game and a more effective and beneficial representation by the Chamber of Deputies. Proceeding from this point, these two opinions are projected. However, this issue certainly comes after formation of the national accord government, regardless of the theories projected on the appointment of deputies.

[Hammud] What is intended is: What is your opinion of the inheritance principle?

[Ja'ja'] I do not support this inheritance principle. I am for the principle of equality among all citizens and for the criterion of capability and worthiness.

#### We Are Serious

[Hammud] Regarding greater Beirut, it seems from the ongoing political movement that this issue has become very imminent. I believe that the ministerial committee will visit you shortly. What is your position now on the greater Beirut issue, especially since you believe that there is a veto against your participation in the government?

[Ja'ja'] We are for greater Beirut, which is normal, and for all the steps stipulated by the al-Ta'if accord. In what light or on what basis will greater Beirut be established? On the basis of the al-Ta'if accord, isn't it so? If there were no al-Ta'if accord, would there be a greater Beirut? Certainly not. Brother, I "cannot understand" why some people insist on selecting and implementing some provisions of the al-Ta'if accord without paying attention to other provisions. Let us examine the al-Ta'if accord and see what arrangement it offers, and let us all then act on its basis. If we disagree on something, what reference can we consult to find who of us is right or with what we should start first? We have to consult the al-Ta'if accord, have to put it in front of us, and have to read what it stipulates in connection with this process. All of us must then implement it. Regarding greater Beirut and the national accord government, and even regarding a comprehensive security plan for all of Lebanon, I wish to tell you here between quotation marks that if the Lebanese Forces had any plan to be obstructive, as some people allege, then they would, to the contrary, have tried to stay outside the government and outside the entire game. The Lebanese Forces could then proceed to say: Yes, but we are not involved. However, just the fact that the Lebanese Forces insist on being in the government is the biggest proof that they are serious in connection with the entire al-Ta'if accord, not just on the provisions that concern others but the provisions that concern the Lebanese Forces themselves. We are serious on what concerns us and what concerns the others in the al-Ta'if accord's provisions and order of things. Regarding the greater Beirut issue, there is a minor point on which I wish to touch anew. Greater Beirut means spreading state control over a large geographic area known as greater Beirut. Well, the first part of greater Beirut over which the state established undisputed control—control for which it paid a dear price—is the part consisting of the northern al-Matn and southern al-Matn areas. There were no militias in these two areas which were controlled by 'Awn's army. The legitimate government then entered this area. Is it or is it not so? Great.

[Hammud] There were militias there earlier. The Nationalist Party was there earlier and there were...

[Ja'ja'] Untrue, untrue.

[Hammud] Especially in northern al-Matn. The party organization was there and the Guardians of the Cedars were there.

[Ja'ja'] It is untrue that there were militias other than 'Awn's army in northern al-Matn when General 'Awn was still there. This is untrue. 'Awn's army and supporters, called the army partisans, were there. What you say is untrue.

#### Issue of Two al-Matns

[Hammud] The parties were not armed but...

[Ja'ja'] This was precisely the case. Now, there was an underground political current. This is true. But nobody is talking about this current. However, there were no armed organizations other than 'Awn's army. Is this true or not? Well, the legitimate government paid a high price and made the Lebanese people pay a high price for regaining these two areas at the outset. However, I do not understand how they permit the entry of two armed militias into these areas at a time when we aspire to greater Beirut! I cannot understand this fact. Why do some persons, factions, or parties insist on muddling the al-Ta'if accord? Sir, the government came to these two particular areas in which no militias existed and in which 'Awn's army was present, fought and defeated 'Awn's army, and took over the two areas. How could this government then bring militias and insert them in the two areas? The government wants to establish greater Beirut! On this basis, there are big gaps. I do not know their cause, and I do not know who is behind them. There is a big gap called the issue of the two al-Matns. If the legitimate Lebanese government and if the state of Lebanon cannot establish full control... I am not saying that northern al-Matn is the den of the Lebanese Forces and that the Lebanese Forces should return to it. But I tell you that we want northern and southern al-Matn to be the lair of the State of Lebanon and of the legitimate Lebanese Government and its agencies only. I am not demanding the return of the Lebanese Forces to al-Matn because then I would not be in harmony with the al-Ta'if accord. However, we seriously demand that they be serious with the al-Ta'if accord and that the state be serious in establishing its control. If the government is not serious there, how can we expect it to be serious in the suburb, in West Beirut, in al-Ashrafiyah, and in greater Beirut as a whole? An operation is underway to strike at the state's credibility, and I do not know who is engaged in this operation. How can one expect people to trust the process as a whole as long as they have introduced militias into an area in which no militia had existed in the first place? It is my view that there are a number of points that must be dealt with quickly and settled so that the state's credibility is not dealt a blow. We have no other options. We only have the State of Lebanon, our state, to take over control of things and to deal with them with an iron fist. We can no longer continue to rely on groupings, militias, or parties, if you wish. The State of Lebanon is a fundamental factor in

regaining Lebanon, in restoring its authority and sovereignty, and in securing the citizen's freedom, stability, security, and welfare. Any logic other than this is, in my opinion, faulty logic. So why are we destroying this state? I do not understand it. When we propose greater Beirut, we do so in the first place in order that we may go and get the militias out of where they exist. For example, Amal and Hizballah have been present in the suburb to start with. Nobody has just brought them and put them there. In an area where no militias existed and which was under the government's full control, we have brought militias and put them there! This is unacceptable. Who is doing it? I do not know. However, this is a flagrant obstruction [placed] in the way of the national accord process. Today, three persons were kidnapped in the morning, and we have been looking for them since then. Three kidnapped persons! Three civilians! One is called Tony Qaysar, another Carlos Humsi, and I have forgotten the name of the third. They were kidnapped in East Beirut specifically. How can this happen and on the basis of what logic? We must deal with the issues. Under what equation does one have to deal with the issues? I do not know from where this "muddling" emanates, whether it is in the form of introducing armed militias to the headquarters of the legitimate government or in the form of a "veto" on the presence of the Lebanese Forces in the government. I do not know where the obstruction comes from. But this obstruction is in nobody's interest. We must all cooperate to implement this accord. It is not every day that we will get an accord that incorporates the minimum points that unite the Lebanese. Let us steer away from outmaneuvering, outsmarting, outfoxing, and out-deceiving each other. Let us implement this accord as it is and in the same order in which it is presented and on which it was agreed. This way, nobody will have problems with anybody, and nobody will be able to cheat anybody. But, if we try to outsmart each other and put one article ahead of another, and if we hamper the government by introducing militias into the government's main area of influence and then demand that the government expand and extend its control to other areas while we obstruct its presence in this main area, then it is a pity.

[Hammud] I do not know. But in the end, the state is not a militia or a party. As for the government's logic, it is another thing. In asking the question, what I am fundamentally concerned with is: If greater Beirut is established and the Lebanese Forces are not included in the government, what will these forces do?

[Ja'ja'] Whatever the price, the Lebanese Forces will not at any moment abandon the al-Ta'if accord. The future will prove to you that the faction that will stay with the al-Ta'if accord to the last moment is the Lebanese Forces. I again say that whatever the price, our acceptance of the al-Ta'if accord is final.

[Hammud] Well, have you, as Lebanese Forces, reached the phase at which you are recognized. Has your presence been recognized?

[Ja'ja'] We do not need anybody's recognition. Besides, who will this recognition come from?

[Hammud] Through the cabinet, at least your recognition will be strengthened?

[Ja'ja'] No, no. Excuse me. If the question is one of recognition, we do not need to be recognized. Our participation in the government is not so much for recognition as it is to contribute to an accord of which we are a mainstay. Naturally, very naturally, we cannot accept any veto against us. In a climate like this, how can we accept a "veto" against us. I cannot understand it.

[Hammud] Let us agree that since you announced your commitment to the al-Ta'if accord, you have abandoned your slogan which calls for a Christian society from al-Madfun to Kfar Shima.

[Ja'ja'] Not at all. Excuse me. This is not true.

[Hammud] But I believe that on 12 March we all heard in a speech you delivered....

[Ja'ja'] I will tell you the story. Do you want to hear it as it is or as it was relayed to you. I said: "If this area that extends from al-Madfun to Kfar Shima is organized, and if it puts its affairs in order, then this will certainly be enough to liberate all of Lebanon and to restore the State of Lebanon and Lebanon itself as a free and independent master." One cannot quote half a phrase and omit the other half, as in the phrase "there is no god but God." One cannot quote "there is no god" and omit "but God." Otherwise, the quotation is weak and truncated.

[Hammud] Well then, is it true that if the Maronites did not fight each other there would be no peace in Lebanon? This is a question raised. It is said that had the clash between General 'Awn and Dr. Ja'ja' or between the Lebanese Forces and the army not taken place, we would not have reached the phase of relaxation we are experiencing currently.

[Ja'ja'] The answer is that you have forgotten that the al-Ta'if accord was concluded in October 1989, whereas the Maronites' military clash occurred on 31 January 1990.

[Hammud] Despite announcement of the al-Ta'if accord, we did not reach the phase of detente until after 13 October 1990.

[Ja'ja'] This is untrue. Had the legitimate government insisted on its opinion and ended General 'Awn immediately after the announcement of the al-Ta'if accord, we would have gotten to the detente and agreement phase immediately after the accord.

[Hammud] Well, with the recovery of the republican palace in B'abda, do you aspire to the return of the Bashir-Sarkis duo which brought about the 1982 Zionist invasion as a consequence of the reliance of [the late] President Bashir al-Jumayyil on a Maronite establishment embodied in the Lebanese Forces?

[Ja'ja'] I do not know why you are determined to know (whether or not any of us seeks to be negative). One can be whatever one wants to be. But I do not know why you—perhaps it is not you and perhaps you are just conveying a viewpoint that is in circulation... I do not know why some are determined to be negative. To begin with, President al-Harawi is not President Sarkis, and I am not Bashir al-Jumayyil. Let us start here: The persons are very different, the circumstances very different, the given facts very different, and the framework is very different. At the time, numerous factors were present in the Lebanese arena, such as the Palestinian element. Those factors are not present now. At the time, there was no understanding and no agreement on a minimum. Now, there is big agreement, and a major accord has been concluded with Lebanese, Arab, and international support. At the time, not everybody was exhausted, and the war was just in its sixth or seventh year. But now we have gone through 15 years of war, and everything has changed: The given facts, the circumstances, and the persons. The political movement has also changed and become different. Do you know to what you can liken the current situation. Perhaps one can liken it, with the difference of time, place, and persons, to 1943. Perhaps. But it is certain one cannot liken it to any other era in Lebanon. What I mean is that President al-Harawi can be Bisharah al-Khuri, and Prime Minister al-Huss can be Riyadh al-Sulh. Is it not so? But what will speaker al-Husayni be?

[Hammud] And what can you be?

[Ja'ja'] It is not essential that every person have a counterpart.

[Hammud] The Lebanese Forces can be new Phalanges that play the role the Phalangist Party played as a shadow cabinet in the preceding eras.

[Ja'ja'] I do not know, and I cannot foretell and say that they will be this or that. "You want to see us as we are." You cannot compare us with any previous person or any past establishment.

[Hammud] Within the context of the talk about the legitimate government and about your commitment to the al-Ta'if accord, there is a provision that concerns disbanding the militias. How serious are you...?

[Ja'ja'] (Laughing) Why do you say serious? When I tell you that we will implement the al-Ta'if accord in its entirety, but only provided it is implemented in its entirety, you may no longer ask this question. The first article in part two of the al-Ta'if accord stipulates: 1. All Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be disbanded and their weapons shall be handed over to the State of Lebanon in six months. The matter is clear.

#### **This Is My Job**

[Hammud] And what will you do with the troops?



[Ja'ja'] Don't you worry. This is my job. We have a "hundred tasks for the troops," beginning with taking care of their private affairs and ending with finding an appropriate place for them within the legitimate Lebanese Government and within the framework of its institutions. Don't you at all worry about the troops. Unlike some people, I do not think that this is a problem.

[Hammud] Do you plan to incorporate the troops into the army?

[Ja'ja'] Numerous ideas are projected in this regard. We have not yet embraced a certain idea in final form. Other proposed ideas will be discussed in the national accord government. We cannot embrace one fourth or three fourths of the al-Ta'if accord. We either embrace it in its entirety, or we cannot proceed with it.

[Hammud] During the past propaganda battle between you and General 'Awn, you constantly responded to his proposal for merging the Lebanese Forces with the army by saying that the Lebanese Forces may not be merged by virtue of their being a resistance force that must preserve its special character. What has changed now?

[Ja'ja'] What has changed is the framework proposed by 'Awn for merging the Lebanese Forces with the army. That framework is totally different from the framework proposed currently. Background is very significant in this regard. General 'Awn was not trying to annex but to strike and eliminate the Lebanese Forces in order that he may assume sole control of East Beirut. This was his ultimate dream. Consequently, we could not approve such action because it was not action that had a sublime or ethical objective leading to a solution to the problem. But now there is an accord. If General 'Awn had managed to strike the Lebanese Forces, would he have been able to add one inch to the interests of state sovereignty over Lebanon's soil? Certainly not. Today, one has an accord through which the State of Lebanon will be restored and will shoulder its responsibility seriously. Within this framework, it is certain that there is no need for a militia.

[Hammud] So there is no special character that you will try to preserve through the form of the Lebanese Forces?

[Ja'ja'] Not necessarily. As I have told you, there are proposals that will be discussed by a national accord government so that we "may find out" which proposed idea is the most realistic and best facilitates the creation of a strong State of Lebanon. The reason for the presence of the militias is the absence of a State of Lebanon, not vice versa.

[Hammud] Doubts are raised regarding the Lebanese Forces' commitment to the al-Ta'if accord. This is because, of all the militias or partisan organizations in Lebanon, the Lebanese Forces have been subjected to the most extensive internal changes and have been led by a number of commanders within a short period of time.

[Ja'ja'] I doubt this. If you have information that disagrees with my opinion, you can "enlighten me" with this information. But I do not believe that the doubts are raised because of the circumstances through which the Lebanese Forces have gone. It is certain that Shaykh Bashir was assassinated. As for the other Lebanese Forces' commanders, the circumstances did not befit the aspirations of the organization and of its members or the existing situation. The situation is now totally different, and one need not worry in this regard. One should focus on how to move ahead with implementing the al-Ta'if accord as it is arranged. You leave the internal process within the Lebanese Forces to me.

[Hammud] What is intended by the question is that the so-called "political Maronism" creates, whenever the country is on the threshold of a solution, new radical forces that nullify the solutions that we consider to be moderate.

[Ja'ja'] I do not agree with this analysis. I say that any balanced and well-considered solution that guarantees Lebanon's future and liberty and democracy in Lebanon will be supported by the majority of the people and of the popular forces without any question. But if we want to start fragmenting the solutions, outsmarting each other, abolishing certain articles, and focusing on others, then this will create instability among the Lebanese Forces and the other organizations. If the accord process proceeds as it is scheduled and planned to proceed, then I am certain that the Lebanese Forces and all the Lebanese forces will welcome this accord most warmly.

[Hammud] You belong to a generation that joined the Phalanges under the slogan of "fighting the traditionalists."

[Ja'ja'] True.

[Hammud] Who has served the Phalanges' objectives more: You, Pierre al-Jumayyil, or Camille Sham'un?

[Ja'ja'] Those who did not know the Phalangist Party prior to 1975 have missed a lot. After 1975, a different situation developed as a consequence of the pressure of war and the feud between Pierre al-Jumayyil's sons—a feud "unleashed" on the party amidst the war chaos. The image the party has gained during the war is not its true image.

Before 1975, the Phalangist Party was a totally committed party of ideology and struggle. I recall the time when we were medical students at the American University of Beirut and when we used to walk from the university to the party's Student Affairs Center in Bab Idris. Then, we would summarize our (lectures) and lessons by 1800, complete our party work at about 2200 or later, go home and study again, then wake up at 0600 the next morning because lessons at the medical school started early, at 0800.

The Phalangist Party holds a number of very lofty principles and objectives. The war came and cast its



shadows, its weight, and its responsibilities, thus draining the Phalangist Party and preventing it from carrying on with its process in the desirable manner. During the war, Shaykh Pierre got preoccupied with the war and was unable to perform his party work as necessary. This is why we believe that we have worked the hardest to achieve the Phalanges' objectives.

#### Phalanges and Forces

[Hammud] Within the context of the Phalanges issue and of your firm relationship with the party, there is a question concerning the nature of the connection between the party [presumably meaning the Lebanese Forces] and the Phalanges and concerning separation of the two organizations, even though the Phalanges is represented in the Lebanese Forces Command Council. If the militias are disbanded in the coming phase, will the Lebanese Forces merge with the Phalanges or will you form a new party under a new name?

[Ja'ja'] Let me clarify this point concerning the Phalanges and the Lebanese Forces for the last time. The Phalanges is one of the parties forming the Lebanese Forces. The Lebanese Forces is a resistance organization that incorporates elements from all the Lebanese parties. For example, is Dr. Tawfiq al-Hindi a phalangist? No, but he is a part of the core of the Lebanese Forces. George 'Adwan, who is chairman of al-Tanzim [organization] Party, is also a part of the core of the Lebanese Forces. Is General Fu'ad Malik a phalangist? He was not a phalangist or a liberal but a Lebanese army officer.

The Phalangist Party is a completely independent party that has its popular bases on which it relies and that has its machine. The Lebanese Forces is a political-military resistance organization that includes elements from the various Lebanese parties and from outside the parties. To this moment, the Phalangist Party has popular bases that "may be" the biggest party, organization, or movement existing in Lebanon. This is why we cannot summarize say: You are represented by Dr. Sa'adah. The Phalanges alone should be represented by more than just George Sa'adah. If we want to be serious, then how is it that the Phalanges and the Lebanese Forces are now represented by Sa'adah?

[Hammud] The answer concerns the coming phase.

[Ja'ja'] The question is submitted for discussion and consideration insofar as this phase is concerned. However, it is my opinion that elements of the Lebanese Forces will, on the one hand, return to the Phalangist Party. But on the other hand, I imagine that a new party or a new political movement may be formed. We have not yet embarked on the details of the issue. Let us first establish government control over the two parts of al-Matn and then we will see how to transform the Lebanese Forces into a new movement or party. You are raising an issue that is still too distant for the time being.

[Hammud] Is this a part of the solution dossier?

[Ja'ja'] There is no doubt. But there are several phases through which the solution dossier must pass. We are in the smallest phase and yet this phase is being obstructed.

[Hammud] Eli Hubayqah has announced the termination of his military presence in the two parts of al-Matn.

[Ja'ja'] This is untrue. This very day and while we "are meeting," they have kidnapped these persons. There is a question I want to ask: How and why has Hubayqah come to have a military presence in the two parts of al-Matn? He had no such presence earlier?

[Hammud] Regarding the republican palace [presidential office] are you for its return to B'abda?

[Ja'ja'] Yes.

[Hammud] Why B'abda and not Beirut? Why not in al-Sanawbar Palace, for example?

[Ja'ja'] For no particular or special reason. Just because it is a symbol.

[Hammud] A symbol of 'Awn, for example?

[Ja'ja'] In the past two years, nobody liked him. But do not forget that B'abda Palace has experienced Lebanon's political life from 1965 to the present. You say Beirut, and I say it is possible. Why not in Junyah or in any part of Lebanon. This is up to President al-Harawi. Neither I nor you is going "to sit" in B'abda, at least not in the foreseeable future.

[Hammud] Isn't it strange that the only battle you have not lost was a battle against another Maronite and that the one battle you won was a battle against a Maronite from the Lebanese Forces?

[Ja'ja'] This is untrue. These words are inaccurate. I have won all the battles in which I was the decisionmaker. I have been in many of the lost battles. But I did not control the decisionmaking in those battles. Why do some people refuse to see things as they are? I gained control of decisionmaking on 15 January 1986. Since then, I have not lost any battle, whether internally or abroad. Prior to 1986, I was not in control of the decisionmaking. I was just a military official. Others drew up the political plans and the political movement, and I was there to implement a part of those plans like any military official in any other establishment. It is as if you are telling me that the Lebanese Forces' officer in charge of al-Qulay'at is the officer who won the battle against General 'Awn. That officer won a part of the battle. It was the command that won the entire battle. This is how the situation was at the time, whether in Ihdin, in Mount Lebanon, or in East or West Sidon. I was not in the position of command or of responsibility in all these places. Most frequently, they sent me to deal with difficult conditions because they were difficult.

[Hammud] Having talked about Ihdin, can you tell us what happened at the time?

[Ja'ja'] I believe that this topic is timeworn. We have all, both those of us directly concerned and those indirectly concerned, surpassed the topic. I do not imagine it is wise to ask such a question at such a time. We believe that we no longer have a problem with anybody, especially with those who have expressed their wish to carry on with the al-Ta'if accord.

[Hammud] In specific terms, what does Halat mean now?

[Ja'ja'] It means that Minister Junblat recently licensed al-Damur airfield while refusing to license Halat airfield because it constitutes a partitionist step. Whatever steps are taken by others such as [those regarding] al-Qulay'at airfield, where planes can land any time they wish, are unifying steps. I have been very pleased with this step, and I hope that approval also will be given to Riyahq airfield because it is not necessary for the Lebanese citizen to suffer constant hardship. But I do not understand why Halat airfield cannot have the same status as al-Qulay'at or Riyahq airfields or al-Damur airport, which Minister Junblat has licensed on the pretext that planes take off from it to photograph propaganda films and for training and recreational purposes, and so forth.

[Hammud] Would you accept such a status for Halat airfield?

[Ja'ja'] Of course, we will agree to any kind of license for training or distributing [as published] propaganda films. We will agree to the same kind of license given to Riyahq or al-Damur airfields. How can one project one's self at the national level and then look at things with just one eye? One must strike a balance between one's acts.

#### Kidnaped Iranians

[Hammud] We have a question on the four Iranian hostages who were taken in 1982. There have been reports that they were in your trust.

[Ja'ja'] This is absolutely untrue. Eli Hubayqah was the head of the security and intelligence agency, which was a single agency. Everybody knows this. The Iranians were stopped at al-Barbarah roadblock which, from the security standpoint, was under the control of Eli Hubayqah, not the northern military command. At the time, the northern command was a military command whereas al-Barbarah roadblock was a security roadblock. All those stopped at al-Barbarah roadblock were taken to the security agency controlled by Eli Hubayqah. Upon their arrival there, Hubayqah ordinarily issued his instructions for their liquidation. When Shaykh Bashir [al-Jumayyil] learned of the matter, he became enraged. Eli Hubayqah did not know what he had to do then. These are facts which we learned from within the establishment. In any case, there are still living young men, persons, and officials who were witnesses to this incident. We will try to find them, even though all I know is that they were with Eli Hubayqah and were taken at the al-Barbarah roadblock. As in the case of all armies, the northern military command had nothing to do with the

issue of the kidnapped. When the kidnappers reached Eli Hubayqah and asked him what to do, he told them, as usual: Liquidate them. When Shaykh Bashir learned of the incident, he decided to remove Eli Hubayqah. But then developments overtook Bashir and he was martyred before he could replace Eli.

[Hammud] Before Habib al-Shartuni was handed over to the legitimate authorities, he was in the custody of the Lebanese Forces.

[Ja'ja'] No, in Hubayqah's custody.

[Hammud] ...

[Ja'ja'] What is the matter with you? I assure you that he was with Eli Hubayqah. What do you want to know?

[Hammud] I want to know why you did not try him?

[Ja'ja'] At the time, Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil and Shaykh Pierre held the view that there was a government in place. What is more, they themselves were in the government. So why did they (handle the matter) in this manner? Al-Shartuni had to be transferred to the government. Eli Hubayqah is the one who arrested al-Shartuni. I do not know why he did not write a complete report! We must put a question mark here. It seems that Hubayqah's alliance with As'ad Hardan started long ago.

[Hammud] And then?

[Ja'ja'] Then Hubayqah handed him over to the government. The government initiated interrogations which it did not finish. One of the points I raised was: In an area controlled by the government, is it permissible to release an officially apprehended detainee in this manner? Brother, al-Shartuni must be at least re-tried. What happened is horrible.

[Hammud] The [Syrian Social] Nationalist Party is prepared to submit al-Shartuni to the court and to link this to the dossier of the perpetrators of the other crimes and massacres that have been committed?

[Ja'ja'] That is fine. Let the party present him to the court. I believe that it is in the interest of the nationalist parties—because there is not just one nationalist party—not to present matters in this way, unless the party says this just for "embellishment." This man was in jail. Who put him in jail? Let us assume that he was put there mistakenly. If so, then there is the appeals court, and an appeal or an official request can be made for his retrial. The court may decide to acquit him. But I want to ask: Who is obstructing the government process. There are those who insist on destroying the government willfully and with predetermination before the government launches its process. We are all aware of the conditions under which Habib al-Shartuni was released. His release is one of the steps intended to mar the government's authority. "This is unbelievable."

[Hammud] Having talked about President [Amin] al-Jumayyil and about your commitment to the al-Ta'if

accord, the article on liberties, at least, notes that the Lebanese Forces have adopted resolutions prohibiting his return and activity.

[Ja'ja'] This is untrue. However, there is a resolution by the Lebanese Forces (urging) the Lebanese Government to sue President al-Jumayyil politically and financially. This is why what you have said is not true. But it is my opinion that al-Jumayyil himself is aware of the climate. If he wants to return, then let him do so. However, we are fully determined to subject him to a political and financial trial, if the government so wishes, within the framework of the Constitutional Court or of the court for the trial of presidents. I do not know if the powers of this court are retroactive. Now I remember, they did establish it 10 years ago with retroactive powers. If the government does not wish to take him to court, then we in the resistance or the Phalangist Party are prepared to subject him to a political trial. It is my opinion that what he committed against Lebanon is a major crime. Moreover, there are financial scandals, and I have heard that they exceed \$300-500 million. We must start acting responsibly in this country. If any person can come and do whatever he wishes without anybody being able to bring him to account ultimately, then anybody who assumes control of the government will do whatever he wishes and then flee, and the people will be left to suffer.

[Hammud] After your closure of the fifth dock and your removal of the al-Barbarah roadblock, or financial....

[Ja'ja'] The al-Barbarah roadblock is part of the general plan to be drawn up. Why do you see the al-Barbarah roadblock only and not the other roadblocks in Lebanon's territories? As part of the security plan, the al-Barbarah roadblock and the other roadblocks will be discussed at the level of the national accord government.

#### Two Doctors

[Hammud] You have started the dialogue with Amal at a time when there are other influential factions, such as the Socialist Party, Hizballah, and a number of other forces.

[Ja'ja'] We will try to hold contacts with all the others. If somebody asks why the contacts with Amal have been started before contacts with the others, it is because two doctors, one of them in the Lebanese Forces and the other in Amal, happen to be friends. The two, namely Dr. Muhammad Baydun from Amal and Dr. Tawfiq al-Hindi from the Lebanese Forces, had personal contacts and, subsequently, channels of communication were opened. You ask me: Why not with the others? My answer is that the contacts, as well as meetings, with all the Lebanese factions will come in succession because "nothing will be done except in this manner." If every faction wants to isolate itself and not deal with the others, then this is a catastrophe.

#### Dialogue With Syria

[Hammud] There is an issue connected with the Christian-Syrian-Lebanese dialogue. The fact is that this dialogue began some time ago, and we have seen more than one Christian notable start the dialogue with Damascus. For you as the Lebanese Forces, what role do you play within the context of this dialogue?

[Ja'ja'] Again, the national accord charter, called the al-Ta'if accord, provides the answers to all these questions. This charter contains a defined framework for Lebanese-Syrian relations. We are committed to this definition. But let us dot the line. We will not define a ceiling that is higher or lower than this ceiling. Lebanese-Syrian relations are established through the legitimate Lebanese Government. We must all support the legitimate government. Otherwise, how can the relations be established through the legitimate government? We adhere to what is stipulated by the al-Ta'if accord.

[Hammud] Some factions need guarantees in order that they may join the settlement. To you, it is the opposite. What are the guarantees that you will offer to the solution in order that it may move forward?

[Ja'ja'] "Now, we are the ones to give guarantees?" It is my opinion that the guarantees demanded by everybody are found in the al-Ta'if accord itself and found with the factions that support the accord and move in its direction. The most important guarantee is [not] to try to outmaneuver each other [but] to try to implement this accord as it is and apply its provisions in the order in which they are presented in the accord itself. I am very certain that if we fully implement the al-Ta'if accord as it is without omitting a single letter from it and in the order in which it is formulated, this would be the biggest guarantee to all the Lebanese at all levels. I hope that we, as Lebanese Forces, will adhere to the end to the al-Ta'if accord in its entirety and in the order in which it is presented. I hope that all the factions will demonstrate the same commitment. Thus, "we can" aspire to a much more tranquil, secure, and stable future than the condition we have experienced in the past 15 years.

#### TUNISIA

##### Correspondent Reports on Split in An Nahda Movement

91AA0043A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
17 Oct 90 pp 6-7

[Article: "Split in An Nahda Party Between Emigre Ghannouchi and His Supporters in Tunis"]

[Text] Will the situation in Tunisia bring a new confrontation with the An Nahda Party led by Shaykh Rachid Ghannouchi from exile, where he has chosen to remain since leaving Tunisia in May 1989?

Signs of confrontation have multiplied since the Nahdists decided to mobilize the grass roots, organize demonstrations, and fill the streets and walls with antigovernment slogans. The escalation by the Nahdists has led to the organization of a number of trials that have caught several dozen participants in the demonstrations. This Islamic organization was formed in the early seventies. Its leader, Ghannouchi, was a supporter of Arab nationalism and of the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. When Ghannouchi returned from studying in Syria and began teaching philosophy in secondary institutions, he and a number of supporters found the atmosphere suitable for giving classes which, although religious in coloring, were at bottom clearly political in implication.

During a period from the seventies to the beginning of the eighties, the Nahdists (the name is new and represents a concession by the Islamists to the government in the wake of the recognition of their party in 1988) were generally in a camp opposed to the aspirations of the people. They did not believe in trade unionism, at a time when such activity was the only point of departure for confronting and opposing the government. During this period, the Nahdists took a stand against the social forces that were siding with the General Union of Tunisian Workers [UGTT]—forces seeking cadres that could serve the democratic process that was strongly expressing itself and seeking to make its way in the UGTT under Habib Achour and the Freedoms' Council during the days of Hasib Ben Ammar and the Tunisian Human Rights Defense League. When the UGTT struck on 26 January 1978, Ghannouchi and his group were not among the forces expressing an open or implicit position.

These positions, along with other positions not committed to the main issue of the Tunisian people's struggle for democracy, caused splits in the movement. A group of progressives emerged, led by Hamida Nifar and Slaheddine Jouchi. Others left the movement. However, these withdrawals had no effect, since the eighties were a period of growing membership: first, because of the appearance of being victims; second, because of the attractiveness of the public message. It was assumed that Ghannouchi would remain in Tunisia. However, after the April 1989 general elections, he preferred to live overseas, despite the fact that his party came in second after the ruling party, with about 17 percent of the votes. Observers believe he has lost touch with reality. This has led An Nahda supporters in Tunisia to assert on several occasions that only positions expressed by the spokesman in Tunisia are binding upon the An Nahda movement.

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

### Crisis Impact on Armed Forces Recruitment, Training

91AE0045A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
17 Oct 90 pp 56, 57

[Text] One week after the call by the Armed Forces General Command to the citizens to volunteer, the first

batch of volunteers was arriving at the training centers that have been set up in all the state's regions and towns.

The rush to volunteer by all categories of people was so great that Armed Forces officials were more than once compelled to increase the training centers and assembly points for volunteers. The response to the call for volunteers was so enthusiastic as to raise the question of whether there is need to introduce compulsory service since the rush to join the Armed Forces ranks has been of such a volume and characterized by such a spirit.

With the end of the first round of consecutive training courses that last six weeks, 35,000 UAE [United Arab Emirates] citizens, aged between 15 and 40 years, will have gone through intensive military training courses. During these courses the volunteers are trained on basic military skills, such as the use of weapons and familiarization with the various arms used in wars. Additionally, many receive instructions in physical fitness, especially office workers who are used to the comfort and ease of civilian life.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Hamdan Khalfan, commander of the special forces of the UAE Armed Forces, "the process of training civilians in military life with its roughness and discipline was not difficult because volunteering stems from a real and genuine desire by the citizens because of the sense of the danger threatening their homeland and have become aware of their responsibility to defend their people and country."

He added: "Under circumstances different from those the area is now experiencing, training civilians and preparing them for military life would have taken a longer time and would have required greater training efforts. But, with the existence of the danger threatening the area, the enthusiasm shown by the citizens, and the interaction between the volunteers' feelings and events in the area, the operation took a different course with respect to the speed by which trainees absorbed military sciences and to their compliance with the conditions and rules of military discipline."

Lieutenant Muhammad al-Ka'bi, from the school of artillery and the school's senior instructor, said: "The training course is divided into three stages. In the first, physical fitness is acquired through different types of physical training. It includes military discipline and getting used to obeying orders. It also includes training on ordinary infantry operations. This period lasts two weeks. In the second stage, the volunteers are trained on individual weapons and how to dismantle and reassemble the rifle, coupled with training on firing, adopting combat position, and on methods of confrontation between infantry forces. This stage takes another two weeks, after which the volunteers move to the third and final stage which also takes two weeks. The last stage is the specialization stage at which the volunteers are trained in other, more advanced weapons, such as 105 mm artillery, chemical warfare, management of military battles, and parachuting."



Volunteering is not limited to a particular faction of citizens, since it covers a broad spectrum of society and people of various interests and ages. The volunteers include a number of the children of UAE President Shaykh Zayid Bin-Sultan Al Nuhayyan and a large number of shaykhs and Al Nuhayyan children, including, for example, Shaykh Sa'id Bin-Tahnun Al Nuhayyan, head of al-'Ayn municipality and a member of Abu Dhabi Emirate Executive Council.

The volunteers also include a large number of departmental directors and heads of ministerial divisions, in addition to a large number of employees of various specializations, including doctors, engineers, and teachers.

In addition to those, the volunteers' ranks include thousands of students from the Emirates University, the higher technical college, the preparatory and secondary schools, and the specialized technical academies.

As a result of students rushing to join training, the Ministry of Education decided to defer the commencement of the scholastic year by three weeks in order to give the students the chance to complete their training. Consequently, the midyear vacation has been shortened to five days instead of three weeks.

Although the level of volunteering has exceeded all expectations, the atmosphere of military training being experienced in the UAE homes has opened the way to a debate in which everybody is taking part and the importance of military conscription is being discussed in many forums.

While some people believe that the level of response to volunteering is more than enough at this stage, some others believe that the intensive training the volunteers are receiving at present is not sufficient to create specialized cadres that would constitute an adequate reserve for the armed forces when it is necessary. They say that conscription provides the trainee with a longer opportunity to adapt to military life and learn all skills, including those specialized skills. In addition, it would give the recruit an opportunity to serve longer with the armed forces, which would qualify him to rejoin the forces any moment when necessary.

They also say that military conscription is not an innovation; it is a system adopted in all the world countries, including those countries that pursue a neutral policy and in which there is no evident role for their military establishments in public life. A third group stands on a middle ground between these two. This group believes that there is no need at this stage to spoil the atmosphere of enthusiasm in which volunteering is taking place by making military training some kind of compulsory and coercive action, as long as volunteering produces the number of volunteers matching the number of military recruits obtained through conscription laws.

This group of people believes that it is possible to make military training a kind of voluntary action in response

to the call of duty or a kind of obligation through certain organizational measures, such as making military culture a basic subject in schools, academies, and universities.

In fact, the Emirates University has decided that the subject of military sciences should become one of the basic requirements which, if a student does not successfully pass, can prevent graduation. Others came up with the idea that military training should be made continuous, under which volunteers are regularly called for one month of training every year.

Scores of male and female citizens have responded with equal enthusiasm to the call for training on civil defense, first aid, tending the wounded, and various other nursing duties. Training in this field includes all types of work in the civil defense system, such as fire extinguishing, rubble removing, and dealing with effects of chemical, bacteriological, and other mass destruction weapons.

Female volunteers have joined intensive training classes which the Armed Forces Command and Civil Defense have prepared for them. They were given basic training in rescue and nursing operations in addition to training on basic military skills.

Although the level of response for training and volunteering to join the Armed Forces ranks was spurred by the conditions which the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has created in the area, it is evident that the present military training is not a temporary operation. Indeed, it will be a permanent part of public life in the region. Events have proved that the area in fact needs to prepare itself, take precautions against any covetous party, and confront any danger.

"Military training," according to armed forces officials, "will be an ongoing thing that will never stop or end with the end of the present crisis in the area because preparing and providing means of power is the deterrent to the outbreak of a similar crisis or the launching of any aggression."

The officials added: "Training is in itself useful to the citizens' civilian life since learning discipline and gaining physical fitness is useful for the volunteers even after they return to resume their usual civilian work. After this military experience, perhaps they will observe more discipline in civilian life and will appreciate the life of comfort they have been enjoying and the role their armed forces are playing in protecting them and defending their gains."

## REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

### Goods Imported with Exodus from Saudi Arabia

91AE0112A Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English  
28 Oct 90 p 2

[Text] Jeddah, 27 October—More than 300,000 Yemenis have so far left Saudi Arabia, opening up more



investment opportunities for Saudis, according to Hamad al-Rashudi director general of the Customs Department.

Yemenis were allowed to carry home all their property, including subsidized agricultural and industrial products and foodstuffs, he said.

Some of them took out 583.3 tons of sugar, 861 tons of barley, 663.5 tons of sorghum, 563.1 tons of flour, 335.4 tons of rice, 202.5 tons of vegetable oil, 302.8 tons of milk, 302.7 tons of wheat, 2.5 tons of tea and 256.8 tons of canned foodstuffs.

Rashudi said the Yemenis also took with them 2,699 units of electrical appliances, 607 tons of agricultural machinery and construction material, 24,135 cars and 1,500 heads of cattle.

More than 70,000 Yemenis who fled Kuwait and Iraq were provided shelter, food and drinking water during their stay in the Kingdom while waiting to be returned home. Some of these were transported to the border check points at the expense of the Saudi government, he told 'Ukaz.

## BANGLADESH

### Ershad in Brussels Asks For EC Aid, Trade

91AS0243A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 19 Oct 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Brussels. 18 October—President Hussain Muhammad Ershad has said that Bangladesh wanted uninterrupted market access to its products in the European countries as a support to build its economy, reports BSS [Bangladesh News Agency].

It is not the aid alone but we want trade to build our economy, the President said while speaking at a meeting with the chairmen of political groups of the European Parliament here yesterday.

Mr Enrique Baron Crespo, President of the European Parliament also spoke on the occasion while Mr Cramp-ton, Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee and Mr Saby, President of Development Committee of the European Parliament participated in the discussion. Foreign Minister Anisul Islam Mahmud was present.

President Ershad said although Bangladesh had been heading towards achieving self sufficiency in food by 1992 and working hard to bring down its rate of population growth yet the country needed "your assistance" for some more time.

He said Bangladesh's food production had been raised from 16 million tons in 1982 to 19.5 million tons while it needed only .5 million tons more food production to become self sufficient.

The President explained the measures taken by his government to deal with the population explosion problem.

President Ershad said his government had introduced a true democratic system at the grassroots level through the creation of 460 sub-districts (upazilas) where he said elected local leaders were running their own affairs.

Referring to the problem of Chittagong Hill Tracts President Ershad said situation was improving there following the creation of local government district councils.

He said these councils had been given enough power to run their own affairs right from collecting tax to recruitment of local police.

President Ershad said he had held 282 meetings with the tribal people there to reach a solution to the problem created by the government which came to power following Bangladesh's liberation. He, however, expressed the hope that the hill tracts problem would be solved gradually.

The President said his government had taken a liberal industrial policy for expeditious industrialisation of the country.

In this context, he said, the government which came to power after the liberation had introduced a socialist system in this sector and had nationalised all industries.

But the present government he added, had denationalised public sector industries and given stress on the growth of industries in the private sector.

President Ershad explained the measures taken by his government to attract foreign investment in Bangladesh.

The President referred to the Gulf crisis and explained its adverse effect on the economy of Bangladesh.

He said Bangladesh also became a worst sufferer of the "green house" effect and added with the rising of sea bed one third of the country might be submerged.

President Ershad recalled the help and support extended by the Euro-parliament to the development of Bangladesh.

He said the Euro-parliament was a true embodiment of democracy overcoming national boundary to achieve a better objective.

Earlier, welcoming President Ershad the Euro-Parliament President Baron Crespo pledged to continue the help and assistance to Bangladesh.

### Ershad Urges Maintenance of Communal Harmony

91AS0242A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 1 Nov 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] President Hussain Muhammad Ershad Wednesday gave a clarion call to the people to maintain communal harmony in keeping with the country's glorious tradition in this regard, reports BSS [Bangladesh News Agency].

Addressing a big youth rally in front of Bangabhaban, the President said Bangladesh has a good reputation in the world for its communal harmony and urged all to maintain this reputation.

President Ershad said "we all, Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Buddhists, have been living for ages in this country with love and amity. I have never asked whether a Hindu or a Christian or a Buddhist is sitting beside me, nor so was asked by others."

Referring to the Tuesday night's incident in Chittagong, the President said he had taken steps so that the Hindu brethren were not persecuted. "So long as I am alive I shall not allow my Hindu brethren to be harassed," he declared.

President Ershad urged the members of the Hindu community to live freely with dignity and said it was the duty of his government and the people of this country to ensure the rights and security of the minority communities.

President Ershad reiterated that he believed in communal harmony and said as Muslims it is our religious duty to love others.

Vice-President Moudud Ahmed, Deputy Prime Minister and Jatiya Party Secretary General Shah Moazzem Hos-sain, and a youth leaders Golam Kibria Tipu who joined the Jatiya Party on the occasion also addressed the rally.

Former Prime Minister Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury, Ministers and Jatiya Party leaders were present.

Turning to national politics, President Ershad told the youths that the Jatiya Party had brought qualitative changes in politics through its relentless efforts for national uplift during the last nine years.

He said eight elections, including two presidential, two parliamentary, two upazila and two union council pollings were held in the country maintaining the democratic process.

President Ershad said that being unnerved at the successes achieved by the Jatiya Party in all fields of national development some opposition parties in the name of "so-called movement" were trying to create chaos in the country.

He said the nature of opposition movement this time was a different one in that they were engaged in destroying national properties. If the Opposition parties are not responsible then who are those people who are destroying national properties and where from they have come? he asked.

President Ershad urged the youth to forge unity to rise against such destructive politics and unmask those giving indulgence to foreign conspiracy to hinder our national progress.

President Ershad said the Opposition movement was diminishing as the people were not responding to their call remembering their misdeeds in the past.

Replying to an Opposition leader's allegation that his government was perusing a policy of repression, the President said the people were aware in which regime lakhs of people had starved and died, 40,000 political activists were killed and 40,000 others languished in jails.

To another Opposition leader's accusation that his government had curbed freedom of the Press, President Ershad said she should see the newspapers which had been writing freely and independently. Eighty daily newspapers and 700 weeklies are now being published in the country projecting their views freely, he asserted.

Referring to a peasant's rally in the capital on Tuesday President Ershad showed a picture of the rally to the audience and said the participants in the rally were dressed in trousers and shirts.

"If they are peasants then certainly the credit goes to my government as it shows their condition has improved," he added.

President Ershad urged the organisers of the peasants' rally not to cut jokes with the peasants and asserted that it was the Jatiya Party government which had done a lot for the welfare of the poor farmers.

President Ershad said it was he who had constituted Rin Shalishi Board, exempted interest on agriculture loans taken by the peasants, and allocated land for the landless and added all the steps were taken to ameliorate the condition of the peasants who had been neglected in the past.

He said the Jatiya Party Government was the first to set up a youth development centre and take steps to generate employment for the youths.

President Ershad said his government through its policy decision had been working for industrial development for the creation of job opportunities and for national development.

He urged the opposition not to mislead people in the name of price increase and said it was because of their (Opposition) hartal and road blockade that the prices of essentials had been increased.

President Ershad said in the international market, the price of oil had been increased from 14 dollars a barrel to 40 dollars but here in Bangladesh the price was raised by 54 percent.

## Government Responds to Demands For Elections

### Vice President's Remarks

91AS0241A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 10 Oct 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Vice President Moudud Ahmed on Tuesday [word indistinct] the offer of dialogue to the country's mainstream opposition said that the Government was ready to take measures for holding meaningful and credible future polls. Informal discussions with the opposition at different levels is in progress, he added.

Talking to a group of newsmen at his Secretariat office chamber on the day Vice President Moudud Ahmed also indicated the possibility of holding the presidential election sometime in next June.

The dialogue offer of the Government came on the eve of the opposition's united programme of sit-in demonstration in front of Bangladesh Secretariat today (Wednesday) to press home their demands for resignation of the present Government paving the way for holding fair polls under a neutral government.

When asked to comment on participation of mainstream opposition parties in future polls under the present Government the Vice President said, "I am hopeful they will join future elections."

The Vice President said that the parties which would not join elections, should not have the right to question on credibility and acceptability of election results.

Meanwhile with the passage of the Ninth Amendment the office of the Vice President has been made elective and the Vice Presidential election is also expected to be held simultaneously with the Presidential polls, according to a highly placed source. Whether the Presidential and election to the office of Vice President will be held on the same day on single ballot will be sorted out in due course, the source indicated.

While talking to newsmen Vice President Moudud Ahmed said that the Government had no objection to the presence of foreign polls observers to oversee the polls. He also recalled President Ershad's offer to the opposition for their suggestion to hold credible and fair polls. The Government is willing to extend publicity in Government controlled electronic media including radio and television provided the opposition join the future polls, Mr Moudud Ahmed said.

Asked to comment on today's (Wednesday) oppositions sit in demonstration Mr Moudud Ahmed said that it was their democratic right to organise movement against the Government. Their movement has so far yielded little impact as "they could not win people's support," he viewed. In an oblique reference to Awami League and BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] he said they would not be able to launch a united mass movement as they suffer from ideological differences and contradictions.

#### **Ershad: Polls 'Next Year'**

91AS0241B Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 1 Nov 90 p 1

[Text] President Hussain Muhammad Ershad said in Dhaka on Wednesday that Union Parishad elections will be held in the country next year, reports BSS Bangladesh News Agency].

Addressing a big youth rally in front of Bangabhaban gate, the President said his government believed in constitutional politics and reiterated its firm determination to uphold democratic process.

In this context, he said during the last nine years altogether eight elections, including two presidential, two Jatiya Sangsad, and two upazila polls were held.

President Ershad said at present two political trends were prevailing in the country. The Jatiya Party politics, he added, was aimed at building national resources for the amelioration of the condition of the masses while the opposition was pursuing the politics of destruction.

He said because of Jatiya Party's positive politics for the welfare of the masses the youths were coming forward to join it despite terrorism created by the Opposition.

#### **Reportage on Relations Between Opposition Leaders**

##### **Khaleda Zia for Unity**

91AS0238A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 14 Oct 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Sirajganj, 13 October: Begum Khaleda Zia said today she was ready to carry on the current movement hand in hand with all Opposition leaders to "oust the Ershad government," reports UNB [United News of Bangladesh].

"I am ready to come on a single platform with any leader of any political party or alliance to lead a united movement to oust Ershad," the BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] Chairperson and Seven-party Alliance leader told a public meeting at Ullapara this afternoon.

The all-party meeting was organised by local Seven-party, Eight-party and Five-party alliance units to protest the killing of Nazir Hossain Jihad, the thana unit leader of Jatiyabadi Chhatra Dal (JCD).

Jihad was shot dead during the opposition sit-in demonstration on Wednesday in the capital.

Begum Zia said, "Ershad will be ousted shortly if nobody betrays the blood of Jihad-Monwaf which brought us on a single platform here."

Being afraid of the people's movement, she alleged, the government had ordered firing on the innocent people and killed many student leaders and opposition activists.

The government is harassing the flood-affected farmers of Sirajganj district by filing certificate cases against them, she said and demanded withdrawal of all these loan-recovery cases.

Presided over by local BNP leader Kamal Yusuf, the meeting was also addressed, among others, by Mustafizur Rahman, Fazlur Rahman Patal, Samiul Islam George and Mir Muraduzzaman of BNP, Abdul Latif of BAKSAL [Bangladesh Awami Krishak Sramik League], Motahar Hossain Talukder of Awami League and student leaders.

##### **Hasina's Negative Response**

91AS0238B Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 15 Oct 90 pp 1, 8

[Text] Awami League chief Sheikh Hasina on Sunday turned down the slogan for a single opposition platform to lead the anti-government movement, saying a genuine unity could be possible only on the street and in the course of movement, reports UNB [United news of Bangladesh].

"No platform, come and unite in the movement on the street," she said.

Addressing a big protest rally at the Bangabandhu Avenue, he advised the people to remain vigilant against "confusion and false propaganda orchestrated by government agents" to mislead the current anti-autocracy movement.

"Don't pay heed to confusion, speed up the movement and avenge the bloodbath pulling down this regime," Hasina told her slogan-shouting workers and supporters.

Referring to a controversy raised on the Dhaka University Campus on Saturday on Joy Bangla slogan, the Awami League leader said people of this country had fought the bloody liberation war at the call of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib with this slogan.

It united the whole Bangalee nation against the then Pakistani military junta, she added.

Urging to give up "Bangladesh Zindabad" slogan, Hasina warned those who would oppose this historic slogan (Joy Bangla) would be identified.

She said the confusion is being created by certain quarters when the student community has stood united.

The Awami League President bitterly criticised repressive measures against the present democratic movement and said closing the university and schools and colleges to stop people's struggle is "simply nonsense."

She asked the students of Dhaka University to go to their respective villages and towns and spread the "fire of wrath" against this regime.

Hasina also issued warning against Minister, MPs [Members of Parliament] and the ruling party people who, she alleged, amassed wealth and deposited in foreign accounts.

Ridiculing the government austerity measures, Hasina said the government was advising the people for austerity on the one hand and on the other President Ershad touring foreign countries squandering crores of Taka.

"Stop going abroad, you have no right to squander people's wealth," Hasina said.

### **Government Issues Pressnotes on Civil Disturbances**

#### **Incidents in Dhaka, Chittagong**

91AS0240A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 1 Nov 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Curfew was imposed in three thanas of Dhaka City on Wednesday evening following the attempt to attack two temples in the capital on Wednesday by a few miscreants, reports BSS [Bangladesh News Agency].

A Press Note issued by the Home Ministry on Wednesday night said curfew was imposed in Sutrapur, Kotwali and Lalbagh then as in Dhaka City from 6 p.m. on Wednesday. The situation is under control, the Press Note added.

Curfew was also imposed in Chittagong City from 3 a.m. to 2 p.m. on Wednesday when the miscreants tried to disturb peace and discipline and attempted to damage a temple there. The situation in Chittagong City is under control, it said.

BDR [Bangladesh Rifles] has been deployed in Dhaka and Chittagong to assist the police and strengthen the maintenance of the overall peace and discipline.

The government expressed the hope that all concerned quarters would maintain peace, discipline and harmony by demonstrating extreme tolerance and patience.

It is the sacred duty of all countrymen to ensure the safety of the property of the people and the government hopes that all concerned quarters will sincerely co-operate with the government for maintaining peace, discipline and harmony, said.

The Press Note said, "A handful of miscreants tried to disturb peace and discipline in Chittagong City deep at night on 30 October entering the Babri Mosque situation in Ayodhya of India and attempted at damaging the Kaiballyadham Temple to some extent. But the law-enforcing agency instantly brought the situation under control. Curfew was imposed in Chittagong from 3 a.m. to 2 p.m. The situation is under control now."

A few miscreants tried to attack Jaikali and Dhakewari temples in Dhaka city. They also tried to set fire to the temples. Curfew has been imposed in Sutrapur, Kotwali and Lalbagh thanas of Dhaka city from 6 p.m. Wednesday. The situation is under control now.

BDR has in the meantime been deployed in Dhaka and Chittagong to assist the police and strengthen the maintenance of overall peace and discipline.

The government hopes that all concerned quarters will maintain peace, discipline and harmony by demonstrating due patience and tolerance.

It is the sacred duty of all countrymen to ensure the security of people's property. The government hopes that all concerned quarters will sincerely co-operate with the government for the maintenance of peace, discipline and harmony."

#### **10 October Incidents**

91AS0240B Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 11, 12 Oct 90 pp 1, 3

[11 October 90 p 1]

[Text] A Ministry of Home Affairs Press Note said Wednesday night that despite maximum restraint practised by the law enforcing agencies while controlling



incidents related to the sit-in demonstration called by some opposition political parties, 5 persons were killed and 40 police and ansar personnel were injured, reports BSS [Bangladesh News Agency].

The Press Note said, "two persons were killed by police firing when the demonstrators attacked the police box at Gulistan and injured sub-inspector Rafiqul Islam in the head with ram dao. One police sergeant and a sub-inspector had also been injured by the attackers. Another person was killed at Motijheel area. The cause of the death was not known.

"The condition of two police sub-inspector Rafiqul Islam and constable Badrul Islam was stated to be critical."

#### 12 October 90 p 3

Following is the remaining part of the Press Note issued by the Home Ministry Wednesday night: The Press Note said the Seven Party, Five Party, Eight Party alliances and some one or two parties took sit-in demonstration programme around Bangladesh Secretariat from 10 a.m. today, the 10th of October 1990.

An estimated 1,000 workers and supporters of Seven Party alliance led by BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] at Dainik Bangla square, 4,000/5,000 workers and supporters of Awami League at Ramna Bhaban premises and 500 supporters and workers of Five Party alliance took part in this programme.

Although any government of an independent and sovereign country does not tolerate this kind of programme full of anarchy and destructive motives, the Press Note said, the government has tried to contain the situation with utmost patience.

The above mentioned political parties also announced their sit-in strike around the Secretariate. But, unfortunately, a hand bomb was hurled at the police on duty at around 11:40 a.m. from the meeting venue of the Five Party Alliance and as a result, Sergeant Manjur was seriously injured.

Despite this sudden attack on police the police tried to contain the situation with utmost patience.

Meanwhile, the Eight Party Alliance after delivering hot speeches announced a programme from its meeting venue and was leading their procession towards Victorian park following withdrawing from the sit-in strike. The Five Party led procession was also proceeding along another route.

Just at the time the supporters and workers of the BNP led Seven Party Alliance at Dainik Bangla square suddenly started terrorist activities with indiscriminately hurling bricks and handbombs at police. Police brought the situation under control through tear gassing.

But after that extensive destruction was taking place through setting fire on various government and non-government vehicles and offices and residences. An unaccountable number of vehicles were burnt and destroyed.

Even, the Press Note said, petrol pump was not spared from arsoning which was unforeseen in the history of this country. When the whole world is facing fuel crisis and the economies of various countries including Bangladesh are at stake, then the responsibility of every patriotic citizen should be to preserve and reserve the fuel. But at that moment, how a petrol pump can be the target of arson and destruction is beyond the perception of the government.

Besides, everybody knows that the flame from inflaming a petrol pump after setting fire spreads quickly all over the city and this can cause extensive damage to life and property. Following this sorrowful and unfortunate incident, the members of the law enforcing agency maintained utmost restraint and fully abstained from firing the Press Note said and added even after that some injured persons were brought to Dhaka Medical College Hospital from Motijheel and other parts of the city between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m.

The government unequivocally makes it clear to the people that police have not fired any shot during this period. So, the question naturally arose as to how three persons were killed by gunfire the Press Note asked. The question also arose whether this incident occurred in a well-planned way by a section of a specific party.

It is necessary to mention here that the woman political leader of that specific party made a very irresponsible allegation on a party that it was responsible for this gunfire incident. The government unequivocally said that there was no worker of that political party in its office at that time. This should also be made clear that police was not present during the time of occurrence of these incidents. So, it was also not clear as to how they were killed or injured.

Still then, there was a strong attempt to set fire on the Bangladesh Biman head office. Besides, the Labour Directorate office was also attacked and 26 vehicles including 6 government vehicles were set on fire which was continuing issuance of this Press Note.

At about 1:30 p.m. Gulistan police box came under attack and police Sub-Inspector Rafiqul Islam was injured seriously during the attack at his back and on his head by the blow of a ram dao. His condition is serious. A police Sergeant and another police Sub-Inspector were also injured.

At that moment, police finding no other way to open fire first for the safety of their lives and property and as a result two persons were killed, the Press Note said.

The government, according to the Press unequivocally said that the government took security measures as an

inevitable step in view of the Secretariate gherao programme taken by the various political parties.

It is evident from the above mentioned incidents that these attacks were made by a certain section of a specific party extensively damaging the property of this poor country and causing death to some valuable lives.

In all, 40 members of police and Ansar forces were injured and condition of Sub-Inspector Rafiqul Islam and constable Badrul Islam was critical.

Police maintained utmost restraint and patience in maintaining law and order in a lawful way, the Press Note said adding that the loss of valuable lives was undoubtedly a matter of sorrow despite there were utmost cautions measures.

The government expressed its deep sense of sorrow at the loss of lives and sympathy with the members of the bereaved families. The government decided to conduct investigation and inquiry into the causes of these accidents, the Press Note also said.

The government clearly mentioned in the Press Note the government was pledge bound to ensure security to all peace loving and law abiding citizens of the country.

Law and order, under no circumstances, will be deteriorated, the Press Note said.

The government sincerely hoped that for the national interest the concerned sections would abstain from the activities subversive to law of the land.

### 13 October Incidents

91AS0240C Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English  
14 Oct 90 pp 1, 4

[Text] One Manirul Islam was killed and two others were injured in police firing while they were engaged in destructive activities in Tejgaon Industrial Area in Dhaka yesterday, according to a Press Note issued by the Home Ministry last night, report BSS [Bangladesh News Agency].

The Press Note said though there was no programme of the political parties yesterday, some student organisations called for strike in the educational institutions. During this strike period extensive damage to a number of government and private vehicles were made in some stray incidents in the metropolitan city. Besides, different government and private assets were also damaged.

It said that police on duty lawfully obstructed some unruly students on the road in front of Tejgaon Polytechnic Institute while they were damaging government and private vehicles at about 9 a.m. At this the students became more agitated and set ablaze a jeep and started brickbattling and hurled cocktails on the police from the roofs of different buildings. At one stage at about 11 a.m. the unruly students entered the Sonali Bank and the BRTC [Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation] bus

repairing workshop adjacent to the Institute. They damaged properties and tried to loot and also set on fire the B.G. Press by entering it.

The Press Note said to make them refrain from these sort of destructive activities police first fired tear gas shells and made lathi charge. In spite of that they did not stop and tried to make more damage. Finding no other alternative police had to fire some rounds of bullets to save these government institutions from destruction. At this one Manirul Islam Azad and two others were injured. Later, Manirul Islam Azad died at the Dhaka Medical College Hospital.

The government sincerely regretted the death of a citizen as a result of violent and destructive activities by some persons, the Press Note added.

The government hoped that all concerned quarters would refrain from unlawful activities of damaging the government and private properties. It was the sacred duty of the government to safeguard state properties and lives and properties of the citizens, it said.

The Press Note further said the government wants to assure the people that it was determined to take appropriate measures to maintain law and order, safeguard the state properties and life and properties of every citizen.

### Law Breakers Warned

91AS0240D Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 17 Oct 90 pp 1, 8

[Text] The Government Tuesday called upon the concerned quarters to refrain from destructive activities including damaging public and private property, reports BSS [Bangladesh News Agency].

In a Press Note issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Government warned that stern action would be taken against those who would engage in such destructive activities. In this connection the Government sought all out cooperation from the members of the public.

The Press Note referred to the destructive activities by a section of unruly elements during Tuesday 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. hartal called by some opposition parties and alliances and said it was clear that a handful of unruly persons had caused wide-spread damage to the state property, which it termed as painful and harmful to the country's economy.

The Press Note said: "Some political parties and alliances had given a half-day hartal call from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. at different parts of the country.

During the time of this hartal, different state property including public and private transports were damaged.

In the Dhaka Metropolitan city, despite different kinds of harassments and serious provocations by the hartal supporters, police performed their lawful duties of maintaining law and order showing commendable patience.

At different points in the city cocktails and handbombs were hurled on the police. As a result three ansars and one passerby were injured. Police arrested four persons with handbombs.

The Press Note said: some unruly students had gheraoed one Old Transmitter Bhaban of Radio Bangladesh near Rajshahi University. At one stage, they forcibly entered the Transmitter area by breaking the lock at the gate and tried to destroy the Transmitter bhaban and valuable equipment. The unruly students hurled cocktails and threw stones at the police. They (police) resorted to lathi charge and lobbed tear gas shells to face this tense situation and to protect government equipment.

At one stage of the situation, police opened four rounds of rubber bullet.

As a result of throwing stones, in all 14 police men including 1 SP [Superintendent of Police], 1 Additional SP, 1 SI [Subinspector of Police], and 3 ASI [Assistant Inspector of Police] were injured. Even then, police showing utmost patience dispersed the students from there and restored peace and discipline.

In Mymensingh Agriculture University area, a section of unruly students lifted some slippers from the railway tracks and tried to set them ablaze. They ransacked and damaged the office of the University Railway Station and tried to set it on fire. Besides, they damaged the Bangladesh Institute of Nuclear Agriculture and Fisheries Research Institute located in the university area.

#### Note on Blockade

91AS0240E Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 28 Oct 90 pp 1, 10

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] The government Saturday expressed the hope that the concerned quarters among the politicians would refrain from damaging the property of the people and the state and would exercise tolerance and restraint, reports BSS Bangladesh News Agency].

The government also sought the cooperation of the concerned quarters in safeguarding the property of the people and of the state.

In a Press Note issued in Dhaka on Saturday night the government said certain political alliances and parties tried to blockade the railway and roads and highways through a pre-announced programme. The situation, due to the programme, however, remained peaceful except a few untoward incidents in some places of the country.

Some people removed fish-plates between Sharishabari and Jagannathganj Ghat Railway stations of the railway track in Jamalpur and also removed a section of the track in the same place. Later, the track was restored, it said.

In Dhaka city brickbats and cocktails were thrown at the police at various places. A mild clash occurred between a

procession of the Five Party Alliance and the Muslim League (Yusuf) in front of Topkhana branch of the Janata Bank. The police, however, brought the situation under control.

The Press Note continued, saying that some unruly persons damaged four staff buses of Janata Bank parked behind the petrol pump opposite Dhaka college. The police protected those buses when attempts to set them on fire were being made. A vehicle kept in front of the Beximco [Bangladesh Export Import Company] office in Dhanmondi area and furniture there were set on fire at 1:45 p.m. The police extinguished the fire. Some micro-buses in front of the 'Gano-Shashthya Pharma' in the same area were also set on fire. The fire had spread inside the 'Ganoshanthya' Pharma Office. The firemen of the fire service brought it under control. Besides the above mentioned vehicles, five micro buses and two tempos were set on fire at various places of the Dhaka city.

Besides one mini-bus, two private cars were damaged. Of the damaged vehicles, five are owned by the "Gano-Shashthya."

The Press Note further said that the government had taken necessary security measures for protecting the property of the state and of the people. The law enforcing agencies, however, had shown praiseworthy patience and tolerance in facing the situation. In spite of this, damage to property were done through the repetition of the incidents of the past, which could not be acceptable under any consideration, it said.

The government hoped that the concerned quarters among the politicians would refrain from damaging the property of the people and of the state and would exercise tolerance and restraint.

The government also sought the cooperation of the concerned quarters in safeguarding the property of the people and of the state, the Press Note added.

#### Shanti Bahini Split, Refugee Troubles Reported

91AS0239A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER  
in English 18 Oct 90 pp 1, 10

[Text] Rangamati, 17 October—A section of the armed Chakma miscreants has vowed to bring back home the chopped head of the fugitive tribal leader Upendra Lal Chakma indicating a severe rift in their ranks, reports UNB [United News of Bangladesh].

The group, comprising some ferocious young men, broke out of a meeting with Upendra on 23 August accusing top leaders of misappropriating funds, according to reports reaching here from across the border.

The group later threatened Upendra of dire consequences and pledged to bring his chopped head to his own village at Khagrachari.

Following the incident at the Agartala camp, Upendra Lal Chakma fled Tripura to Delhi taking along his two daughters, the reports said.

On the other hand, Samiran Chakma, one of the top leaders of the Hill Tracts Jano Sanghati Samity, has formed the CHT Displaced People's Organisation to help resettle the displaced and returnee Chakma families.

Samiran's new move is considered to be another indication of a possible split in the Sanghati Samity, which is said to be the political mentor of the so-called Shanti Bahini.

The Sanghati's chief, Jyotindra Bodhi Priyo Larma, known as Shantoo Larma, has been fighting for life with a serious illness at the Agratala J.B. Hospital.

Upendra Lal Chakma, who officiated in his place for the last two years, having fled to Delhi, Sanghati Samity itself is now said to be in disarray and on the verge of disintegration.

Meanwhile, the refugees camps across the border have turned into slaughter houses, according to the Chakma families who have recently escaped and trekked back home in Bangladesh.

They confirmed the reports which earlier trickled across the border that exchange of fire and shooting incidents involving the armed miscreants and border security forces had been very frequent in the recent days.

There had been at least four firing incidents in the last two months, in which a good number of innocent Chakma refugees anguishing in the camps were killed, the reports said.

Of these incidents, one took place at Katalchhari camp on 10 August two in Karbuk camp on 17 September and 10 October and the last very recently at the Pancharampara camp.

In the last incident at Pancharampara, the report said, one Police Inspector received head injury and was now under treatment at the hospital.

The camp dwellers are reportedly passing their days in panic fearing reprisal shooting by the Tripura police.

## INDIA

### Gujral Tells India's Stand on Gulf Crisis

91AS0218A Madras THE HINDU in English  
22 Oct 90 p 7

[Article by F. J. Khargamvala: "Gujral Outlines Bold Stance on Gulf Crisis"]

[Text] United Arab Emirates, 21 October—India has made what is by far the most clear and apparently final

position on the Gulf crisis, it goes well beyond anything said so far and clearly reflects the emerging realities of the situation.

The external affairs minister, Mr I.K. Gujral, at the end of a 2-day "goodwill visit" to the UAE [United Arab Emirates], in a prepared statement to the media, said "we believe that States have the right to take steps that are necessary, in order to defend themselves." This more than implicitly is an expression of understanding and support for the presence of the U.S.-led multinational force in the Gulf, though this is not said in so many words. Speaking in Dubayy, on the record, Mr Gujral added that India supported the "early convening" of an international conference (for West Asia) to resolve other outstanding issues.

This formulation succinctly rejects a direct linkage between the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and resolution of issues such as Palestine and Lebanon. However, officials clarified on background that there was a recognition of the "linkage" but that it was sequential. In other words, India does not agree with Iraq that its withdrawal from Kuwait should be conditional to the convening of an international conference.

The wording of the statement desiring "early convening" of the conference is the "same as Mr Gujral's speech at the UN General Assembly last month but its import lies in the rejection of direct linkage at a time when the "linkage" factor is very much under discussion in international councils.

Release of foreign nationals: India has also called for the "immediate and unconditional" release of foreign nationals in Iraqi hands. This is a veiled expression of concern and, for the first time, the implied assertion that some Indian nationals are being detained against their will by Iraq. Indian officials are unable to give specific figures in this regard.

Equally significant and in sync with the realities of the situation in the Gulf was Mr Gujral's statement that "while we recognise the complexities of the situation we hope that there will be a peaceful solution, in the interest of all." The "recognition of complexities" is a clear shift from India's earlier strong emphasis on a peaceful solution and suggests that though it remains opposed to the use of force, should it become necessary India would understand that it might be the only way out of the impasse.

Strong position: Earlier, Mr Gujral called on the president of the UAE, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, and during an hour-and-a-half-long meeting, outlined India's predicament as a result of the Iraqi invasion. This would have been an explanation to address concerns of many Gulf regimes at what they perceived as a weak-kneed stance. What finally emerged is almost as strong a position as any of the anti-Iraq regimes have adopted, save that the question of restoration of the Al-Sabah regime is left vague.

It is thoroughly appropriate that the UAE, which has, among the Gulf regimes, the closest ties with India, should have been chosen as the place to enunciate India's forthright position. Using this support for the Gulf, Mr Gujral's visit broadly sets in motion a possible new era of rectifying "a long period of neglect of the Gulf," as one delegation source said.

Mr Gujral is the first Indian Minister of any serious consequence to visit the Gulf during the period following a ceremonial visit to Oman by Mr Rajiv Gandhi in 1985. Even though the period running up to the Islamic foreign ministers meeting India sent special envoys who were clearly out their depth, including a National Front minister who preferred to move around in Bahrain in Arab dresses than gauge Gulf attitudes accurately on the tensions surrounding the Kashmir problem.

Opportunism charge rejected: Indian officials have been at pains to deny the opportunism inherent in India's Gulf crisis policy so far. "We reject any insinuation of opportunism or expediency" linking earlier positions to the fact that Indian nationals were stranded in Iraq and Kuwait, said one senior Indian spokesman. Privately, however, they admit to this link but add that several countries, even the United States have adopted positions that are still evolving.

Of great significance is India's implied support for the Gulf to take "steps that are necessary" to defend themselves. Its import lies not just in the present crisis but as a precedence for future developments of this nature. The "steps" taken by the Gulf, namely the invitation to foreign forces, are obviously militaristic. This is perhaps the first time that India has categorically supported militarisation in and around the Indian Ocean and inferred that it is in India's interest. During the Gulf war, India accepted it but did not explicitly support the presence of the U.S.-led Naval Armada.

In his speech to the UN General Assembly this year, Mr Gujral had said "a permanent foreign military presence is not desired by any country, nor would it be in anyone's interest." That implied acceptance of the U.S.-led forces. The statement made by him on Sunday in Dubayy supports the foreign presence and is not qualified by any mention of permanence.

This stance appears based on some sound assessment and advice from Indian representatives in the region and Mr Gujral's advisers in South Block and his own hands on stewardship.

The basis of "India's Gulf perestroika" is that India has vast interests to maintain and protect in the region. These go hand in hand with the order under which these interests have flourished. Officials clarify that one cannot be protected without the other. There is of course the unstated feeling, that the U.S. presence is of such resolve that whining against it is not going to make a whit of a difference.

In substance, some officials draw a close parallel between the West's need for Gulf oil and India's need to ensure a substantial export market and a vital source of inward remittances and jobs.

Joint venture with UAE: Earlier, during briefing sessions Indian officials stressed on several proposals on the anvil for joint ventures with the UAE, but there is nothing substantially new by way of a breakthrough. Instead, India has hinted that the UAE could help improve India's balance of payments position. One responsible source clarified "we cannot be as direct or opportunistic as some others—read Pakistan—but the UAE has been made aware that India's position is as bad if not more difficult as a result of the crisis."

One refreshing aspect of Mr Gujral's visit is the agreement between him and his UAE counterpart, Mr Rashid Abdullah, that both countries need to look beyond the Gulf crisis stand makes this joint approach more promising. As a result, both countries are to hold a Joint Commission meeting at a suitably high level in the second half of November in Delhi. This winning of UAE goodwill is the result of maturity on both sides and very much to credit of the unflappable Mr Gujral's lucid arguing of the need to give impetus to a historical relationship.

There are, however, some qualifying factors. Officials say it will be a great pity if domestic developments lead to a pass where it would claim a man who is truly a Foreign Minister unlike pompous politicians in India's past, who read briefs in the backseat of a car. Mr Gujral has no doubt erred in sending out special envoys to West Asia who have been unequal to the task. Hence it remains to be seen if the UAE visit could be a base to apply the palliative in other states in the region. This can only be done by one man, according to those who assist him.

#### Ministry Statement on Oil Price, Tax Increases

91AS0217A Madras THE HINDU in English  
15 Oct 90 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, 14 October—The following is the text of the statement issued by the Ministry of Finance with reference to the increase in price of petroleum products and the surcharge on corporate tax.

Following the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq, an extremely difficult political and economic situation has arisen in the Gulf. A large number of Indian citizens have been affected and have lost their livelihood. Prices of crude oil and other petroleum products, which we import, have doubled. The increase in oil price will impose an additional burden of Rs [rupees] 5,000 crores on our country in foreign exchange in the next 12 months, if the average price of crude oil is \$25 a barrel. In recent weeks, however, because of fears of a war breaking out in the Gulf, oil prices have been in the range of \$35-\$40 a barrel. If these prices prevail, the burden on us would be even greater.



Our country has successfully dealt with many difficult situations arising out of droughts, war and oil. We had successfully coped with the far greater oil stocks of 1973 and 1979. We successfully met the challenge of the drought of 1987, one of the worst in the century. The economy is also stronger today than it was a year ago. The economic situation is characterised by further growth in agricultural production, strong export growth and buoyant capital markets. Food stocks on 1 September 1990 were 17 million tonnes as against 10 million tonnes a year ago. These will increase further with the kharif procurement. Because of steps initiated in the earlier part of the year, our foreign exchange reserves on 1 September 1990 were actually higher than on 1 January 1990. (This is in contrast to a fall of Rs 1,450 crores in the first 8 months of 1989). The fiscal deficit during April-July 1990 was also Rs 1,500 crores lower than in the corresponding period of last year.

Until the Gulf crisis the underlying macro-economic situation was showing improvement. The developments in the Gulf have disturbed the emerging balance. The additional cost that we have to pay will affect the national economy, prices and the common man.

**Proposed measures:** A set of hard decisions is necessary to cope with problem. The government proposes to deal with the problem in the following ways.

A programme has been drawn up for additional exports of Rs 2,000 crores over the next 12 months. This includes exports of iron ore, surplus agricultural commodities, and certain manufactured items. Firm arrangements have already been made for additional exports of nearly Rs 1,200 crores.

Action has been initiated to reduce import of components for industries primarily catering to the domestic market, and for making greater use of export-related replenishment licenses for purposes of meeting import requirements of the industry. Similarly, import intensive and high cost projects will be discouraged, and in any case will be expected to meet their foreign exchange requirements through exports. The measures already taken are expected to lead to a reduction in the import bill by Rs 1,000 crores.

We have a very large amount of unutilised and committed external assistance in convertible foreign exchange from bilateral and multilateral sources. Much of this is tied to projects and its utilisation depends on the progress in implementation. However, a portion is also available for import of capital goods and for meeting local currency expenditure on projects. Steps are being taken to increase utilisation of external assistance. It is expected that these efforts may yield Rs 900 crores to Rs 1,000 crores by way of additional foreign exchange. The government is also in touch with friendly governments and multilateral institutions in regard to possibility of additional financing.

The Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) is entrusted with the responsibility of importing crude oil and petroleum

products. In September the IOC paid Rs 590 for every barrel of oil imported as against Rs 260 a barrel thrice in 4 months ago [as published]. This includes quantities imported under long term contracts. In view of the present high international prices, the IOC does not have sufficient rupee resources to buy the quantities of oil contracted for by it. In order to overcome the rupee problem, it has become necessary to introduce a temporary "Gulf Surcharge" of 25 percent on all petroleum products, except domestic LPG [Liquefied Petroleum Gas] cylinders, with immediate effect. It may be noted that, except for petrol, which accounts for only 6 percent of our oil consumption, our present prices of most other petroleum products are not only lower than import prices but also substantially lower than those in oil-importing countries as well as industrial countries. For example, our price of diesel is about Rs 4.10 a litre. The import price is about Rs 5.10. The price of diesel in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka is Rs 7.30 and Rs 5.60. In the U.K., France and Germany, the price ranges between Rs 11 and Rs 15.

In view of the higher subsidy on kerosene, and wide differential in the existing price of kerosene (which is Rs 2.25 a litre), and that of diesel and petrol, widespread adulteration and diversion of kerosene have been reported. The State Governments have been advised to take stringent action to prevent these malpractices.

An additional surcharge for the assessment year 1991-92 of 7 percent will be levied on corporate income tax. The receipts from this surcharge will go towards meeting the expenditure incurred on evacuation and the provision of other essential facilities for Indian citizens who were settled in the Gulf but have been forced to leave. We must give all possible help to our fellow citizens in their hour of need.

The Gulf crisis has also highlighted the need for putting our fiscal house in order. A strong fiscal situation will strengthen our capacity to meet external challenges. The government has already decided to reduce administrative uncommitted expenditure by 10 percent. Some success has been achieved in reducing the deficit. It has also been decided to impose a cut of 25 percent on petrol consumption by the Central Government and the public sector undertakings. In view of the impact of the Gulf situation, the government will redouble its efforts to maintain the fiscal balance.

**Scheme for NRIs [Nonresident Indians]:** The Reserve Bank of India has introduced a new scheme for foreign currency deposits by non-resident Indians (NRIs) in West Asia. Under this scheme, savings of NRIs are denominated in dollars and can be taken out in dollars without any prior notice. The scheme is designed to provide a safe and secure source of investment for those who are not certain about their permanent place of residence. These deposits are free of taxes. Further, it has been decided to pay an interest equivalent to the interest payable on other foreign currency deposits in case these deposits do not get withdrawn before 6 months.

Good revaluation: Gold held by RBI [Reserve Bank of India] as part of the country's foreign exchange reserves is at present valued at the rate of Rs 84.39 for 10 grams under the RBI Act, 1934. The international practice generally is to value gold at international prices, which is about Rs 2,200 for 10 grams. The gross under-valuation of gold gives a highly unrealistic picture of our total foreign exchange reserves. The relevant section of the Act is being amended to permit valuation of gold by the RBI in line with the practice followed by the Central Banks in other countries. The gold held by the RBI as part of our foreign exchange reserves, amounts to about Rs 7,200 crores at present international prices. This measure has no impact on the domestic prices of gold.

Against the background of the Gulf crisis, the government would appeal to all trade unions and associations not to undertake any industrial action that will disrupt production at this critical juncture.

Industrial units are being asked not to increase prices by taking undue advantage of the difficult situation arising out of the Gulf crisis. In the national interest, they should conserve oil, minimise inventories of imported raw materials and maximise the use of indigenous resources.

### **Akali Dal Leader Leaves Lok Sabha, Meets Press**

#### **Details of Resignation**

91AS0214A Madras THE HINDU in English  
13 Oct 90 p 4

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] New Delhi, 12 October—Parliament House today witnessed a unique drama as Mr Simranjit Singh Mann, MP [Member of Parliament] and Akali Dal (Mann) president, carrying a kirpan and a sword was refused entry and had to sit at the doorstep for almost an hour before an official came out to collect his resignation to be passed on to the Speaker.

Apparently, the security staff's refusal to allow him in took Mr Mann and his supporters by surprise because he claimed that only yesterday the Deputy Speaker had assured him that he could walk into his room with his sword to hand over his resignation.

However, as Mr Mann arrived at Parliament House at 10:30 a.m. with a few of his supporters, he was stopped at the door by the guards who said he could not go in as he was carrying a sword. Even as Mr Mann sat down at the doorstep and started his dharna his lawyer, Mr B.L. Wadhera, went inside to discuss the matter with officials.

While his lawyer was holding talks, Mr Mann upset over the "arrogance" of the officials, the deputy speaker and the secretary-general of the Lok Sabha said it was very unfortunate that they had not shown him even the basic

courtesy extended to a beggar by Indian homes. He said it was the officials who were responsible for the fear psychosis.

Mr Mann said he felt shocked that people like Mr L.K. Advani, BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] chief and MP, who was now violating the Constitution and indulging in "anti-national" activities, and Mr V.P. Singh, prime minister, who had "set the nation on fire" could walk into Parliament where as he a peace-loving person was being kept outside. "If the Constitution is not kept above politics, this country is bound to split."

He said elections were not held in Punjab on the ground that conditions were not conducive for holding a poll. But in view of the current situation, "can peaceful elections be held anywhere in the country now," he asked.

However, Mr Mann lifted his dharna around 11:20 a.m. as Mr T.S. Ahluwalia, director in the Lok Sabha secretariat, came out of the door and accepted an envelope, addressed to Mr Rabi Ray, Lok Sabha Speaker, from him.

Later, Mr Wadhera, told this reporter that Mr Mann would continue to be a member till the resignation letter was accepted. Asked if he saw any hitch in this as the letter may be conditional, he said it may not be possible for the Speaker to accept the resignation straightaway as it was a conditional resignation.

Later, at a press conference in the afternoon, Mr Mann claimed that the other MPs of his party were ready to resign but he had advised them against it. "The future course of action will be decided at the party convention scheduled to be held in Chandigarh on 18 October. [as published]

Mr Mann claimed that the passing of the 65th Constitutional amendment would alienate the people of the State even more. "The government is creating a divide among the country."

Meeting defended: Defending his meeting with the American Ambassador to India he claimed that something like the 'Marshal Plan' was required to get the State back on its feet. "There are strong lobbies in America. They will be in a position to help us. After all what is wrong in this for even Indira Gandhi had gone to the Soviet Union to seek support when she was in the doghouse."

Mr Mann said that a dangerous situation was developing in the country. "The Army is being called out to maintain law and order in the big cities. What is there to stop the Army from deciding to step in and take over the administration." However, he hastened to point out that this was not a call to the Army.

He criticised the manner in which the government had allowed Mr Advani to carry on his rath yatra. The yatra was inciting people to violence and was highly communal, he said. "This gentleman is breaking many laws

of the IPC [Indian Penal Code]. If he wants to infuse confidence in the Hindus why does he not start the rally from Amritsar or at least touch the city," Mr Mann wondered.

Asked how he could resign when he had not taken the oath, Mr Mann said that it was wrong to state that he was not a member. "For all intent and purpose I remain an MP for I had been intimidated by the returning officer that I had won the Lok Sabha seat.

### More on Press Conference

91AS0214B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA  
in English 13 Oct 90 p 15

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] New Delhi, 12 October (UNI)—The Akali Dal (Mann) president, Mr Simaranjit Singh, who resigned from the Lok Sabha today has expressed apprehension that if the "excessive deployment" of the army continued in the civil areas, there was every danger of the army taking over.

Addressing a press conference, Mr Mann said democracy was 'dyeing' in India. "The people of Punjab have lost it through the repeated extensions of president's rule in the state. The people in other states were on the verge of losing it."

Mr Mann said the situation in the country was such that the army was being invited almost in every city of the country to control law and order. This was a symptom of decaying democracy in the country, he alleged.

Asked whether it was a suggestion to the army to take over in view of the prevailing situation, Mr Mann said "Please do not misquote me."

Mr Mann said that he had submitted his resignation to protest against the government's action, depriving the people of Punjab of their democratic rights.

He said that his party's executive will meet in Amritsar on 18 October, to decide whether the party MPs [Members of Parliament] and others who had won the election from Punjab with the support of his party should also quit.

He said his party would also ask the external affairs minister, Mr I.K. Gujral, who had been elected from Jalandhar with his party's support to resign on moral ground.

The two other MPs from Punjab, Mr Kirpal Singh (Amritsar) and Mr Harbhajan Singh Lakha (Phillaur), had also won the election with his party's support, he said.

Asked about his future course of action, Mr Mann said he would fight against the "colonial" rule of the Centre in Punjab.

Mr Mann said "we have lost the hope in the Central Government and we would like that the elections in the state be held under the supervision of United Nations.

Asked whether there was any possibility of holding 'free and fair' election in the state, Mr Mann quipped "You tell me whether free and fair elections can take place in any part of the country particularly in the wake of the anti-Mandal agitation, Babri Masjid-Ramjanambhoomi controversy and Mr L.K. Advani's Rathayatra."

Mr Mann said his future course of action would be to continue his fight against the "repressive" attitude of the Central government against the Sikhs through democratic and peaceful means.

Mr Mann criticised Mr Advani's rathayatra and said that the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] president was inciting communal passions by propagating Hindu fundamentalism.

He said that if Mr Advani was so concerned about the Hindus, who according to him were insecure in Punjab, he should have undertaken his rathayatra in Punjab.

Mr Mann said extortion and violence were indulged in by state sponsored vigilante groups.

### Bangarappa Sworn In as Karnataka Chief Minister

91AS0215A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English  
18 Oct 90 p 1

[Text] Bangalore, 17 October—The Congress(I) leader, Mr S. Bangarappa, was sworn as the 12th Chief Minister of Karnataka here this evening, reports UNI [United News of India]. The governor, Mr Bhanu Pratap Singh, administered the oath of office and secrecy at an impressive ceremony held on the steps of Vidhana Soudha, the State secretariat. Mr Bangarappa was the only member to be sworn in.

With the swearing-in of Mr Bangarappa, the 8-day-old President's rule is revoked. President's rule was imposed on the State on 10 October following political uncertainty in the wake of Mr Veerendra Patil defying the Congress(I) president, Mr Rajiv Gandhi's directive to step down in view of his ill health.

With the anti-Patil group having a majority of legislators, Mr Bangarappa was elected leader of the legislature party on 13 October and he immediately staked his claim for forming the government.

PTI adds from New Delhi: The Janata Dal president, Mr S.R. Bommai, today welcomed the Centre's decision to revoke President's rule in Karnataka. In a statement in New Delhi, Mr Bommai said the government's decision indicated that the National Front Government and the Janata Dal stood for upholding the spirit of the Constitution and democratic conventions. "This is the shortest period of President rule ever imposed unlike the previous Congress regimes," Mr Bommai said.

The Congress(I) today said the developments in Karnataka leading to the revocation of President's rule obviously showed "mismanagement" by the Centre in dealing with the situation.

A party spokesman, Mr V.N. Gadgil, at his daily briefing accused the Centre of "political incompetence," besides showing total disregard for democratic norms for imposing President's rule.

### Defense Official on 'Reactive Armor' Technology

91AS0212A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA  
in English 13 Oct 90 p 28

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] Pune, 12 October—India has joined a select band of nations possessing the advanced 'reactive armour' technology, providing defence against high-speed projectiles, the scientific adviser to the defence minister, Dr V.S. Arunachalam, said there on Wednesday.

Delivering the keynote address at the 2-day national seminar on futuristic combat vehicles organised by the Institute of Armament Technology (IAT) here, Dr Arunachalam said that Israel, the USSR and perhaps Britain were the only countries known to possess this technology. The defence minister's scientific advisor was all praise for the Pune-based Explosives Research Development Laboratory (ERDL) which had developed the reactive armour technology.

Dr Arunachalam who is well-known for developing the world famous 'Kanchan' armour, noted that the reactive armour could even hold against the firing of 'hollow charges'—the most powerful anti-tank weapon presently. He also appreciated the work done by the Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) in developing the 'Fin Stabilised Armour Penetrating Destructive Sabot (FSAPDS) which was now being manufactured indigenously.

About 157 delegates from the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), public and private sector units attended the seminar.

Stating that the battle tank would continue to play an important role in modern day warfare, Professor Arunachalam elaborated on the requirements of the battle tank of the future.

Prof Arunachalam regretted that though the DRDO laboratories were doing commendable work, the nation did not possess a strong manufacturing capability. "There ought to be at least one generation of researchers, designers, engineers and manufacturers who will sit together and ensure satisfactory design-to-production capability," he said.

In his inaugural address, Air Vice Marshal Deshpande noted that with the main battle tank 'Arjun' nearing completion, it was necessary to start thinking about the

next generation of battle tanks. The seminar also discussed the future shape of things and their influence on the design and utilisation of military fighting vehicles. "We shall be primarily concentrating on the main battle tank during the deliberations of this seminar," Mr Deshpande said.

### Writer Tells Current Condition of Indian Air Force

91AS0213A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA  
in English 15 Oct 90 p 12

[Article by Vijay Mahajan, a former wing commander: "Where the IAF [Indian Air Force] Stands Today"]

[Text] The Indian Air Force [IAF], which celebrated its 58th anniversary on 8 October, has spent most of the past decade re-equipping its combat and transport squadrons. It has introduced a broad mix of both Soviet and Western designed aircraft, with the combat aircraft being roughly split between defensive and offensive roles.

The MiG-29 "Fulcrum" and Mirage 2000 H have both been earmarked for the frontline air defence. The IAF which has two squadrons of each, inducted between 1984 and 1987, ordered a third squadron of 20 single seat MiG-29s last year which are to be supplied this year. These aircraft are expected to be the first Fulcrum Cs with upgraded avionics and weapons system and will add to the 50 early-model MiG-29s, including the dual-seat UB [expansion unknown] trainer versions, pushing up the total to 70 aircraft.

Although task of the main air defence has been taken over by the newer MiG-29s and Mirage 2000s, the IAF still relies heavily on its 17 squadrons of MiG-21 FL/BIs interceptors and MiG-21 ML fighter/ground attack aircraft, which make up more than half its entire combat assets.

### Modernisation Plan

The Soviets have proposed a mid-life modernisation programme for the newer aircraft in the IAF's large inventory of well over 400 MiG-21s. The programme will cover refitting the engines, an avionics upgrade including a multi-mode radar and hud, and an increase in fuel capacity. They have also proposed an avionics update for the IAF's smaller inventory of about 160 MiG-27 ML strike aircraft on similar lines to the MiG-21. In both cases, the work will be handled by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and it is quite possible that a MiG-21 update is also in the cards.

Two major re-equipment decisions still to be made are the selection of a new advanced jet trainer and whether or not to go ahead with the production of the light combat aircraft (LCA) as a replacement for the MiG-21 in the late nineties. These plans have been seriously delayed, and the availability of adequate funding will be crucial.



### Basic Jet Trainer

The new trainers are needed to provide fresh fighter pilots graduating from the locally-designed Kiran basic jet trainer with stage III air combat and weapons delivery techniques prior to the final conversion to the Mirage of MiG-29. This 60-hour transition is currently made on aircraft that are long overdue for retirement.

Although the trainer choice has been narrowed to the BAE Hawk and Dassault-Dornier Alpha jet, with the elimination of the Aermacchi MB-339A and Czech Aero L 39 Albatros, a decision has repeatedly [been] put off over the past 3 years because of a lack of funding. The procurement of about 100 aircraft is envisaged by the IAF, most of which will be built under licence by HAL [Hindustan Aeronautics Limited].

For deep penetration strike capability, the IAF has four squadrons of BAE/Dassault international Jaguars. An initial 40 were supplied in a flyaway condition by the BAE and progressive production of another 76 is nearing completion at HAL's Bangalore facility. HAL is incorporating several improvements including updated Adour 811 engines and an advanced avionics package including the inertial navigation system and combined moving map/electronic display. Another eight Jaguars have been dedicated to maritime strike equipped with the Thomson-CSF/ESD Agave search and track radar and a Darin NAV/attack system. They are also armed with Sea Eagle long-range sea-skimming antiship missiles.

The future of the ambitious LCA [light combat aircraft] project is complicated not only by financial but also by technical factors, and the government has yet to make a final commitment to go ahead with production. The LCA, conceived as an all-weather battlefield air superiority fighter with a secondary close support mission, will form the backbone of the IAF in the nineties and beyond, replacing at least 200 MiG-21s.

### Systems Selection

The IAF wants a state-of-the-art aircraft that combines quadruplex digital fly-by-wire controls, digital NAV/attack system, full authority digital engine control and extensive use of weight-saving composites in the wing and tail sections. It would be powered by a locally-designed and developed afterburning engine, the GTX-35 VS, in the 19,000-lb thrust class.

However, after nearly 9 years, the LCA has only just entered the detailed design and systems selection stage. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), which is coordinating design and development ran into serious delays in the project definition stage and had to call in expertise from Dassault to help complete it.

### Fleet Renewal

The development of the engine by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) is also behind schedule, and the ADA has already purchased the General Electric

F 404 to power the flight test prototypes. Because of the delays in both aircraft and engine programmes, it is now thought unrealistic to expect the first LCA prototype to fly before 1995, which would push production to the late nineties. In this situation, the IAF will need an interim solution. This can be achieved by a large-scale modernisation programme for 200 or more MiG-21s to keep them flying until the LCA is ready.

The IAF continues to depend heavily on Soviet aircraft for its transport requirements, having phased out almost all of its Western-supplied aircraft as part of a large fleet renewal programme. Seven of its 12 fixed-wing squadrons are now equipped with twin turboprop Antonov AN-32s and HAL assembled HS-748s, while two more operate AN-12s and long-range Ilyushin Il-76 MD jets. The other three are to be re-equipped with 19 seater Dornier DO-228s to be built by HAL.

The most dramatic change has been the acquisition of Soviet-dedicated attack helicopters to beef up close air support capability. The IAF has a mix of about a dozen Mi-25s capable of carrying a variety of armaments. These are to be supplemented by an order of 20 Mi-35s with increased weapons-carrying updated avionics and additional anti-armour protection.

### Paper Interviews Chosen Chief of Naval Staff

91AS0216A Madras THE HINDU in English  
17 Oct 90 p 4

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] Visakhapatnam, 16 October—Achieving much more with much less, the motto of the Eastern Naval Command [ENC], will be the guiding principle of Vice-Admiral Lakshminarayana Ramdas, flag officer commanding-in-chief [FOC-in-C] of the ENC, who is shortly taking over as the chief of the Naval Staff from Admiral J.G. Nadkarni.

Spelling out his priorities during an exclusive interview with THE HINDU Admiral Ramdas expressed determination to dedicate himself to the task of building the Navy as a taut, lean, trim and, combat-ready force protecting India's shores and maritime interests.

He will be the second FOC-in-C of the ENC to adorn the highest position after Admiral Nadkarni. Admiral Ramdas is the son-in-law of the late Vice-Admiral Rama Das Katari, who was the first Indian chief of the Navy staff.

Exuding confidence he said: "I feel greatly honoured that the government has found me suitable for this challenging assignment and hope to live up to its expectations with the assured cooperation of all naval personnel, both service and civilian."

At the same time, he expected a "high degree of integrity, courage, consistency and team work" on the part of his



subordinates so that the morale of the rank and file of the force would be equally high to face any threat from any quarter.

Asked about the future responsibilities of the Navy vis-a-vis the global situation, he remarked that the current geo-strategic scenario was anything but satisfactory, and reminded everyone that the Navy was essentially designed and planned to provide the requisite security to the national and maritime interests in any formidable situation, especially the possible fallout in the neighbourhood.

The task was doubtless difficult, but not insurmountable. "I have every reason to believe that our country will be able to withstand this Gulf crisis."

Declining to comment on the common criticism that the Navy's needs were of low priority in the Defence Ministry's agenda, Admiral Ramdas cited the appointment of the Defence Expenditure Committee under the chairmanship of Mr Arun Singh to assess the needs of the three services and apportion the necessary budget.

"It is my firm belief that the country's security is not single service-oriented. All the three have a specified role to play and they are complementary," he said.

In the case of Admiral Ramdas, there is one advantage. Both he and General S.F. Rodrigues, chief of the army staff, were together in Dehradun in 1949 when the first course of the Joint Services Wing (which later became the National Defence Academy) was launched. This should augur well for better inter-services cooperation, he said. He felt that by and large the hardware requirements of the Navy were being met. On R&D and indigenisation [as published], he declared that the Navy had fully utilised the opportunities thrown by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

Indigenisation: "In fact the Navy has been singularly fortunate to have an excellent interaction with the DRDO, and many of our operational systems have been indigenised [as published] to a great extent thanks to such a fine coordination," he said.

While admitting the possibility of lack of international cooperation in respect of sharing the technology of electronic warfare and artificial intelligence because of the basic reluctance of the 'haves,' Admiral Ramdas emphasised that this should spur research in these core areas.

Asked of any proposal to make the career in Navy more attractive, he said "the Naval career is already attracting talent from all over the country. Actually, a sizable number of aspirants for the career are from land-locked States. That proves the attraction of the blue water. Every effort is being taken to make the naval career more and more attractive."

For Mrs Lalita Ramdas, his elevation is a unique experience. "Right from my birth I am associated with the

Navy, and it is indeed a rare privilege. I have fully utilised this advantage to work for the well-being of the Naval personnel and their families.

### Survey Identifies 1,051 Backward Classes

91AS0201A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English  
1 Oct 90 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, 30 September—As the controversy over the number of backward communities listed by the Mandal Commission continues, a just-concluded study by the Anthropological Survey of India [ASI] has identified 1,051 backward classes in the country, reports PTI [Press Trust of India]. (The Mandal Commission had listed more than 3,000 communities as socially and educationally backward.)

The objective of the project launched in 1985, was of course different from that of the Mandal Commission. It was to generate brief descriptive, anthropological profiles of all communities of India, the impact of change and the development process on them and the linkage that brings them together.

The study, free from political overtones, is expected to enrich knowledge on the sociological pattern of the country.

Explaining the necessity of such a project, the director general of the ASI, Mr K.S. Singh, said in an interview that there existed a large information gap about a very large number of communities of India, or the information that was there was scanty and needed to be updated.

The project was also in accordance with the objective of the ASI which has been pursuing bio-cultural researches among different population groups since its inception 45 years ago, Mr Singh said. The ASI's objective had been re-defined in the policy resolution adopted in 1985 which committed it to the survey of "the human surface of India," he said.

The ASI has been able to identify, locate and write on 4,384 communities, including 443 Scheduled Castes, 426 Scheduled Tribes, 1,051 backward classes, and other communities.

"We have been able to prepare probably the most comprehensive lists of communities with all their ramifications such as subgroups, divisions, clans, lineages, surnames and titles," Mr Singh said.

The ASI is releasing its data called "People of India" tomorrow for scrutiny and further discussion. As the data is still being analysed it will not be appropriate to mention any findings conclusively, he said.

However, a few trends are available:

—The study reveals the strength and continuity of regional identities which go back to the pre-historic

times, in terms of morphological and genetic characteristics of populations, language and literature, material culture, food habits, rituals, folklore, local forms of religion, fairs and festivals etc. These regional identities are primarily secular, according to the study.

- The communities, no matter how ranked they are, share the regional space and ethos. This explains why about 80-90 percent of the communities of India are within the boundaries of Indian States and Union Territories, which were reorganized on the basis of language. These are thus linguistic-cultural and social identities, largely homogenous. Only about 10 percent of communities are spread over more than one State or the adjoining area of States. They consist of traders, merchants, artisans, minorities and so on.

There are few communities which do not consider themselves migrants. Every community recalls its migration in its folklore and history, set off by famines, wars, political and sheer necessity.

The whole of India is a kshetra, and an Indian is a migrant par excellence. The immigrants accepted regional ethos. Their role in promoting the development of regional languages and literature, building economy is well known, the study emphasizes.

- Caste and jati have none become rigid in their "political" role, but they have been dynamic entities when seen in the historical context, and in contemporaneous terms of a caste's perception of itself, its role, its relationship with others and with environment.

There has been a good deal of occupational mobility and change in spite of continuity. Segments of a community have moved away from traditional moorings or a section of a community has given up its traditional occupation, and/or adopted a new technology.

There is an all-pervasive sense of Indianness often elusive and indefinable but ever present. In words of Jawaharlal Nehru, Indianness has been a matter of feeling, a dream, a vision, an emotion. In terms of prosaic anthropological concepts it represents sharing of ethos and environment, a way of life and a world of rituals and fairs and festivals with their local meanings, of interaction in many ways, says the study.

Mr Singh said that the ASI prepared a list of all communities based on the lists of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes drawn up by the State Governments and the Centre, and of other communities mentioned in the earlier ethnographic surveys.

He said the project covered the entire nation bringing within the ambit such parts of the country that had not been ethnographically surveyed earlier or where the survey had been perfunctory.

The data collected has been put on computer and its descriptive part is now available in about 110 volumes. About 394 scholars participated in the project, including about 197 from 26 institutions which included university departments of anthropology, tribal research institutes, and other research organizations, he said.

The investigators spent 24,800 days in the field and interviewed 21,536 people of whom 5353 were women, he said.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

#### SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.